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1. While the focus of this article is on the Sovereign Immunity Act, many of the
decisions addressed are governed by the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act ("Torts
Claims Act"), Act of October 5, 1980, P.L. 693, No. 142, §221(1), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8541-
8564 (1990). Pennsylvania courts have found it instructive to review the case law
interpreting the Torts Claims Act for guidance when determining the scope of liability
resulting from the Sovereign Immunity Act's waivers. See Snyder v. Harmon, 562 A.2d 307
(Pa. 1989); Downing v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 610 A.2d 535, 537 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1992)(citing Buschman v. Druck, 590 A.2d 53 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991)). But cf. Goryeb v.
Department of Public Welfare, 575 A.2d 545, 549 n.18 (Pa. 1990) ("Since we have
determined this case on other grounds, we need not decide if acts of others are to be treated
the same under the Sovereign Immunity Act as the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act."
Id.)
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Queens Never Make Bargains
'3
Prior to 1978, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ("Common-
wealth"), its agencies and employees were immune from suits ex-
cept for those instances in which the General Assembly, pursuant
to article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution had waived
the immunity bar.3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court succinctly
stated that immunity "is the prerogative of a sovereign to be ex-
empt from coercion by action; for jurisdiction implies superiority,
and a sovereign can have no superior."'
Following the supreme court's abrogation of sovereign immu-
nity,' the General Assembly reaffirmed immunity for the Common-
wealth and Commonwealth parties.6 This article presents a history
of the Sovereign Immunity Act ("Act")7 and surveys the significant
court decisions interpreting the Act and the waivers it contains.
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW
A. History of Sovereign Immunity
Unless otherwise prescribed by statutory exception, the Com-
monwealth, its agencies and instrumentalities are immune from
2. LEwis CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE LOOKING-
GLASS, 237 (1872 and reprint 1965).
3. Mayle v. Department of Highways, 388 A.2d 709, 716 (Pa. 1978).
4. O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187, 189 (1851).
5. Mayle, 388 A.2d at 719.
6. Act of September 28, 1978, Pa.Laws 788, No. 152, § 1, 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2310
(Supp. 1992).
7. Act of October 5, 1980, Pa.Laws 693, No. 142, § 221(1), as amended, 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 8521-8528 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
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suit.8 The sovereign. immunity doctrine originated in English com-
mon law and was embodied in the maxim "the King can do no
wrong."' Although it is supposed that this maxim may have been a
misinterpretation of the law,' 0 by the mid-13th century it was ac-
cepted that the Crown could not be sued unless it consented to
suit."
The extension of "the King can do no wrong" to common law
tort immunity for municipalities lies in an early misrepresenta-
tion 2 of the English case Russell v. Men of Devon.'s There it was
held an action would not lie against an unnamed group of men
residing together because "all civil suits. .. must either be brought
against individuals ... particularly named, or against corporations
.... This mode of bringing actions against large bodies of men
would render nugatory the privileges of the Crown of creating cor-
porations, and would destroy the mode of suing corporations in
their corporate capacity.' 14 Through reliance by other courts,' 5 this
decision became the rationale for municipal tort immunity.' 6
In Pennsylvania, the doctrine of sovereign immunity was origi-
nally recognized in the case of Respublica v. Sparhawk.7 In Spar-
hawk, suit was brought to recover the value of flour which had
been relocated by the Pennsylvania Board of War during the Rev-
olutionary War. The relocation was to prevent capture of supplies
if the British should occupy Philadelphia. 18 The Pennsylvania
8. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2310 (Supp. 1992); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(a) (1990).
9. Mayle, 388 A.2d at 710.
10. Id. While there is some authority that the doctrine was partially based on the
maxim "the King can do no wrong," there is evidence that the maxim originally meant that
the King was not privileged to do wrong. Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in
Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 1-2 (1924).
11. Mayle, 388 A.2d at 710. The United States Supreme Court also embraced this
maxim in Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. 386 .(1850), wherein it stated: "[n]o maxim is
thought to be better established, or more universally assented to, than that which ordains
that a sovereign ... cannot ex delicto be amenable to its own creatures or agents employed
under its own authority for the fulfillment of merely its own legitimate ends." Hill, 50 U.S.
at 389. See also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 241-43. Clearly, immunity for gov-
ernmental activities, at the local, state and national levels, was a concept firmly established
in society's legal framework. In the Commonwealth, it would remain undisturbed for over a
century, sustaining itself against attacks as if held and supported by the strength of two
hard thumbs.
12. Mayle, 388 A.2d at 713.
13. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
14. Russell, 100 Eng. Rep. at 360.
15. See Mayle, 388 A.2d at 713.
16. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8541 (1990).
17. 1 Dall. 357, 362 (Pa. 1788).
18. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. at 357.
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Board of War ("Board of War"), acting under the recommenda-
tions of the Continental Congress, had ordered the removal of vari-
ous supplies "to a place of security." 19 The Board of War empha-
sized that the removal would not divest the citizenry of its right to
the property. This decision indicated that the Board of War would
be liable to the owners for the supplies "provided they were not
exposed to be taken by the enemy."20
The supplies, including 323 barrels of flour owned by Sparhawk,
were removed to a depot in the Chestnut Hill section of Philadel-
phia.21 The British did not advance as rapidly as expected and
ninety-six barrels of flour had been re-delivered to Sparhawk
before the British took control of the depot and, with it, the re-
maining 227 barrels of flour.2 2 After the war, Sparhawk presented a
bill to the Board of War, demanding compensation for the flour.2 "
The Sparhawk court initially noted that the transaction oc-
curred during a state of war, and consequently could not be con-
sidered a trespass.2 4 Under such circumstances, the court held that
the plaintiff must bear his own loss because "it is better to suffer a
private mischief, than a public inconvenience. ... 5 In short, the
court concluded that on balance, the public coffers could not be
compromised even where an individual would suffer loss attributa-
19. Id. On April 13, 1777, the Pennsylvania Board of War requested the citizens of
each ward of Philadelphia "to obtain from every family a return of the provisions, & c., then
in possession, and the number of persons that composed the families, respectively, in order
that proper measures might be pursued for removing any unnecessary quantity of supplies
to a place of security." Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 358.
22. Id.
23. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. at 357.
24. Id. at 362.
25. Id. The court noted striking examples for the cited principle, including the fact
that a man could go through a private enclosure while a public road was under repair (citing
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARiEs, 36); bulwarks may be built on private land during
wartime (citing Dyer 8; Brook., Trespass, 213; 5 Bac. Abr. 175); additionally, servants and
horses are permitted on the banks of navigable waters for towing purposes (citing 1 Ld.
Raym. 725); foxes may be pursued onto another's ground, because the destruction of such
animals is for the public good (citing 2 Buls. 62; Cro. Jac. 321); and houses may be razed to
prevent the spread of fire for the public good (citing Dyer 36; Rud. L. and Eq. 312). On this
last point, the court stated:
We find, indeed, a memorable instance of folly recorded in the 3 Vol. of Claren-
don's History, where it is mentioned, that the Lord Mayor of London, in 1666, when
that city was on fire, would not give directions for, nor consent to, the pulling down
forty wooden houses, or to the removing the furniture, & c., belonging to the lawyers
of the temple, then on the circuit, for fear he should be answerable for a trespass; and
in consequence of this conduct, half that great city was burnt.
Sparhawk, 1 Dall. at 362.
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ble, at least in part, to the action of a public servant.
The above rationale received support in the matter of Black v.
Rempublicam.2 6 This case arose after Pennsylvania galley captains
appropriated private provisions to feed their own troops while flee-
ing from the British across the Delaware River.27 The Black court
found no cause of action because Sparhawk precluded recovery in
tort.28
In Chisholm v. Georgia,29 the United States Supreme Court held
that Article III of the United States Constitution" gave the federal
court jurisdiction over suits against a state by a citizen of another
state whether or not the state had consented to the suit.3 1 As a
result of this case and in response to the economic fear that many
suits of this nature would eventually bankrupt state treasuries, the
Eleventh Amendment was passed.3 2 This amendment denied fed-
eral jurisdiction to entertain suits against a state by citizens of an-
other state.33 After the passage of this amendment, the Supreme
26. 1 Yeates 139 (Pa. 1792).
27. Black, 1 Yeates at 139-140. The captains had promised to compensate the land-
owners for the provisions. Id. The court held that the captains had no authority to contract
and so recovery under a breach of contract theory was barred. Id.
28. Id. at 140.
29. 2 Dall. 419 (1793). Chisholm, a citizen of South Carolina, sued the State of Geor-
gia, invoking jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution which extends the judicial
power to controversies between states and citizens of other states. Id. The State of Georgia
contended that while a state might sue a citizen of another state in the federal court, the
state could not be sued. Id. The United States Supreme Court disagreed holding that the
state could in fact be sued under Article III of the Constitution. Id. at 430-431.
30. Article III of the United States Constitution declares that "[tjhe judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Section 2 of
Article III provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; -to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Min-
isters and Consuls; -to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; -to Con-
troversies to which the United States shall be a Party; -to Controversies between
two or more States; -between a State and Citizens of another State; -between Citi-
zens of different States; -between Citizens of the same State, claiming Lands under
Grants of different States; and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
31. Chisholm, 2 Dall. at 430-431.
32. See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT & SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, 65-67
n. 99 (1972); see also Fleming James, Jr., Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their
Officers, 22 U.CHI.L.REv. 610 (1955).
33. The Eleventh Amendment states that "[tihe Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any other suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Sub-
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Court, in Hans v. Louisiana,s" held that a suit against a state by its
own citizens could not be maintained in the federal courts unless
that state had consented to it. a5
The 1851 case of O'Connor v. Pittsburgh," heralded the formal
adoption of sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court in O'Connor held that sovereign immunity was
unaffected by the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 or the Penn-
sylvania Constitution of 1776.17 Rather, the court viewed the doc-
trine as part of the law of the Commonwealth, inherent in the con-
cept of a state body, requiring neither legislative nor constitutional
enactment."8
Prior to the 1890s, the notion of sovereign immunity had rooted
jects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
34. 134 U.S. 1 (1889).
35. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10. The Court first noted that the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution forbids a citizen of another state or a foreign state to sue a state and that this
rule had been established by recent cases in the Supreme Court. Id. After reviewing the
history surrounding the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court in Hans looked to
the reason behind the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and its application to a suit by
an individual against his own state, noting the following:
The reason against it is as strong in this case as it was in that. It is an attempt to
strain the Constitution and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of.
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was understood
to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the federal courts,
whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly
repelled? Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had ap-
pended to it a proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a State from
being sued by its own citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States: can we imagine that it would have been adopted by the States? The
supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on its face.
Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
36. 18 Pa. 187 (1851).
37. O'Connor, 18 Pa. at 189-190. As the O'Connor court noted:
[Ilt is the prerogative of a sovereign to be exempt from coercion by action; for juris-
diction implies superiority, and a sovereign can have no superior. At the declaration
of American independence, prerogatives which did not concern the person, state, and
dignity of the king, but such as had been held by him in trust for his subjects, were
assumed by the people here and exercised immediately by themselves; among the
rest, unwisely I think, the prerogative of refusing to do justice on compulsion.
Id.
38. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court initially explained, "[tihat a suit cannot be
maintained against the state without its consent, is shown by the statute which enabled
Pennsylvania claimants to sue the state for the value of lands ceded to Connecticut claim-
ants within the seventeen townships in Luzerne County." Id. The court went on to note:
Yet it must be admitted that, while it is inequitable to injure the property of an
individual for the benefit of the many, it would be impossible for a corporation to
bear the pressure of successive common law actions for the continuance of a nuisance,
each verdict being more severe than the preceding one.
Id. at 189-190. See also Mayle v. Department of Highways, 388 A.2d 709, 719 (Pa. 1978).
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itself deeply in the judicial system of Pennsylvania."9 Cases dis-
missed based on sovereign immunity were appealed to the supreme
court, with the request that the court abolish sovereign immu-
nity.40 The court refused,4' believing its hands were tied by article
I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution."2
The controversy over sovereign immunity is centered upon the
interpretation of article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion which states, in relevant part:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands,
goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and
right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be
brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in
such cases as the [General Assembly] may by law direct.
4
Surprisingly, not until more than 140 years after the Constitution
of 1790 and more than 80 years after judicial adoption of sovereign
immunity in Pennsylvania, was there a judicial statement that ar-
ticle I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution embodied the
principle that "the state may not be sued without its consent".44
39. See, e.g., Fitler v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa. 406 (1858).
40. See, e.g., Smeltz v. Copeland, 269 A.2d 466 (Pa. 1970); Flinchbaugh v. Spera Con-
str. Co., 264 A.2d 708 (Pa. 1970); Laughner v. County of Allegheny, 261 A.2d 607 (Pa. 1970);
Thomas v. Baird, 252 A.2d 653 (Pa. 1969); Rader v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 182
A.2d 199 (Pa. 1962).
41. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Orsatti Inc., 292 A.2d 313 (Pa. 1972); Conrad v. De-
partment of Highways, 272 A.2d 470 (Pa. 1971); Meagher v. Commonwealth, 266 A.2d 684
(Pa. 1970); Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 190 A.2d 111 (Pa. 1963); Smeltz v.
Copeland, 269 A.2d 466 (Pa. 1970); Perkins v. Johnstown City, Pennsylvania, 271 A.2d 340
(Pa. 1970); Laughner v. County of Allegheny, 261 A.2d 607 (Pa. 1970); Thomas v. Baird, 252
A.2d 653 (Pa. 1969); Bannard v. New York State Natural Gas Corp., 172 A.2d 306 (Pa.
1961); Stoufer v. Morrison, 162 A.2d 378 (Pa. 1960); Commonwealth v. Berks County, 72
A.2d 129 (Pa. 1950).
42. Brown v. Commonwealth, 305 A.2d 868, 871 (Pa. 1973). In Brown, the court
stated "[wihether the doctrine of sovereign immunity should be modified in this Common-
wealth is a legislative question. We could not base a contrary holding upon our impatience
with the Legislature's failure to act as speedily and as comprehensively as we believe it
should." Brown, 305 A.2d at 871.
43. PA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
44. Bell Tel. Co. v. Lewis, 169 A. 571 (Pa. 1934). Bell addressed a petition for declar-
atory judgment against the Governor of the Commonwealth under the Declaratory Judg-
ments Act of June 18, 1923, Pa. Laws 840, 12 P.S. 831. Bell sought to construct a telephone
line across a bridge belonging to the State without taking out a license in the manner re-
quired by the Acts of June 1, 1931, Pa. Laws 350, § 1 (current version at PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
71, § 194(a) (1993)), and May 21, 1931, Pa. Laws 147, § 1 (current version at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 36, § 2934 (1993)), both of which required the approval of the Governor and permitted
the license to be revoked upon six month's notice. As the court noted "[iun essence, the
proceeding is against the Commonwealth. It is the owner of the bridge. That the State may
not be sued without its consent is fundamental." Bell, 169 A. at 571 (citations omitted).
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However, as late as 1963, judges did not use case law to support
the proposition that the Commonwealth is immune from suit ab-
sent legislative consent.46 Only since 1963 has the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court regularly stated that the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity was judicially compelled.""
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity in the case of Mayle v. Department of High-
ways 7 . The supreme court concluded that the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity in the Commonwealth rested upon common law
evolution which was wholly within the power of the courts to al-
ter.4 This was in sharp contrast to prior reasoning concluding that
the doctrine gathered its authority from constitutional founda-
tions. 9 In direct response to the decision in Mayle,5° the Pennsyl-
vania General Assembly passed the Sovereign Immunity Act,51
In 1919, the supreme court relied upon article I, section 11 in a sovereign immunity mat-
ter in the case of Collins v. Commonwealth, 106 A. 229 (1919). However, Collins states that
the constitutional provision authorized the General Assembly to waive immunity but it does
not state that the constitution requires sovereign immunity in the absence of legislative
action. Collins, 106 A. at 232.
45. See, e.g., Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 190 A.2d 111 (Pa. 1963).
46. See, e.g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 370 A.2d 1163 (Pa. 1977); Zerby v. Depart-
ment of Transp., 346 A.2d 914 (Pa. 1975); Williams v. Commonwealth, 333 A.2d 924 (Pa.
1975); Sweigard v. Department of Transp., 309 A.2d 374 (Pa. 1973); Biello v. Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board, 301 A.2d 849 (Pa. 1973); Meagher v. Commonwealth, 266 A.2d 684
(Pa. 1970).
47. 388 A.2d 709 (Pa. 1978).
48. Mayle, 388 A.2d at 720. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
The question before us is whether the Commonwealth is immune from tort liability
except where a legislative act expressly or implicitly authorizes suit. This rule of 'sov-
ereign immunity' has been recently upheld by this Court. [footnote omitted.] We to-
day abrogate this doctrine of 'sovereign immunity.' We conclude that the doctrine is
unfair and unsuited to the times and that this Court has power to abolish the
doctrine.
Id. at 709-10.
After a review of the sovereign immunity doctrine and its history in the Commonwealth,
the court "abolish[ed] the doctrine of sovereign immunity and overrule[d] all inconsistent
cases." Id. at 720. In Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 305 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1973), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had abrogated the judicially created doctrine of governmental
immunity applicable to political subdivisions. In response thereto, the General Assembly
enacted the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8541-8564 (1982).
49. See note 41 and cases cited therein.
50. See Historical Note, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §8522(b) (1982), Section 5(a) and
Historical Note, 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §2310, Section 5(a) (Supp. 1993) stating that "[tihis
act is intended to specifically respond to and prescribe limitations on the decision of Mayle
v. Commonwealth, decided by the Supreme Court on July 14, 1978." Id.
51. Act of September 28, 1978, 1978 Pa. Laws 788, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5521-5538
(1990 & Supp. 1992).
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which was subsequently amended by Act 152.52
The constitutionality of the Sovereign Immunity Act was put to
the test in Marino v. Seneca Homes, Inc.5 3 In Marino, the Act was
challenged based on the language in article I, section 11 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. 4 In upholding the statute, the court
concluded that the legislation was rationally related to legitimate
government objectives of providing compensation to victims of cer-
tain enumerated government torts while at the same time protect-
ing the public treasury from insolvency.55 Indeed, the Act has sur-
vived constitutional challenges grounded upon the federal and
state Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses,5" as well as article
52. Statutory. provisions relating to sovereign immunity now appear at 1 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 2310 (Supp. 1992) and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8521-8528 (1990).
53. 439 A.2d 1287 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981), appeal dismissed, 451 A.2d 444 (Pa. 1982).
54. See note 43 and accompanying text.
55. Marino, 439 A.2d at 1290-91. The commonwealth court relied upon the reasoning
in Carroll v. County of York, 437 A.2d 394 (Pa. 1981), which addressed a constitutional
challenge to the validity of sections 8541-8564 of the Judicial Code, 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 8541-8564 (1990). In Carroll, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that its func-
tion was not "to displace a rationally based legislative judgment." Carroll, 437 A.2d at 397.
The commonwealth court, in addressing the constitutional challenge to the adoption of the
Sovereign Immuiity Act, referred to the supreme court's language, stating that although the
Pennsylvania Constitution at article I, section 11 was not intended to grant constitutional
immunity to the Commonwealth, the language did give the General Assembly authority to
choose areas in which the Commonwealth would be immune from suit. Marino, 439 A.2d at
1290-91. The court concluded that "the reasoning in Carroll disposes of the constitutional
challenge here asserted." Id. at 1291.
56. See Picariello v. Commonwealth, 421 A.2d 477 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980). In Pi-
cariello, the plaintiff challenged the validity of Act 152 under the Pennsylvania and federal
constitutions asserting that Act 152 denied him due process and equal protection under the
14th Amendment. Picariello, 421 A.2d at 479. The court concluded that Act 152 "is ration-
ally related to legitimate government objectives." Id. at 480. The legitimate government
objectives were explained as follows:
A specified, limited waiver of sovereign immunity allows an actuarial evaluation of
potential costs and promotes efforts to insure against potential liability. A balance
must be struck between unlimited potential liability and the need for fiscal security.
Full monetary responsibility for the tortious conduct of its agencies and employees
involves the risk of an intolerable tax burden. Act 152 allows compensation of victims
of certain enumerated government torts while at the same time protecting the public
treasury from insolvency. The [General Assembly] legitimately may take steps to pre-
serve sufficient public funds to guarantee that the government will be able to con-
tinue to provide those services which it believes benefits the citizenry.
Id. at 480.
With respect to the equal protection claim, the plaintiff based his argument on the alleged
unequal treatment of a plaintiff based on the status of the pa ty sued. The court concluded
that since neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right was urdened, the legislative clas-
sification resulting in the inequality must be sustained provi led a rational relationship to
the legitimate government interest existed to justify it. Id. at 180 (citing Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)). The court again looked to the above factors as providing "a
rational basis for the distinction drawn by Act 152 between governmental and non-govern-
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I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Under the present
law, nine categories exist wherein "the King can do wrong. '
B. The Sovereign Immunity Act: An Overview
Determining the applicability of Sovereign Immunity Act waiv-
ers to any particular case requires an initial analysis of the
mechanics of the Act itself. Courts generally employ a three-
pronged test 58: first, the plaintiff must demonstrate that at com-
mon law or by statute, absent an immunity defense, a party could
be held liable for the harm alleged; second, the injury must have
been caused by an act of an agent or an employee acting within the
course and scope of his employment;9 third, the claim must fall
within one of the listed exceptions. When interpreting the waiver
provisions, courts adhere to the mandates of the Statutory Con-
struction Act of 1972,60 discussed below.
In general, if a statute does not define a word or the word is not
mental tortfeasors . . . ." Picariello, 421 A.2d at 480.
57. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(1-9) (1990). See also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5725
(1983) which waives immunity in certain circumstances for abuse of electronic surveillance
activity.
58. See Mascaro v. Youth Study Ctr., 523 A.2d 1118, 1121-23 (Pa. 1987).
59. This requirement puts into effect the Office of the Attorney General's obligation
to defend, provided for in 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8525 (1990). Pursuant to section 8525, when
an action is brought against an employee of the Commonwealth, and the act of that em-
ployee which gave rise to the claim is alleged to have been within the scope of the office or
duties of the employee, the commonwealth party, through the Attorney General, is required
to defend the action unless the Attorney General determines that the act did not occur
within the scope of office or duties of the employee. If the commonwealth party employee
acted within the scope of his or her employment and has a judgment entered against him or
her, the commonwealth party is obligated to pay that judgment. However, the common-
wealth party is not liable to defend or reimburse an employee who commits an intentional
tort, even when the employee was acting within the scope of his or her authority.
See Freedman v. City of Allentown, 562 A.2d 1012 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989). In Freedman,
the deceased was arrested for possible violations of Pennsylvania prescription laws. Id. at
1013. After questioning, Allentown police placed the deceased in an isolated cell where
within less than an hour, he committed suicide by hanging himself in the cell. Id. His family
brought suit specifically alleging that the deceased's parole officer held the position of a
"related health care personnel" who had previous knowledge of the deceased's mental disor-
ders and suicidal tendencies and that the officer recklessly and negligently failed to pass
along that knowledge to the Allentown police department. Id. The commonwealth court
concluded that willful misconduct had not been shown, and therefore the protection af-
forded by sovereign immunity remained. Id. at 1015. The court went on to note that willful
misconduct is defined as "conduct whereby the actor desired to bring about the result that
followed or at least was aware that it was certain to follow, so that such desire can be
implied." Freedman, 562 A.2d at 1015, (citations omitted). See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8525
(1990); Wiehagen v. Borough of North Braddock, 594 A.2d 303 (Pa. 1991).
60. Act of December 6, 1972, 1972 Pa. Laws 1339, No. 290, 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1501-
1991 (1975 & Supp. 1993).
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defined in the general definitions section of the Consolidated Stat-
utes,6 it is the responsibility of the courts to derive the intent of
the General Assembly's use of the word. 2 Courts have strictly con-
strued the immunity waivers in the Sovereign Immunity Act.0 3
For example, in Davidow v. Anderson"" an action was brought
against the Commonwealth and others as a result of a boating acci-
dent. The Davidows asserted that an agreement entered into be-
tween the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Pennsylvania
Fish Commission established a commonwealth interest in the care,
custody or control of certain buoys,65 thereby waiving sovereign
immunity pursuant to section 8522(b)(3).66 The court determined
that the lake was not owned by the Commonwealth and pointed
out that the Army Corps of Engineers had assumed responsibility
for providing, installing and maintaining the buoys in question. 7
61. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1991 (1975 & Supp. 1992) as amended.
62. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(a) (1975).
63. See, e.g., Mascaro v. Youth Study Ctr., 523 A.2d 1118, 1121-23 (Pa. 1987).
64. 476 A.2d 998 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
65. Davidow, 476 A.2d at 999. At the time of the accident, the Pennsylvania Fish
Commission, pursuant to a memorandum of understanding executed between it and the
United States Army Engineering District, was responsible for, inter alia, enforcing the boat-
ing rules and regulations on Raystown Lake, which was built and owned by the federal
government. According to the Davidows, the memorandum of understanding created a Com-
monwealth interest in the property permitting an action under 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 8522(b)(3) (current version at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(3) (1990)). Id. at 999-1000.
The court concluded that the memorandum of understanding did not bring the Fish Com-
mission within the exception to immunity at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(3). Id. at 1001.
66. Davidow, 476 A.2d at 999. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(3) (1990) provides a lim-
ited waiver of sovereign immunity in cases arising out of the care, custody or control of
personal property. Pursuant to this subsection, a negligence action may be brought against
the Commonwealth for:
The care, custody or control of personal property in the possession or control of com-
monwealth parties, including commonwealth-owned personal property and property
of persons held by a commonwealth agency, except that the sovereign immunity of
the Commonwealth is retained as a bar to actions on claims arising out of Common-
wealth agency activities involving the use of nuclear and other radioactive equipment,
devices and materials.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(3) (1990). This waiver is discussed in notes 365-405 and ac-
companying text.
67. Davidow, 476 A.2d at 1001. As the court stated:
[Blecause the Corp of Engineers, pursuant to the aforementioned agreement, as-
sumed responsibility for providing, installing, and maintaining the buoys, and the
Commission was obligated merely to consult the engineers concerning, inter alia, the
marking of the buoys, we cannot say that the buoys were under the custody or control
of the Commission within the meaning of 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(3). See
Vaughn v. Department of Public Welfare, 46 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 101, 405 A.2d
1119 (1979).
Davidow, 476 A.2d at 1001.
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Finding that the buoys were not under the custody or control of
the Commission within the meaning of section 8522(b)(3), 6" the
court noted that while the agreement gave the Commission prime
authority and responsibility for enforcing and establishing fishing
and boating laws on the lake upon which the Davidow accident
occurred, 69 the lake itself was neither owned nor leased by the
Commonwealth. 70 The court indicated that it was obligated to con-
strue the statute strictly7' and concluded that absent actual owner-
ship or actual leasehold of the lake by the Commission,7 the ac-
tion did not come within the ambit of section 8522(b)(3).
7 3
The strict interpretation of the Sovereign Immunity Act and its
exceptions was again put to the test in Love v. City of Philadel-
phia.74 In Love, an elderly woman alighting from a city-owned van,
fell and landed in the street.7 5 The woman filed an action against
the city alleging that an employee of the city acting within the
scope of his employment negligently caused her injuries.7 1 The trial
court found in favor of Mrs. Love, 77 the commonwealth court re-
68.. See note 66.
69. Davidow, 476 A.2d at 1000.
70. Id. at 1001. The commonwealth court also addressed whether the Davidow's
claim fell within the real estate exception to sovereign immunity, found at 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. §8522(b)(4) (1990). Answering in the negative, the court stated:
We also believe that the Memorandum of Understanding does not bring the Commis-
sion within 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 8522(b)(4). The lake is neither owned nor leased by
the Commonwealth. The Davidows would admit this, of course, but they contend that
the agreement creates a Commonwealth interest tantamount to ownership or to a
leasehold. For the reasons already mentioned concerning our obligation to construe
the statute strictly, however, we must hold that, absent actual ownership or an actual
leasehold, the Commission does not come within the ambit of 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 8522(b)(4).
Id.
71. Davidow, 476 A.2d at 1001.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 543 A.2d 531 (Pa. 1988).
75. Love, 543 A.2d at 531.
76. Id. at 532.
77. Id. At the trial court level, the action was tried without a jury. At the conclusion
of the trial, the judge entered a verdict against the city in the amount of $375,000. The court
concluded that the injuries were caused by the employee's negligence and that the action
fell within the "motor vehicle" exception to the Tort Claims Act, which provides:
The following acts by a local agency or any of its employees may result in the imposi-
tion of liability on a local agency:
(1) Vehicle liability-The operation of any motor vehicle in the possession or control
of the local agency. As used in this paragraph, 'motor vehicle' means any vehicle
which is self-propelled and any attachment thereto, including vehicles operated by
rail, through water or in the air.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542(b)(1) (1982).
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versed,7" and the supreme court affirmed the commonwealth
court.7 The supreme court determined that at the time Mrs. Love
alighted from the van, the city employee was not involved in the
"operation of a motor vehicle" under section 8542(b)(1)." ° The
court relied upon the definition of the word "operate" in Black's
Law Dictionary8l and the Oxford English Dictionary, 2 in reaching
its decision.8 According to the court in Love, to operate something
means to actually put it in motion."4
To date, the courts have continued to strictly construe the ex-
ceptions to sovereign immunity. 5 Additionally, the courts have an-
alyzed issues concerning the applicability of the sovereign immu-
nity defense to particular persons and what constitutes a
"commonwealth party" under the Act. These issues are discussed
below.
C. Who is Entitled to Sovereign Immunity?
A preliminary issue in analyzing the Sovereign Immunity Act is
to determine who is entitled to assert the immunity privilege. The
pertinent language is found at section 8522(a), which sets forth the
waivers to sovereign immunity. These waivers are applicable "to an
action against [c]ommonwealth parties, for damages arising out of
78. Love, 543 A.2d at 532. The commonwealth court concluded that the city was im-
mune from suit and held that the facts of the case did not fall under the "motor vehicle"
exception. Id.
79. Id. at 533. The court summarized the issue as follows:
[T]he issue is the confining question of whether a political subdivision is immunized
from suit when one is so injured, notwithstanding what may be the actual tort of
their employees. The [General Assembly], for reasons of policy, reasons we are not
entitled to dilute for sympathy or even outrage at specific instances of blatant tort,
has decided that such an immunity does exist, and we must abide, sometimes leaving
dreadful injuries, negligently inflicted, uncompensated.
Love, 543 A.2d at 533 (citations omitted).
80. Id.
81. Id. Black's Law Dictionary defines the word "operate" as follows, "[t]his word,
when used with relation to automobiles, signifies a personal act in working the mechanism
of the automobile . . . . (citations omitted)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 984 (rev. 5th ed.
1979). Black's further defines "operation" as "the process of operating or mode of action."
Id.
82. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, Volume VII 144 (1933).
83. Love, 543 A.2d at 532-533.
84. Id. at 533. The court in Love stated,"[t]hus, according to the common and ap-
proved usage of the word 'operation', the van was not in operation at the time of Mrs.
Love's accident. Getting into or alighting from a vehicle are merely acts ancillary to the
actual operation of that vehicle." Id.
85. See, e.g., Snyder v. Harmon, 562 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1989); Serrano v. Pennsylvania
State Police, 568 A.2d 1006 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
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a negligent act . "...86
The term "commonwealth party" is defined to include both com-
monwealth agencies and employees thereof, provided the employ-
ees' actions fall within the scope of their office or employment.87
The term "commonwealth agency" includes "[a]ny executive
agency or independent agency."'8 An "executive agency" includes
"the [g]overnor and the departments, boards, commissions, author-
ities and other officers and agencies of the Commonwealth govern-
ment .... ,"se The independent agencies "are those "[b]oards, com-
missions, authorities, agencies and officers . . . which are not
subject to the policy, supervision and control of the [g]overnor...
,,90 The term does not include the General Assembly, or officers or
agencies of the General Assembly or of the judiciary.91
The status of various regional transportation authorities, the
Turnpike Commission, and certain state-relatedcolleges has been
analyzed to determine whether these parties are commonwealth
agencies. In Feingold v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transporta-
tion Authority, 2 the supreme court held that the Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) was a common-
wealth agency."3 The supreme court quoted the language of the
Mass Transit Law,94 which described all transportation authorities
under the Mass Transit Law as exercising "the public powers of
the Commonwealth as an agency and instrumentality thereof."9 5
In Marshall v. Port Authority of Allegheny County,96 the Port
Authority of Allegheny County ("Authority") was also defined as a
commonwealth agency for purposes of the Sovereign Immunity
86. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(a) (1990); see notes 254-68 and accompanying text.
87. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8501 (1990). Note also that, pursuant to section 8953(d),
any municipal police officer who responds to a request for aid or assistance from a state law
enforcement officer shall be considered an employee of the Commonwealth. 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 8953(d) (1990).




92. 517 A.2d 1270 (Pa. 1986)
93. Feingold, 517 A.2d at 1276. See also Toombs v. Manning, 835 F.2d 453 (3d Cir.
1987) (SEPTA deemed a commonwealth party and consequently the $250,000 statutory cap
on damages is applicable to an action brought against SEPTA); see also, generally, Cham-
bers v. SEPTA, 563 A.2d 603 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
94. 74 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1502(a) (1991).
95. Feingold, 517 A.2d at 1275; see also, Crilly v. SEPTA, 529 F.2d 1355 (3d Cir.
1976) (concluding that SEPTA was a commonwealth agency based on its designation as an
agency and instrumentality of the Commonwealth to exercise public powers).
96. 568 A.2d 931 (Pa. 1990).
1993
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Act 97 In Marshall, a claim of negligence was directed against the
Authority for injuries incurred by a construction worker during
demolition of an Authority-owned bridge."8 The court expanded on
the Feingold holding, and found that because the Authority exer-
cised "the public powers of the Commonwealth as an agency and
instrumentality thereof",99 such an authority was' not a local
agency but rather a commonwealth agency. 100
In Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Jellig,'0 the common-
wealth court decided whether the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commis-
sion ("Turnpike Commission") was a "commonwealth party," pro-
tected by sovereign immunity; a "local agency," protected by
governmental immunity; or neither of the above, entitled to no
such immunity.10 2 Plaintiffs argued that the Turnpike Commission
was neither a local governmental agency nor a commonwealth
agency, but rather a statutorily created independent entity with no
entitlement to tort immunity.103 The commonwealth court re-
viewed the definitions of "commonwealth party," "commonwealth
agency," and "independent agency" and concluded that the Turn-
pike Commission was protected by sovereign immunity because a
''commission" was expressly listed as a commonwealth agency in
the Judicial Code's definition of "independent agency."' 0 ' The
court placed great emphasis upon the definition provision in sec-
tion 102 of the Judicial Code, 105 indicating that independent agen-
cies included boards, commissions, authorities and other agencies
and officers of the Commonwealth government not subject to the
policy, supervision and control of the governor. 06 This, according
to the court, "evidenced a legislative intent . . . that independent
97. Marshall, 568 A.2d at 933.
98. Id. at 932-933.
99. Id. at 934. See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 55, § 553(a) (1964 & Supp. 1992).
100. Marshall, 568 A.2d at 934.
101. 563 A.2d 202 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
102. Jellig, 563 A.2d at 204. See also Bradley v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 550
A.2d 261, 263 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), wherein the court concluded that the Turnpike Com-
mission was a commonwealth agency cloaked with sovereign immunity protection from suit.
In Specter v. Commonwealth, 341 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1975), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
concluded that for purposes of immunity, the Turnpike Commission was not a common-
wealth agency and that the immunity enjoyed by the Commonwealth did not extend to the
Turnpike Commission. Specter, 341 A.2d at 490-91. (Note that the Specter decision pre-
dated the Sovereign Immunity Act.)
103. Jellig, 563 A.2d at 204.
104. Id. at 204-05. See also Doughty v. City of Philadelphia, 596 A.2d 1187, 1191 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991).
105. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 102 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
106. Jellig, 563 A.2d at 204-05.
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commissions such as the Turnpike Commission are to be viewed as
part of the Commonwealth government.
107
Not all state-related entities enjoy tort immunity. For example,
the courts have determined that both the Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity and Temple University may not be entitled to tort immu-
nity under the provisions of the sovereign immunity statute. In
Roy v. Pennsylvania State University, °s the commonwealth court
concluded that the Pennsylvania State University ("the Univer-
sity") was not an "agency" of the commonwealth under the Right
to Know Act'09 and was not required to make records available for
examination, despite the University's receipt of financial support
from the Commonwealth. 110 In so doing, the court looked to the
history of the University, noting that although the University re-
ceived state appropriations to meet part of its operating expenses,
the University still relied upon private sources for a substantial
portion of its income."' The court concluded that state funding
did not result in an absolute designation of "state agency". 112
In Doughty v. City of Philadelphia,'" the court again addressed
the issue of whether a state-related institution, this time Temple
University ("Temple"), was a commonwealth agency. Here, the
commonwealth court specifically confronted the issue of whether
Temple was entitled to sovereign immunity as defined by sections
8501 and 8521.1" The underlying action was brought on behalf of a
minor, Doughty, who suffered a fractured arm on January 31,
1985." 5 On that date, Doughty, who was severely retarded, was
transported from her home to Temple, spent most of the day in
school, and was transported home." 6 When she arrived home, it
was discovered that her arm had been fractured. 1 Due to her re-





107. Id. at 206.
108. 568 A.2d 751 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
109. Act of June 21, 1957, 1957 Pa. Laws 390, as amended (codified at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 65, §§ 66.1-66.4 (1959 & Supp. 1993).
110. Roy, 568 A.2d at 754.
111. Id. at 753-54.
112. Id.; see also Mooney v. Temple University Bd. of Trustees, 285 A.2d 912 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1972), aff'd, 292 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1972).
113. 596 A.2d 1187 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
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At the close of pleadings, Temple moved for summary judgment,
arguing it could not be held liable pursuant to the Sovereign Im-
munity Act."' Temple's argument was based in large part on the
fact that the General Assembly described Temple with the word
"instrumentality" when it adopted Temple as a state-related en-
tity. 12 0 This, according to Temple, indicated the General Assem-
bly's intent for Temple to be classified as an independent com-
monwealth agency, 12 1 thus falling within the definition of a
commonwealth agency.
1 22
The court disagreed, concluding that the Temple Act did not
"transform Temple into a commonwealth agency."'2 3 In making
this determination, the commonwealth court placed great emphasis
on the supreme court decision of Mooney v. Board of Trustees of
Temple University. 24 In Mooney, students and faculty members
were seeking information which they believed they were entitled to
under the Right to Know Act. 25 Under the Right to Know Act,
public records of a state agency are open and available for exami-
nation by Pennsylvania citizens.22 After analyzing a number of
factors, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that Temple
was not a state agency under the definition set forth in the Right.
to Know Act 27 and consequently denied the request to compel
Temple to make the information available for inspection. 128
119. Doughty, 596 A.2d at 1188.
120. Id. See Temple University - Commonwealth Act, Act of November 30, 1965, 1965
Pa. Laws 843 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2510-1 - 2510-12 (1992)) ("Temple
Act").
121. Doughty, 596 A.2d at 1188.
122. Id. at 1188.
123. Id. at 1191. As the court noted, "Contrary to Temple's argument, the term 'in-
strumentality' has not been construed as conveying Commonwealth agency status. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the mere description of Temple as an 'instrumentality' of the
[C]ommonwealth does not entitle Temple to use the defense of sovereign immunity." Id.
124. 292 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1972).
125. Mooney, 292 A.2d at 396.
126. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 66.1-66.4 (1993).
127. Section 66.1 of the Right to Know Act defines "state agency" as:
Any department, board or commission of the executive branch of the Commonwealth,
any political subdivision of the Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commis-
sion, or any State or municipal authority or similar organization created by or pursu-
ant to a statute which declares in substance that such organization performs or has
for its purpose the performance of an essential governmental function.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(1) (1959).
128. Mooney, 292 A.2d at 400-01. Initially, in Mooney, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court noted that the Temple Act provided for twelve commonwealth representatives to be
appointed to the Temple Board of Trustees. Id. at 398-99. This constituted only a one-third
minority of the Board. Id. Therefore, the non-public trustees maintained management and
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In Doughty, Temple argued that the Mooney holding was inap-
plicable for a number of reasons, including: (1) the Mooney court
limited its analysis to the definition of state agency stated in the
Right to Know Act; (2) Mooney was decided six years before the
Sovereign Immunity Act was adopted; and (3) Mooney did not ad-
dress the. fact that the Temple Act designates Temple as an "in-
strumentality of the Commonwealth". 29 The commonwealth court
rejected all of these contentions, focusing its attention on whether
the ties between Temple and the Commonwealth were sufficient to
find Temple to be "an agency of the Commonwealth. '3s
The court concluded that no such agency relationship existed
despite the fact that Temple was considered an "instrumentality"
of the Commonwealth.13' In reaching its result, the court noted
that Temple did not have the type of accountability to the state
generally required of a commonwealth agency; nor did Temple
have the type of power generally found within an agency.13 2 In
short, although Temple received some financial support from the
Commonwealth, this alone did not result in agency status.' Addi-
tionally, the use of the term "instrumentality" did not in and of
itself convey to Temple the status of a commonwealth agency.13 4
The court held that for purposes of the Sovereign Immunity Act,
the status of the state-related universities is determined by the
statutory language applicable to their existence.' This language 3 6
control majority over Temple. Id. The control would include management of the land, build-
ings and facilities owned by Temple; management control and conduct of the instructional,
administrative and financial affairs of the University, general power to exercise all Temple
powers and franchise to make by-laws for the Board and Temple's government and control
over the conduct at the school teaching level. Id. at 399. The supreme court also noted that
the Commonwealth could acquire land, erect and equip buildings, and provide facilities for
the use of Temple only with agreement of the Board of Directors. Id. The fact that Temple
was required to file annual reports of its expenditures with the Commonwealth to insure
proper use of its funding did not constitute such control over the activities of Temple as to
find it was a state agency. Id. at 400-01. In summary, the supreme court concluded that all
of the factors evidenced an intent that the Temple Act "was not to transform Temple into a
state agency for the purpose of the Right to Know Act." Id.; See also Doughty, 596 A.2d at
1189-90.
129. Doughty, 596 A.2d at 1189. The commonwealth court noted that in Mooney the
supreme court specifically rejected the argument that by authorizing the General Assembly
to appropriate money for Temple, the Temple Act transformed Temple into a state agency.
130. Doughty, 596 A.2d at 1189-90.
131. Id. at 1190-91.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1191.
134. Id. See Northampton County Area Community College v. Dow Chemical U.S.A.,
566 A.2d 591 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); aff'd, 598 A.2d 1288 (Pa. 1991).
135. Doughty, 596 A.2d at 1191. This article addresses the status of the universities
1993
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continues the pre-existing status of the universities.
Community colleges have been viewed as local agencies for pur-
poses of immunity, thus entitling such colleges to governmental
rather than sovereign immunity. s7 Under the Community College
only for purposes of the Sovereign Immunity Act. Compare Krynicky v. University of Pitts-
burgh, 742 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015 (1985) (actions taken by two
state-related institutions were actions taken under color of state law, subject to scrutiny
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because the state had placed itself into a position of interdepen-
dence with the universities); Accord, Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 477 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.
1973), on remand 392 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Pa. 1975), afl'd, cause remanded, 552 F.2d 948'
(3d Cir. 1977).
136. See, e.g., the Temple University - Commonwealth Act, Act of November 30, 1965,
1965 Pa. Laws 843, §1 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2510-1 - 2510-12 (1992 & Supp.
1993)); University of Pittsburgh - Commonwealth Act, Act of July 28, 1966, Special Session,
No. 3, 1966 Pa. Laws 87, §1 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2510-201 - 2510-211
(1992)); Lincoln University - Commonwealth Act, Act of July 7, 1972, 1972 Pa. Laws 743,
No. 176, §1 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2510-401 - 2510-412 (1992 & Supp. 1993));
Pennsylvania College of Technology Act, Act of July 1, 1989, 1989 Pa. Laws 132, No. 27, §1
(codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2510-501 - 2510-512 (1992)) (granting the Pennsylva-
nia College of Technology the benefits and responsibilities of the status of the Pennsylvania
State University as a state-related institution and as an instrumentality of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania). Compare with the State Colleges Act, Act of March 10, 1949, 1949
Pa. Laws 30, art XX, §2001, as amended, currently found at Article XX-A, State System of
Higher Education Act, Act of June 23, 1988, 1988 Pa. Laws 457, No. 77 (codified at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 20-2001-A - 20-2018-A (1992)). In addition, the College and University
Security Information Act, Act of May 26, 1988, 1988 Pa. Laws 448, No. 73, §1 (codified at
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2502-2 (1992)) provides the following definitions distinguishing
between the various types of higher education facilities in the Commonwealth:
"Community Colleges." Institutions now or hereafter created pursuant to Article
XIX-A of the Act of March 10, 1949 (P.L. 30, No. 14), known as the Public School
Code of 1949, or the Act of August 24, 1963 (P.L. 1132, No. 484), known as the Com-
munity College Act of 1963.
"State-owned institutions." Those institutions which are part of the State System of
Higher Education pursuant to Article XX-A of the Act of March 10, 1949 (P.L. 30,
No. 14), known as the Public School Code of 1949.
"State-related institutions." The Pennsylvania State University, the University of
Pittsburgh, Temple University and Lincoln University and their branch campuses.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2502-2 (1992).
137. Community College of Allegheny County v. Seibert, 601 A.2d 1348, 1352 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992), aff'd, 622 A.2d 285 (Pa. 1993) ("a community college, as a tax supported
institution created by local government units under a grant of authority by the state legisla-
ture, is a local governmental agency.") Id. See also the analysis in Northampton County
Area Community College v. Dow Chemical U.S.A., 566 A.2d 591 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), aff'd,
598 A.2d 1288 (Pa. 1991) (involving the question of whether a community college in an
action for breach of contract and express and iinplied warranties against a contractor could
invoke the doctrine nullum tempus occurit regi ("time does not run against the sovereign,"
a common law doctrine making the statute of limitations inapplicable to the sovereign as a
plaintiff) to negate a statute of limitations defense. The superior court, as affirmed by the
supreme court, concluded that analogizing this case with cases addressing sovereign immu-
nity would be appropriate.).
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Act,13 8 these institutions are to be "operated in accordance with
the provisions of [the Community College Act] by a local sponsor
... ,,9 A local sponsor may include a school district, municipal-
ity, county board of school directors or combination of the above
participating in the establishment and operation of the community
college. "" Since community colleges are locally established to re-
spond to local needs and receive local financial support, they are
"141considered "more properly classified as a local agency ....
To summarize, the courts have followed a logical approach to the
determination of whether the various entities in the Common-
wealth are entitled to immunity. The focus of any analysis on the
issue is directed to the enabling statute applicable to the entity42
and the definitions provided by the Sovereign Immunity Act. With
respect to educational facilities, the courts have found state-re-
lated institutions not to be so interrelated with governmental con-
trol as to be considered commonwealth agencies. On the other
hand, colleges within the State System of Higher Education that
are so interrelated are afforded immunity, while community col-
leges, which are locally supported, fall within the definition of a
local agency for purposes of governmental immunity.
D. Who is a Commonwealth Party Employee?
A more focused analysis is necessary when the issue addressed is
whether a particular individual is entitled to a defense based upon
138. Act of August 24, 1963, 1963 Pa. Laws 1132 (formerly PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§§ 5201-5214 (1992)), repealed and reenacted by the Act of July 1, 1985, 1985 Pa. Laws
1013 (currently found at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 19-1901-A - 19-1913-A (1992)).
139. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 19-1901-A(4) (1992).
140. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 19-1901-A(2) (1992).
141. Bucks County Community College v. Bucks County Bd. of Assessment Appeals,
608 A.2d 622, 625 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (stating that the "community college is not an
instrumentality of the Commonwealth, but rather is 'the creature and representative of the
sponsor which created it.' As such, it is more properly classified as a local agency .... " Id.
(citation omitted)). See also Northampton County Area Community College, 566 A.2d at
591.
142. Compare Crosby v. Kotch, 580 A.2d 1191 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (authority cre-
ated under the Housing Authority Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1550 (1993), constitutes a
commonwealth agency); Flaxman v. Burnett, 574 A.2d 1061 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding
the Monroe County Transportation Authority was not a commonwealth agency); DeVeaux
v. Palmer, 558 A.2d 166 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (Medical Professional Liability Catastrophic
Loss Fund is protected by sovereign immunity despite its insurance-like function); Matteo
v. City of Philadelphia, Dept. of Public Health Family Medical Servs., 512 A.2d 796 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1986) (the City's health department office is not a commonwealth party since it
was created by a provision contained in the City's Home Rule Charter, not state law).
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sovereign immunity. A commonwealth party employee, 143 when
acting within the scope of his or her employment, stands in the
same position as the commonwealth party. Thus, if a judgment is
entered against the commonwealth party employee, the common-
wealth party is obligated to pay."' However, the commonwealth
party may not be liable to defend or reimburse an employee who
commits an intentional tort even when that employee acted within
the scope of his or her authority. 
1 5
1. Independent Contractors
Sovereign immunity does not afford protection to independent
contractors performing work for a commonwealth party because
such individuals are not considered employees.1 46 In determining
whether a person is an independent contractor or an employee of
the government body for purposes of immunity, the court will con-
sider the following factors: (1) control of manner for doing work;
(2) whether the agency has responsibility only for the result; (3)
the terms of agreement between parties; (4) the nature of work or
occupation; (5) the skill required for performance; (6) whether the
activity is a distinct business or occupation; (7) which party sup-
plies the tools; (8) the method of payment (by time or by job); (9)
143. Section 8501 of the Judicial Code reads in pertinent part:
Definitions:
The following words and phrases when used in this Chapter shall have, unless the
context clearly indicates otherwise, the meanings given to them in this Section:
"Employee." Any person who is acting or who has acted on behalf of a government
unit whether on a permanent or temporary basis, whether compensated or not and
whether within or without the territorial boundaries of the government unit, includ-
ing any volunteer fireman and any elected or appointed officer, member of a gov-
erning body or other person designated to act for the government unit. Independent
contractors under contract to the government unit and their employees and agents
and persons performing tasks over which the government unit has no legal right of
control are not employees of the government unit.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8501 (1990).
144. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8525 (1990).
145. Freedman v. City of Allentown, 562 A.2d 1012 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989); see also
JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, REPORT on SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, at 15 (1978)("JOINT
REPORT") (stating the Task Force specifically rejected waiving sovereign immunity for
claims arising out of intentional torts). The JOINT REPORT has been cited as valid legislative
history for interpreting the Sovereign Immunity Act by both the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court and the commonwealth court. See Carroll v. County of York, 437 A.2d 394 (Pa. 1981);
Germantown Savings Bank v. City of Philadelphia, 512 A.2d 756 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986);
Gall v. Allegheny County Health Dep't, 510 A.2d 926 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
146. Marshall v. Port Auth. for Allegheny County, 568 A.2d 931 (Pa. 1990); County of
Schuylkill v. Maurer, 536 A.2d 479 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).
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the regular business of the employer; and (10) the right to termi-
nate employment at any time.
147
The courts have held that the relationship between a cbunty and
a public defender is similar to that of an independent contractor
and a party contracting for his or her services.148 This relationship
is reinforced by the fact that the county has no control over the
manner of representation given indigents by the public defender. 4 9
The same holds true with respect to firms that contract for the
construction of commonwealth buildings.150 For purposes of mem-
bership in a public school employees' retirement system, a school
district physician is not an employee, but rather an independent
contractor.' 51 The same is true regarding referees hired by a school
district to referee sports games. 5"
The factors unique to each situation must be examined
147. See County of Schuylkill, 536 A.2d at 482; Hammermill Paper Co. v. Rust Eng'g
Co., 243 A.2d 389 (Pa. 1968); Murray v. Zarger, 566 A.2d 645 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
148. Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735, 738 (Pa. 1979).
149. Reese, 406 A.2d at 738-39.
150. Parking Unlimited, Inc. v. Monsour Medical Found., 445 A.2d 758 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982). The parties entered into a written building contract by which Parking Unlimited
agreed to furnish architectural and engineering services in connection with the construction
of a parking garage and office building for a medical foundation. Parking Unlimited, 445
A.2d at 760.
151. Zimmerman v. Public Sch. Employees' Retirement Bd., 522 A.2d 43, 46 (Pa.
1987). Cf. Babich v. Pavich, 411 A.2d 218 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). In Babich, Bethlehem, the
decedent's employer, neither controlled nor had the right to control the hospital's physical
conduct in the care and treatment of injured employees. Babich, 411 A.2d at 220-21. How-
ever, although Bethlehem did not control the manner or method of treating patients, this
fact alone was not controlling in determining whether the doctors involved were employees
or independent contractors. Id. The doctor in this instance was considered an employee
because he worked for Bethlehem on a full-time basis; Bethlehem paid him a fixed salary
and did not allow him to engage in private practice; and his fringe benefits were the same as
those received by Bethlehem's supervisory personnel. Id.
152. Lynch v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 554 A.2d 159 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1989). In Lynch, a referee hired by a school district was injured in the course of refereeing a
football game and was deemed to be an independent contractor. Lynch, 554 A.2d at 160.
The fact that the district paid the referee was not indicative of either type of relationship
(employer/employee or owner/independent contractor). Id. However, the fact that a claim-
ant was paid for a specific piece of work was indicative of an independent contractor rela-
tionship. Id. In Lynch, there was no evidence to indicate that the district had or exercised
any control whatsoever over the manner in which the referees performed their duties during
the game. Id. at 162. Further, the referees were paid for one football game regardless of how
long it took to play, and were paid shortly before the start of the game by the school's
athletic director. The officials were not on the district's payroll and no deductions were
taken from their fee for taxes or social security. Last, the referees bought their own
uniforms, shoes, hats, whistles and penalty markers and provided their own medical insur-
ance. Id. See also City of Monessen v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 387 A.2d 1000
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
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closely. 15 s As a general proposition, the distinction between an in-
dependent contractor and an agent or employee is based upon the
amount of control exercised or exercisable over the other party to
the contract and control over the manner in which the work is to
be performed.15' However, other factors must be considered.155 It
appears that an examination of any contract signed by the parties
will be, to a certain degree, dispositive of the issue of whether a
person is an independent contractor or an employee. 156
2. Students
Generally, students are not considered employees of a school, ab-
sent the presence of additional factors. Uninsured vo-tech students
were not acting as employees of a school when they drove them-
selves to school with the school's express permission or acquies-
cence.1 57 Therefore, the commonwealth court found that the stu-
dents' operation of a motor vehicle did not fall under the vehicle
exception to governmental immunity.'58 The vehicle exception to
governmental immunity, as well as that to sovereign immunity, ap-
plies only to situations where an employee of a local agency or
state agency actually operates the vehicle in question.159 However,
a member of a high school football team has been found to be an
employee of a government unit and was entitled to immunity from
liability.1 60 Such a player was acting on behalf of the school district
by participating in its football game. The school exercised control
over the student, who was required to comply with the coach's in-
structions and the school district's rules governing athletic compe-
tition. As such, the commonwealth court held that the student-ath-
lete was "designated to act" in the extra-curricular activity and
was therefore an employee of the government. 6'
153. See, e.g., Surowski v. Public Sch. Employees' Retirement Sys., 467 A.2d 1373 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1983), wherein the court found the following were indicative of an employee/
employer relationship: the school district paid the annual salary of a tax collector, contrib-
uted to his benefits and provisions of work supplies. Surowski, 467 A.2d at 1374-75.
154. Feller v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 70 A.2d 299, 300 (Pa. 1950); Drexel v.
Union Prescription Ctr., .582 F.2d 781, 785 (3d Cir. 1978).
155. See Hammermill Paper, 243 A.2d 389; see note 147 and accompanying text.
156. See Moon Area Sch. Dist. v. Garzony, 560 A.2d 1361, 1368 (Pa. 1989).
157. Capuzzi v. Heller, 558 A.2d 596, 600 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
158. Capuzzi, 558 A.2d at 600.
159. Id. at 599.
160. Wilson v. Miladin, 553 A.2d 535 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
161. Wilson, 553 A.2d at 537.
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3. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
In addition, because the Commonwealth is an entity distinct
from the agencies encompassed by the term "commonwealth
party", it remains immune to suit."e2 Consequently, naming the
Commonwealth and not the commonwealth party (i.e., the agency)
will result in dismissal of a lawsuit. 183
III. FORUM CONSIDERATIONS
A. Restatement of Eleventh Amendment Application
An action against a state agency under any waiver to immunity
must be brought in state court; an action in federal court remains
barred. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion"" limits a party's ability to bring an action against one state
in a foreign state's court.6 5 This amendment has been interpreted
to bar suits for money damages in federal courts against states
which have not consented to such suits."66 This is also true with
respect to a state agency or department.
1 6 7
Historically, courts have required clear, express language of a
state's waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.168 The waiver
must be either a clear declaration in the language of the applicable
statute 6 " or through such overwhelming implication from the text
of the waiver so as to leave no doubt as to any other construction
162. Hall v. Acme Markets, 532 A.2d 894, 897 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
163. Hall, 532 A.2d at 897. See, also e.g., Spencer v. Pavlik, 590 A.2d 1342 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991); Bainbridge v. Department of Transp., 557 A.2d 456 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1989); Garcia v. Commonwealth, 570 A.2d 137 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990). In Wilson v. Neff,
578 A.2d 1014 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990), the commonwealth court determined that an amend-
ment to substitute a commonwealth agency for the Commonwealth would not be permitted
where the complaint was filed after the statute of limitations had run and where the
amended complaint was the first document filed with the court identifying the agency as a
party. Wilson, 578 A.2d at 1015.
Note that an action by the Commonwealth must be brought in the name of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania. See also PA. R. Civ. P. 2102(a)(1). Also, PA. R. CIV. P. 2102(a)(2)
states that an action against a Commonwealth agency or party-"shall be styled in the follow-
ing manner: Plaintiff v. '[name of Agency or Party] of the Commonwealth of Pennsylva-
nia'." Id.
164. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
165. See note 33.
166. See notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
167. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
168. Allegheny County Sanitary Auth. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 732
F.2d 1167 (3d Cir. 1984).
169. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946); Ford
Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co.,
213 U.S. 151 (1909).
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of the language.1"' Simply because a state has waived its sovereign
immunity to suit by its own citizens in state court does not consti-
tute a waiver of that state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.
17 1
The clear language of the Sovereign Immunity Act preserves the
protection afforded by the Eleventh Amendment. 17 The General
Assembly, obviously intending to avail itself of the immunity guar-
anteed by the Eleventh Amendment, incorporated language into
the Sovereign Immunity Act providing that "[niothing contained
in [the Sovereign Immunity Act] shall be construed to waive the
immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts guar-
anteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. '17s The various courts addressing this issue have
uniformly concluded that the Act has not waived the immunity of
the Commonwealth from suit in federal court.
174
B. Venue
Venue in any action against a commonwealth agency is governed
by. section 8523 of the Act,17 5 Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
2103 17 and section 111 of title 37 of the Pennsylvania Code.
1 77
170. See Kennecott Copper, 327 U.S. at 578-79; Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 465-66.
171. See Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151 (1909); Richins v. Indus. Con-
str., Inc., 502 F.2d 1051 (10th Cir. 1974). States and their agencies have consistently not
been construed to be "citizens" for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ramada
Inns, Inc. v. Rosemount Memorial Park Ass'n, 598 F.2d 1303 (3d Cir. 1979).
172. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8521-8528 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
173. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b) (1990).
174. See Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 590 F.2d 470 (3d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Ruman v. Pennsylvania, 462 F. Supp. 1355
(M.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 612 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 964 (1980); Her-
nandez v. Whitesell, 462 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
175. Section 8523 provides:
(a) Venue.-Actions for claims against a Commonwealth party may be brought in and
only in a county in which the principal or local office of the Commonwealth party is
located or in which the cause of action arose or where a transaction or occurrence
took place out of which the cause of action arose. If venue is obtained in the Twelfth
Judicial District (Dauphin County) solely because the principal office of the Com-
monwealth party is located within it, any judge of the Court of Common Pleas of
Dauphin County shall have the power to transfer the action to any appropriate
county where venue would otherwise lie.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8523 (1990).
176. Rule 2103, governing venue for actions brought against political subdivisions, pro-
vides as follows:
(a)An action brought in a court of common pleas by the Commonwealth may be
brought in any county permitted by a rule of the Supreme Court.
(b)Except when the Commonwealth is the plaintiff or when otherwise provided by an
Act of Assembly, an action against a political subdivision may be brought only in the
county in which the political subdivision is located.
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When read together, 1 8 these provisions permit a cause of action to
be brought in any county where either the principal or the local
office of the involved commonwealth agency is located, or the loca-
tion of the transaction or occurrence on which the cause of action
is based. 179 The venue language is similar, but not identical, to that
found in Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1006, governing
general venue rules for civil actions. 80
PA. R. Civ. P. 2103.
177. Section 111.4 provides:
(a)Venue in actions for claims against a Commonwealth party as defined in 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 8501 (relating to definitions) shall be in the county in which one of the
following exists:
(1) The cause of action arose.
(2) A transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose.
(3) The principal office of the Commonwealth party is located.
(4) The local office of the Commonwealth party is located.
(b)The principal offices of the Commonwealth parties are the same as those offices
designated in §111(b) and (c) (relating to service of process).
(c)For purposes of subsection (a)(4), the local office of the Commonwealth party is
the local office located in that county where the cause of action arose or where a
transaction or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action arose..
37 PA. CODE §111.4 (1990).
178. The statute, rule and regulation limit venue to one of two counties. The specific
nature of the venue provisions and the requirements therein control the general venue pro-
visions in the rules of civil procedure. See PA. R. Civ. P. 132, which provides:
Whenever a general provision in a rule shall be in conflict with a particular provision
in the same or another rule, the two shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may
be given to both. If the conflict between the two provisions is irreconcilable, the par-
ticular provisions shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general
provision, unless the general provision shall be promulgated later and it shall be the
manifest intention of the Supreme Court that such general provisions shall prevail.
Id.
179. Although in general the supreme court is vested with exclusive dominion to es-
tablish rules for venue, the Pennsylvania Constitution specifically authorizes a legislative
determination of the "manner" and "court" in which suits against the Commonwealth are to
be brought. PA. CONST. art. I, § 11. Article 5, section 10(c) gives the supreme court the
power to establish "general rules governing practice" consistent with the constitution. PA.
CONST. art. V, § 10(c).
180. Rule 1006(a)-(c) provides:
(a)Except as otherwise provided by Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this Rule, an action
against an individual may be brought in and only in a county in which he may be
served or in which the cause of action arose or where a transaction or occurrence took
place out of which the cause of action arose or in any other county authorized by law.
(b)Actions against the following defendants, except as otherwise provided in Subdivi-
sion (c), may be brought in and only in the counties designated by the following rules:
political subdivisions, Rule 2103; partnerships, Rule 2130; unincorporated associa-
tions, Rule 2156; corporations and similar entities, Rule 2179.
(c)An action to enforce a joint or joint and several liability against two or more de-
fendants, except actions in which the Commonwealth is a party defendant, may be
brought against all defendants in any county in which the venue may be laid against
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The venue provisions permit suit to be brought in the county
where the agency's principal office is located.1 " For most agencies,
this will be Dauphin County.18 2 If suit is brought in Dauphin
County solely because the principal office of the involved common-
wealth agency is located there, the Dauphin County Court of Com-
mon Pleas may transfer the action to another appropriate county
(i.e., where the cause of action arose). 188
The rules governing venue applicable to a commonwealth agency
balance the competing interests of plaintiff and defendant relative
to the proper forum for the action. The general goal of venue pro-
visions is to find a suitable, interested court where the parties to
the lawsuit may have the matter resolved."" On the one hand,
commonwealth residents should be protected from having to initi-
ate suit against the Commonwealth in a distant, inconvenient
county."8 5 At the same time, the rules should adhere to the general
purpose for statutory venue of protecting the defendant against
the risk that a plaintiff will forum shop and select either an unfair
or inconvenient trial locale. 1' The venue provisions related to
commonwealth agencies limit the relevant situs for suits to a
county where the cause of action arose, where a transaction or oc-
currence took place out of which the cause of action arose, or
where either the principal or local office of the involved common-
wealth agency is located. These provisions were intended to pro-
vide some discretion to a plaintiff to determine where a suit will be
filed, while protecting the commonwealth agency from litigating in
an inconvenient forum, thereby striking a balance between com-
peting interests. Pennsylvania courts have upheld challenges to the
venue restrictions set forth above.1
8 7
In Cortese v. Department of Transportation,88 the common-
any one of the defendants under the general rules of Subdivisions (a) or (b).
PA. R. Civ. P. 1006(a)-(c).
181. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8523(a) (1990); 37 PA. CODE § 111.4(a)(3) (1990).
182. See 37 PA. CODE §111.1(b) (1986), listing the addresses of the principal offices of
Commonwealth agencies designated to accept service of actions brought under 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 8501-8564 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
183. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8523(a) (1990).
184. LeRoy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183-84 (1979) (finding that
"[i]n most instances, the purpose of statutorily specified venue is to protect the defendant
against the risk that a plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial." Id. (cita-
tions omitted)).
185. LeRoy, 443 U.S. at 183-84.
186. See JOINT REPORT, cited at note 145, at 22-23; LeRoy, 443 U.S. at 184-85.
187. See Cortese v. Department of Transp., 463 A.2d 1293 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
188. 463 A.2d 1293 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
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wealth court faced the issue of whether venue against the Pennsyl-
vania Department of Transportation ("PaDOT") was available in
any of Pennsylvania's sixty-seven counties, regardless of where the
accident occurred. The appellants, residents of Wyoming County,
brought suit in Luzerne County for injuries sustained by their mi-
nor child in an accident that occurred in Wyoming County. The
plaintiff child was a passenger in an automobile operated by an-
other individual who was killed in the accident. The personal rep-
resentative of the decedent's estate was a resident of Luzerne
County and a defendant in the action. The suit was instituted in
Luzerne County, pursuant to the general rules of venue.' PaDOT
filed preliminary objections to the complaint, 90 alleging improper
venue. 91 The Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County sus-
tained PaDOT's preliminary objections.192 The commonwealth
court, affirming the trial court's ruling, held that venue in trespass
actions against PaDOT is limited to either the county in which the
cause of action arose or the county where the principal office may
be found."'3 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument, based on
the general venue provisions, 94 that the action could be brought in
any county containing a local office of the defendant. The court
went on to note that "[tlo permit suits against [PaDOT] in all
[sixty-seven] 67 counties of the Commonwealth regardless of where
the cause of action arose, in our opinion, would be a gross distor-
tion of the intent of the Code."' 95 The court explained that the
General Assembly, in vesting the Attorney General with the au-
thority to implement various regulations relative to venue provi-
sions for suits against a commonwealth agency,9 6 in effect author-
ized the Attorney General to provide a convenient forum for the
Commonwealth to answer suits brought against it.9 7 Thus, the
General Assembly balanced the plaintiffs' general right to exercise
the prerogative of choosing an appropriate forum against the com-
189. Cortese, 463 A.2d at 1294. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1006(a), set forth in note 180.
190. Cortese, 463 A.2d at 1294.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1295.
194. Id.; see PA. R. Civ. P. 1006, discussed in note 180.
195. Cortese, 463 A.2d at 1295.
196. Id. Section 3(b) of the Act of September 28, 1978, Pa. Laws 788 (1978 Act), 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 931 (Historical Note) (1981) states, "[tihe Attorney General shall pro-
mulgate rules and regulations not inconsistent with this act in order to implement the intent
of the act. The subject of the rules and regulations may include ... the designation of local
and principal offices for Commonwealth agencies .... Id.
197. Cortese, 463 A.2d at 1295.
1993
Duquesne Law Review
monwealth agency's right to have suit brought in a convenient
forum.
19 8
The commonwealth court has also addressed the validity of the
definition of "local office" set forth in section 111.4(c) of title 37 of
the Pennsylvania. Code. In Bogetti v. Department of Transporta-
tion,1ee the plaintiffs brought an action against, among others,
PaDOT. The single car accident forming the basis of the lawsuit
occurred in Northumberland County, the location of the plaintiff's
domicile. 00 The action was brought in Allegheny County, located
215 miles from the accident site.2'0
PaDOT filed preliminary objections to the action, arguing that
since the accident occurred in Northumberland County and
PaDOT had a local office located there, the claim was proper in
Northumberland County, not Allegheny County. 02 The trial court
agreed and transferred the matter to Northumberland County.
20 3
In their appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the Attorney General's
venue regulations defining "local office" were contrary to the intent
of the General Assembly in defining venue in the Code, and there-
fore, were invalid.20 4 According to the plaintiffs, the regulations in
effect at the time of the accident permitted service upon PaDOT
in Dauphin, Philadelphia or Allegheny counties .20  The plaintiffs
argued that the Attorney General's definition of "local office" im-
properly repealed the General Assembly's intent to permit venue
against a commonwealth agency in any county where a local office
was maintained.20 6
The commonwealth court affirmed the decision of the trial court,
finding venue improper in Allegheny County.2 0 The court looked
to the history of the venue provisions in the Sovereign Immunity
198. Id. See notes 184-187 above for a discussion of these competing interests.
199. 601 A.2d 421 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
200. Bogetti, 601 A.2d at 423.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 422.
203. Id. Rule 1006(e) provides:
Improper venue shall be raised by preliminary objection and if not so raised shall be
waived. If a preliminary objection to venue is sustained and there is a county of
proper venue within the State the action shall not be dismissed but shall be trans-
ferred to the appropriate court of that county. The costs and fees for transfer and
removal of the record shall be paid by the plaintiff.
PA. R. Cxv. P. 1006(e).
204. Bogetti, 601 A.2d at 422.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 423.
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Act20 and the interplay of these provisions with the definition of
"local office" promulgated by the Attorney General.0 9 The court
concluded that the Attorney General's venue regulation defining
"local office" did not usurp the legislative intent in defining
"venue" in section 8523.210 The court reiterated an earlier discus-
sion of the venue regulation of the Attorney General.2 1 ' At that
time, the court had stated that the intent of the General Assembly
when it used the term "local office" in section 8523(a) "was not to
open all 67 counties of the Commonwealth to suits against
[PaDOT], irrespective of where the cause of action arose. '212
In further support of its position, the commonwealth court
turned to section 921(c)(6) of the Statutory Construction Act.2"3
This section "provides that an important consideration in inter-
preting the words of a statute that are not explicit is the conse-
quence of a particular interpretation."21 " The court also noted that
section 1922 of the Statutory Construction Act 21 5 creates presump-
tions that "the General Assembly does not intend a result that is
absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable. '216 Finally, the
court noted that section 1922(5) of the Statutory Construction
Act2 17 mandates that the General Assembly is "to favor the public
interest as against a private interest.121 8
Applying the above rules, the court concluded that permitting a
suit in Allegheny County, 215 miles from the accident site, when
208. Id. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8523 (1990); See also notes 181-185 above.
209. 37 PA. CODE § 111.4 (1990).
210. Bogetti, 601 A.2d at 423. As the court had previously explained:
[w]hen the legislature vested the Attorney General with authority to implement the
intent of the Code by the promulgation of regulations relative to suits against the
Commonwealth, it authorized the chief litigation officer in the Commonwealth to pro-
vide a forum conveniens for the Commonwealth to answer suits brought against it.
We do not believe it was necessary for the Attorney General to designate more than
one location for the commencement of suit against it in order to effectuate the intent
of the Code. The result of the regulations in the instant case was to give Appellants
the choice of two counties, Wyoming or Dauphin. To permit suits against [Pa]DOT in
all 67 counties of the Commonwealth regardless of where the cause of action arose, in
our opinion, would be a gross distortion of the intent of the code.
Cortese, 463 A.2d at 1295.
211. Bogetti, 601 A.2d at 422 (quoting Department of Trans. v. Chatzidakis, 492 A.2d
1170, 1172 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985)).
212. Chatzidakis, 492 A.2d at 1172.
213. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(c)(6) (1975).
214. Bogetti, 601 A.2d at 422-23.
215. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1922(1) (1975).
216. Bogetti, 601 A.2d at 423.
217. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1922(5) (1975).
218. Bogetti, 601 A.2d at 423.
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the plaintiffs and witnesses were all located in the county where
the accident occurred, would violate the Statutory Construction
Act provisions. 19 Finding venue proper in Allegheny County would
have authorized suit against PaDOT in any county in Pennsylva-
nia, since PaDOT maintained a maintenance office in all sixty-
seven counties of the Commonwealth.220 In addition, such a finding
would be absurd and lead to forum shopping by plaintiffs, who
would look to the most advantageous county in which to file suit,
rather than whether the county had any ties to the litigation in
question.2 ' Such a finding would also be contrary to the rule
favoring the public interest as against the private interest, since it
would require PaDOT and its witnesses to travel all over the Com-
monwealth for an action simply because the plaintiff chose to file
suit in a county other than that in which the action arose. Conse-
quently, the court concluded that the proper forum for the action
was the county where the cause of action arose or where PaDOT
maintained a local office, as set forth in the venue provisions and
the regulations defining the term "local office.
222
In summary, the above venue analysis is generally applicable to
cases brought against a commonwealth party. Such an action must
be brought in a county where the cause of action arose or a trans-
action or occurrence took place out of which the cause of action
arose. If the action is brought where the agency's principal office is
located, generally Dauphin County, that court is entitled to trans-
fer the matter to another appropriate forum. An action brought
against PaDOT in the county where PaDOT maintains it local of-
fice must conform to the "local office" definition advanced by the
Attorney General. This provision defines the term "local office" as
the office located in the county where the cause of action arose or
where a transaction or occurrence took place out of which the
cause of action arose. Thus the effect is to curtail forum shopping
and require that the action be heard in a county having close ties
to the action.
C. Service of Process in Actions Against a Commonwealth Party
Once a claimant determines the proper forum for an action
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the other party. The rules for service of process on a Common-
wealth agency are set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.2 2 The rules require service of original process by hand de-
livery to an authorized representative at either the principal or
local office of the involved Commonwealth agency, along with ser-
vice upon the Office of the Attorney General.22" The service re-
quirements were intended to be consistent with the general ration-
ale requiring notice to be provided to both the Attorney General
and the involved agency.
225
The rules regarding service of process conform to the specific
mandates commonly applicable to other civil suits, with certain
added responsibilities placed on the plaintiff.
22 6
In addition to the general requirements, a plaintiff instituting an
action against a commonwealth agency must conform to the re-
223. PA. R. Civ. P. 422(a). See note 226 for the text of this rule.
224. PA. R. Civ. P. 422(b). See note 226 for the text of this rule.
225. JOINT REPORT, cited at note 145, at 23.
226. Rule 402 sets forth the general manner for acceptance of service as follows:
(a)Original process may be served
(1)by handing a copy to the defendant; or
(2)by handing a copy
(i)at the residence of the defendant to an adult member of the family
with whom he resides; but if no adult member of the family is found,
then to an adult person in charge of such residence; or
(ii)at the residence of the defendant to the clerk or manager of the
hotel, inn, apartment house, boarding house or other place of lodging at
which he resides; or
(iii)at any office or usual place of business of the defendant to his
agent or to the person for the time being in charge thereof. ...
PA. R. Civ. P. 402.
Rule 422 provides for the proper means of serving original process upon the common-
wealth agency or officer. This rule provides:
(a)Service of original process upon the Commonwealth or an officer of the Common-
wealth, or a department, board, commission or instrumentality of the Common-
wealth, or a member thereof, shall be made at the office of the defendant and the
office of the attorney general by handing a copy to the person in charge thereof.
(b)Service of original process upon a political subdivision shall be made by handing a
copy to
(1)an agent duly authorized by the political subdivision to receive service of
process, or
(2)the person in charge at the office of the defendant, or
(3)the mayor, or the president, chairman, secretary or clerk of the tax levy-
ing body thereof, and in counties where there is no tax levying body, the chair-
man or clerk of the board of county commissioners ....
(c)This rule shall not apply to an appeal from an administrative determination,
order or decree of such officer, department, board, commission or
instrumentality.
PA. R. Civ. P. 422.
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quirements set forth in rule 422(b). 2 1 As previously noted, this
rule sets the manner in which service of original process may be
achieved and in lieu of such service, the manner in which a defend-
ant may accept service. 2 8 The burden rests upon the plaintiff to
show a good faith attempt to have the writ served.229
The final "requirement that a plaintiff must satisfy is found at
rule 422(a), which addresses the proper delivery for service of pro-
cess upon a Commonwealth agency or political subdivision.23 0 The
commonwealth court held in Comyn v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation'Authority that this provision must also be strictly
followed.31 In Comyn, a default judgment was entered against the
City of Philadelphia ("City") based on the City's failure to timely
respond to the complaint. The City challenged the default judg-
ment based in part upon the plaintiff's failure to properly serve the
City with the complaint. The record indicated that the deputy
sheriff had not ascertained the name of the person he served, nor
the official capacity of the person to whom he handed the com-
plaint.23 2 The sheriff, after reviewing the writ, could remember the
floor he had been on, but had no recollection as to whom he had
handed the writ. He recalled only that it was someone in the recep-
tion area.2as
The court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their
burden of proof as to proper service and ordered the default judg-
ment opened.234 Analyzing the applicable service provisions, the
court explained that rule 422(a) requires that the writ be handed
to an agent or a person in charge.23 5 Since the sheriff could not
remember whom he had served, it was impossible to conclude that
the requirements of rule 422 had been satisfied.236
227. See note 226.
228. See note 226.
229. Feher v. Altman, 515 A.2d 317, 320 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), appeal denied, 531
A.2d 430 (Pa. 1987).
230. PA. R. Civ. P. 422(a) provides for service upon the Commonwealth and political
subdivisions at the office of the Defendant and the Office of the Attorney General. See note
226.
231. 594 A.2d 857 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
232. Comyn, 594 A.2d at 860.
233. Id.
234. Id. See also LeGrand v. McCrea, 'No. 92-0987, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16348 (E.D.
Pa. 1992) (Plaintiff's default judgment against the government for injuries allegedly falling
within the Federal Tort Claims Act set aside and action dismissed (without prejudice) where
plaintiff failed to effect service of process as specifically required pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P.
4(d)(4) & (5) and 40)).
235. Comyn, 594 A.2d at 860. See note 226.
236. Comyn, 594 A.2d at 860. The court reasoned that "since the Deputy Sheriff could
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The Comyn decision raises the possibility that a case will be dis-
missed if the plaintiff properly serves the Commonwealth agency,
but fails to provide service to the Attorney General. Rule 422(a)
requires plaintiff to make service on the Attorney General.2 7 As
the General Assembly noted, this dual service "is consistent with
the rationale for the requirement that notice be given to the attor-
ney general in addition to the Commonwealth agency involved." 2a
The Cortese and Comyn decisions suggest that failure to provide
the dual service as required by this rule could jeopardize the plain-
tiff's case.
D. Six-Month Notice Requirement
Pursuant to section 5522, notice of the intent to sue must be
provided to the agency and the Office of the Attorney General
within six months from the date of the injury or loss. 23' The notice
not state affirmatively that the person to whom he handed the complaint was a receptionist,
or the person in charge, service on the City was not accomplished." Id.
237. See note 226.
238. JoINT REPORT, cited at note 145, at 23.
239. Section 5522 provides:
(a) NOTICE PREREQUISITE TO ACTION AGAINST GOVERNMENT UNIT. -
(1) Within six months from the date that any injury was sustained or any cause of
action accrued, any person who is about to commence any civil action or proceeding
within this Commonwealth or elsewhere against a government unit for damages on
account of any injury to his person or property under Chapter 85 (relating to matters
affecting government units) or otherwise shall file in the office of the government
unit, and if the action is against a Commonwealth agency for damages, then also file
in the office of the Attorney General, a statement in writing, signed by or in his be-
half, setting forth:
(i) The name and residence address of the person to whom the cause of action has
accrued.
(ii) The name and residence address of the person injured.
(iii) The date and hour of the accident.
(iv) The approximate location where the accident occurred.
(v) The name and residence or office address of any attending physician.
(2) If the statement provided for by this subsection is not filed, any civil action or
proceeding commenced against the government unit more than six months after the
date of injury to person or property shall be dismissed and the person to whom any
such cause of action accrued for any injury to person or property shall be forever
barred from proceeding further thereon within this Commonwealth or elsewhere. The
court shall excuse failure to comply with this requirement upon a showing of reasona-
ble excuse for failure to file such statement.
(3) In the case of a civil action or proceeding against a government unit other than
the Commonwealth government:
(i) The time for giving such written notice does not include the time during which an
individual injured is unable, due to incapacitation or disability from the injury, to
give notice, not exceeding 90 days of incapacity.
(ii) If the injuries to an individual result in death, the time for giving notice shall
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must provide the name and address of the individual to whom the
cause of action has accrued, the date, time and location of the acci-
dent, and the name and address of any attending physician.240
Failure to provide this notice will not jeopardize an action upon a
showing of reasonable excuse.241
Appellate courts have determined that statutes requiring notice
to a governmental agency do not violate the Equal Protection, 242
Due Process2 43 or Privileges and Immunities244 clauses of the
United States or Pennsylvania Constitutions. The purpose of the
notice requirement "is to provide the [Commonwealth] with the
opportunity to make timely investigation and avoid the difficulty
of defending against stale and fraudulent claims. ' 245 Generally,
courts have been hesitant to deny claimants their days in court
based solely upon a failure to strictly comply with the require-
ments of section 5522.246 The courts have permitted a cause of ac-
tion to proceed upon a showing of "reasonable excuse" for failure
to notify the Commonwealth of a pending suit within six
months.2 47 Therefore, when a reasonable excuse exists for failure to
commence with such death.
(iii) Failure to comply with this subsection shall not be a bar if the government unit
had actual or constructive notice of the incident or condition giving rise to the claim
of a person. (emphasis added).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5522 (1981 & Supp. 1993).
240. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5522(a)(1)(i)-(v) (1990).
241. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5522(a)(2) (1990).
242. US. CONST. amend. XIV; PA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
243. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
244. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
245. James v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 477 A.2d 1302, 1307'(Pa. 1984) (citing
Dubin v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 281 A.2d 711, 712 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971)).
246. Yurechko v. County of Allegheny, 243 A.2d 372 (Pa. 1968); Landis v. City of Phil-
adelphia, 369 A.2d 746 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976); Ramon v. Department of Transp., 556 A.2d
919 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) aff'd, 573 A.2d 1025 (Pa. 1990). In Yurechko, the supreme court
discussed a predecessor statute, the Act of July 7, 1937, Pa. Laws 2547, §1 (current version
at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 5301 (1993 Supp.)), which applied only to municipalities, and
required notice within six months from the date of origin of the claim. The court stated:
The statute is not a sword provided to municipalities by the legislature whereby they
might cut down the rights of all tardy litigants, including those whose claims are
validly based upon negligence of that very municipality and whose tardiness has not
caused any prejudice. Rather the Act of 1937, supra, serves as a shield by which
municipal governments might protect themselves against claims of those who have
tarried so long that they have made it insurmountably difficult for the municipality
to conduct a proper investigation into the circumstances of the accident.
Yurechko, 243 A.2d at 377.
247. Yurechko, 243 A.2d at 377. In Yurechko, the supreme court articulated a two-
prong test to be used when deciding whether a claimant's failure to give proper notice
within a six month time period should result in the dismissal of the claim. Failure to file the
requisite notice, without a showing of reasonable excuse for the failure to file, would bar the
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comply with the notice requirement, a court may excuse the non-
compliance and allow the party to proceed with his or her cause of
action.24
Liberal construction has been the rule for the courts in defining
what constitutes "reasonable excuse" for failure to give the statu-
torily mandated notice. Ignorance of the law or an inability to un-
derstand the notice requirement, coupled with an absence of
prejudice to the government unit, has been determined to be rea-
sonable excuse for failure to provide the required notice."" In ad-
dition, ignorance of the law, coupled with ignorance as to the se-
verity of the injury, and the absence of prejudice to the
government unit, has constituted a reasonable excuse for failure to
provide such notice of injury to the government unit.
2 50
suit. The elements of the test are (1) whether the claimant was ignorant of the notice re-
quirement or claimant's counsel was negligent, and (2) whether the complainant's failure to
strictly -comply worked an undue hardship on the governmental agency. Id. at 376-77.
248. See Hoy v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 565 A.2d 848 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989),
aff'd, 585 A.2d 464 (Pa. 1991). In Graffigna v. City of Philadelphia, 512 A.2d 91 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1986), the plaintiff failed to provide the requisite notice and provided no rea-
son for such failure. Instead, the plaintiff argued that the defendant failed to indicate how it
was prejudiced by the failure and argued that without a showing of prejudice, the claim
should proceed. The commonwealth court disagreed, concluding that the statute does not
require the government unit to "show that it was prejudiced by lack of timely notice." Graf-
figna, 512 A.2d at 94.
249. Ramon v. Department of Transp., 556 A.2d 919 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), affd, 573
A.2d 1025 (Pa. 1990). In Ramon, the minor daughter of Cuban immigrants was injured when
she fell in a pothole on a PaDOT highway. The six month notice required by 42 PA. CoNs.
STAT. § 5522 (current version at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5522 (1990 & Supp. 1992)), was not
given and the trial court dismissed the suit against PaDOT. Id. The commonwealth court
vacated the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings, including considera-
tion that reasonable excuse was offered for non-compliance and holding that the burden
then shifted to the public entity to prove that it had suffered prejudice as a result of the
non-compliance. Id. at 922-23. According to the commonwealth court, ignorance of the law
or an inability to understand the same, in the absence of prejudice to the government unit,
constituted reasonable excuse for failure to provide notice. Id.; Hoy, 565 A.2d at 850. Judge
Palladino, in her dissent to the Hoy decision, profferred the opinion that "Ramon is limited
to those instances where there is both ignorance of the law and the inability to understand
the law." Hoy, 565 A.2d at 851 (Palladino, J. dissent) (emphasis added); but see Augusta v.
Commonwealth, 563 A.2d 1313 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) where the court concluded that
plaintiff presented reasonable excuse for her non-compliance with the six-month notice re-
quirement wherein she asserted she had not realized that she had a possible cause of action
against PaDOT until a friend suggested she contact a lawyer. The court rejected the defend-
ant's argument that "an [18-year old] college freshman who speaks English must know of
when there is a possible lawsuit, refusing to impute such legal 'knowledge' to all laypersons."
Augusta, 563 A.2d at 1315.
250. Hoy, 565 A.2d at 850. In Davis v. Liquor Control Bd., 568 A.2d 270 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 578 A.2d 931 (Pa. 1990), the commonwealth court (en banc) con-
cluded that "a reasonable excuse exists when either the claimant or the claimant's attorney
is ignorant of the six-month notice requirement, so long as no undue hardship resulted to
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The notice provision has been viewed as an affirmative defense
to recovery, not a strict statute of limitations on the claim.25 The
commonwealth court has concluded that the determination of
whether reasonable excuse for noncompliance exists is a legal issue
for the court to resolve.252 Once reasonable excuse is established,
the government unit must raise specific facts to establish undue
hardship.25
IV. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY PARAMETERS
Section 8522(a) sets forth the parameters by which exceptions to
sovereign immunity are to be viewed. 54 Section 8522(a) clearly
limits the waiver of sovereign immunity. The General Assembly
did not intend to "create" any new causes of action, but merely to
"waive" sovereign immunity as a bar. to certain types of actions.255
the governmental unit." Davis, 568 A.2d at 273 (citing Yurechko v. County of Allegheny, 243
A.2d 372 (Pa. 1968)).
251. Bissey v. Commonwealth, 613 A.2d 37 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992); see also Landis v.
City of Philadelphia, 369 A.2d 746, 749 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (interpreting Act of 1937). In
Clyde v. Thornburgh, 533 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1982), the court carefully analyzed 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 5522(b)(1) (1990) and "established a two-step analysis to determine those
civil rights claims which are properly subjected to the six month period." Clyde, 533 F.
Supp. at 284-88. The statute was viewed "as complementing, rather than supplanting, the
traditional analysis courts employ in determining which statute of limitations to apply." Id.
"If the state has provided a statute of limitations for the specific conduct at issue, then that
specific [statute of limitations] would apply." Id. Where the state activity forming the basis
of the §1983 claim had no specific limitation, then the six month limitation contained in 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 5522(b)(1) (1990) applied. Id. In Salaneck v. Olena, 558 F. Supp. 370
(E.D. Pa. 1983), the court concluded from a review of the opinion in Clyde that section
5522(b)(1) was merely residuary in nature, and thus not applicable where the conduct in
question fell within another specific limitation. Salaneck, 558 F. Supp. at 371. (citing Has-
sell v. City of Philadelphia, 507 F. Supp. 814, 817 n. 3 (E.D. Pa. 1981)); Webster v. Great
American Ins. Co., 544 F. Supp. 609, 612-13 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
252. See Bissey, 613 A.2d at 41 (citing Landis, 369 A.2d at 749 n. 4).
253. Bissey, 613 A.2d at 41; Davis v. Liquor Control Bd., 568 A.2d 270 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1989) (where reasonable excuse for failure to file timely notice is shown, burden shifts to
commonwealth agency to prove undue hardship resulted from failure to satisfy notice re-
quirement), appeal denied, 578 A.2d 931 (Pa. 1990).
254. Section 8522(a) states:
The General Assembly, pursuant to Section 11 of Article I of the Constitution of
Pennsylvania, does hereby waive, in the instances set forth in subsection (b) only and
only to the extent set forth in this subchapter and within the limits set forth in Sec-
tion 8528 (relating to limitations on damages), sovereign immunity as a bar to an
action against Commonwealth parties, for damages arising out of a negligent act
where the damages would be recoverable under the common law or a statute creating
a cause of action if the injury were caused by a person not having available the de-
fense of sovereign immunity.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(a) (1990).
255. See JOINT REPORT, cited at note 145, at 11: "The intention here is to prohibit the
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Additionally, potential claims are limited to negligence actions
against commonwealth parties. 6' Therefore, claims of intentional
torts, claims against independent contractors, claims for breach of
warranty, and claims for other non-negligent causes of action do
not fall within the waiver provision. Indeed, the legislative task
force reviewing potential waivers specifically rejected waiving im-
munity for intentional torts, improper tax assessments, seizure and
detention of personal property, products liability actions, civil
rights and constitutional violations, quarantine restrictions, claims
of adverse possession, improper licensing claims, and actions based
on a failure to inspect. 57 The General Assembly also rejected waiv-
ing actions for or by independent contractors,"'8 requiring instead
that the action be one arising from an act of a commonwealth
party.
2 59
The threshold inquiry into whether sovereign immunity is
waived regarding a cause of action requires an initial determina-
tion of whether the lawsuit is based on a recognizable cause of ac-
tion sounding in negligence. 2 0 The action may be grounded on a
duty recognized by common law261 or by statute.26 2 Generally, the
creation of any new causes of action and merely to remove the bar from suit where the cause
of action already exists in the enumerated areas." Id.
256. Id. The specific language of section 8522(a) requires that for an action to fall
within the exception, it must arise "out of a negligent act .... " 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 8522(a) (1990). See also Marshall v. Port Auth., 568 A.2d 931, 935 (Pa. 1990).
257. See JOINT REPORT, cited at note 145, at 15.
258.. Id. at 16.
259. See note 86 and accompanying text; see also Marshall, 568 A.2d at 935.
260. Gilson v. Doe, 600 A.2d 267, 269 (Pa. 1991), (citing Giosa v. School Dist. of Phila-
delphia, 562 A.2d 411, 412 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989)), appeal denied, 578 A.2d 416 (Pa. 1990);
Mascaro v. Youth Study Ctr., 523 A.2d 1118, 1120 (Pa. 1987). The elements of a negligence
action consist of:
(1) a duty recognized by law to conform to a certain standard of conduct,
(2) a failure to conform to the standard,
(3) a causal connection between the failure to conform and the injury, and
(4) damages arising from the failure.
Morena v. South Hills Health Sys., 462 A.2d 680, 684 n. 5 (Pa. 1983). See also W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-165 (5th ed. 1984).
261. See Snyder v. Harmon, 562 A.2d 307, 312 (Pa. 1989), wherein the court stated
that "the duty of care a Commonwealth agency owes to those using its real estate, is such as
to require that the condition of the property is safe for the activities for which it is regularly
used ...." See also Drew v. Laber, 383 A.2d 941, 943 (Pa. 1978) ("[A] municipality is
required to construct and maintain its highways in such a manner as to protect travelers
from dangers which, by the exercise of normal foresight, careful construction and reasonable
inspection, can be anticipated and avoided." (quoting Mitchell v. Rochester Borough, 150
A.2d 338, 340 (Pa. 1959)).
262. See, e.g., Gilson v. Doe, 600 A.2d 267 (Pa. 1991) (claiming negligence for failing to
install "curb cuts", as required by the Physically Handicapped Act of 1965, Act of Septem-
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duty required is "to conform to a certain standard of conduct for
the protection of persons such as the plaintiff."" 3 In determining
whether a duty exists, courts must "determine the relationship be-
tween the parties and balance the various competing interests and
costs involved in providing the requested protection. This requires
a determination of the probability of harm in conjunction with the
inconvenience of acting to prevent the harm. '264 If no duty is
breached, a negligence action cannot be maintained.2 5
Courts have strictly construed the waivers to conform to the leg-
islative intent to exempt the sovereign from immunity only in the
areas clearly defined by section 8522(a).266 Additionally, the claim
must be directed at an individual or entity defined as a "common-
wealth party. 26 7 A "commonwealth party" includes common-
wealth agencies and their employees, provided that claims against
the employees involve acts within the scope of their
employment.
2 68
Once the provisions of section 8522(a) have been satisfied, the
focus of the analysis shifts to whether the claim falls within one of
the areas waived under the Sovereign Immunity Act. These waiv-
ers of sovereign immunity are discussed below.
V. WAIVERS TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. Waiver Addressing the Operation of a Motor Vehicle
Section 8522(b)(1) waives statutory immunity for "[t]he opera-
tion of any motor vehicle in the possession or control of a common-
wealth party. As used in this paragraph, 'motor vehicle' means any
vehicle which is self-propelled and any attachment thereto, includ-
ing vehicles operated by rail, through water or in the air.
'269
her 1, 1965, 1965 Pa. Laws 459, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1455.1-1455.3(b)
(1990)).
263. Merritt v. City of Chester, 496 A.2d 1220, 1221 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (citing
Macina v. McAdams, 421 A.2d 432, 434 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)); accord Leoni v. Reinhard,
194 A. 490, 491 (Pa. 1937).
264. Mindala v. American Motors Corp., 543 A.2d 520, 524 (Pa. 1988) (per curiam).
265. Marshall v. Port Auth., 568 A.2d 931, 935 (Pa. 1990) (citing Morena v. South
Hills Health Sys., 462 A.2d 680 (Pa. 1983)).
266. See notes 64-85 and accompanying text.
267. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(a) (1990). Further section 8522(a) states that acts may
impose liability on the Commonwealth if the acts complained of are "by a [c]ommonwealth
party." Id. See note 87 and accompanying text for an explanation of what constitutes a
commonwealth party.
268. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(a) (1990).
269. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(1) (1990). See JOINT REPORT, cited at note 145, at
12. The General Assembly looked to the various definitions of motor vehicles, including that
Vol. 32:1
Sovereign Immunity In Pennsylvania
Appellate courts have addressed the issue of what constitutes
"possession or control" of a motor vehicle by a commonwealth
party. In Burnatowski v. Butler Ambulance Service Co.,270 the
commonwealth court concluded that the vehicle exception applied
only where an employee of the government unit actually operated
the vehicle2 1 The court went on to conclude that mere control of
a motor vehicle was insufficient to trigger the motor vehicle excep-
tion to governmental immunity.27 2 Consequently, in order for the
exception to apply, there must be some act indicating that the ve-
hicle was in operation by a governmental official.
73
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined the term "opera-
tion" strictly, to mean actually putting a vehicle in motion. Ac-
cording to the court, acts taken in preparation of or after cessation
of vehicular operation are not sufficient.17 4 In applying this rule,
the commonwealth court has held that "operation" does not in-
clude for example, injuries resulting from being struck on the head
by a raw egg thrown through an open window of a trolley by an
unknown third party.275 Such a claim contains no allegation that
the "injuries were caused by the movement of the vehicle, or by
movement of part of the vehicle, or by an act that was even nomi-
nally related to the operation of a vehicle. ' 27 6 Since the vehicle's
movement and operation were not in any way related to the injury,
the court concluded that the complaint did not state a cause of
action within the vehicle exception to sovereign immunity.277 In
short, this immunity waiver applies only where there is a legal
nexus between the vehicle's operation and the injury claimed.
The term "operation" has been held to include the opening and
closing of bus doors, provided that the claim is premised on the
door's operation and not the act of the individual in passing
through the doors.2  In Sonnenberg v. Erie Metropolitan Transit
found at 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 102 (1992) and I PA. CONS. STAT. § 1991 (1975 & Supp. 1992).
270. 567 A.2d 1121 (Pa. Comrw. Ct. 1989).
271. Burnatowski, 567 A.2d at 1121 (citing Capuzzi v. Heller, 558 A.2d 596 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1989)).
272. Id. at 1124 (citing Burkey v. Borough of Auburn, 514 A.2d 273 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1986), appeal denied, 531 A.2d 432 (Pa. 1987); Davies v. Barnes, 503 A.2d 93 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1986)).
273. Burnatowski, 567 A.2d at 1124.
274. Love, 543 A.2d at 533. See notes 74-84 and accompanying text for a complete
discussion of the facts and holding of Love.
275. Hall v. SEPTA, 596 A.2d 1153, 1154 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
276. Hall, 596 A.2d at 1156.
277. Id.
278. Sonnenberg v. Erie Metro. Transit Auth., 586 A.2d 1026 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991);
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Authority, an action was brought against the Erie Metropolitan
Transit Authority for injuries allegedly incurred by the plaintiff
when she was stepping down through the door prior to alighting
from the vehicle.27  According to the complaint, as the plaintiff
moved through the back exit doors, the doors suddenly closed,
trapping her.280 The plaintiff alleged she sustained permanent inju-
ries to her back while struggling to escape from the door.281
The commonwealth court determined that the above facts set
forth a viable cause of action, precluding summary judgment.282
According to the commonwealth court, the term "operation" does
not require movement of the entire vehicle, but rather may be es-
tablished by movement of parts of the vehicle or attachments to
the vehicle, provided such movement is an act normally related to
the "operation" of the vehicle.
2 83
Unlike Love,54 the facts in Sonnenberg set forth a colorable
claim because the action was premised on the movement of the
bus, or a part thereof, rather than the physical act of alighting
from the vehicle. The movement (or "operation") of the bus door
was an activity within the control of the government agency or its
employee. In contrast, the action of a person alighting from a vehi-
cle is not something reasonably within the control of the agency.
The court properly focused its analysis on whether the acts of the
government entity with respect to the motor vehicle were
negligent.
Courts have denied the existence of liability if the allegations are
directed to acts of third parties. In Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority v. Hussey,285 plaintiffs brought suit for
injuries received during an argument with unknown third parties
compare Lehman v. County of Lebanon Trans. Auth., 599 A.2d 259 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991)
(no cause of action under vehicle liability exception for injuries sustained stepping off bus,
where allegations are premised on alleged unsafe stop).
279. Sonnenberg, 586 A.2d at 1027.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1028.
283. Id. See also Vogel v. Langer, 569 A.2d 1047, 1048 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (the
vehicle exception is applicable to a claim for injuries suffered by a passenger in a motor
vehicle waved through an intersection by a bus driver, where the motor vehicle collided with
a third vehicle. The court found that "[t]he operation of a motor vehicle necessarily entails
temporary stops," and the "operation of a motor vehicle entails communication with other
drivers." Id.)
284. 543 A.2d at 531. See notes 74-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
facts and holding in Love.
285. 588 A.2d 110 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
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at a subway stop. The confrontation occurred within the direct ob-
servation of the SEPTA 86 trainman operating the train from
which the combative passengers emerged.287 The plaintiffs claimed
that SEPTA was negligent because the trainman "(1) failed to
keep the doors of the train closed, or failed to close them expedi-
tiously to prevent the escalation of violence; (2) failed to control
the confrontation and assert his authority; (3) failed to alert the
canine police aboard another car of the train; and (4) failed to en-
list the aid of police, other SEPTA employees, or willing passen-
gers to quell the altercation. '' 25 The commonwealth court con-
cluded there could be no finding against the Commonwealth under
the vehicle liability exception to Sovereign Immunity for criminal
acts of third parties, even if the acts were facilitated by the com-
monwealth agency's operation of a vehicle.289
In general, courts have interpreted the vehicle liability exception
narrowly, strictly construing the term "operation". The prelimi-
nary focus is whether the vehicle (or a portion thereof) was actu-
ally in operation when the injury occurred, and whether this opera-
tion was causally connected to the injury sustained.90 While
operation is not limited to the movement of the entire vehicle,
whatever operation is involved must have a substantial causative
connection to the injury.
Decisions addressing this exception include the stated or implied
286. SEPTA is the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority and was held
to be a commonwealth agency for purposes of the Sovereign Immunity Act in Feingold v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 517 A.2d 1270 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1986); see also Chambers v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Trans. Auth., 563 A.2d 603 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1989).
287. Hussey, 588 A.2d at 110-11.
288. Id. at 111.
289. Id. at 112-13.
290. See Dickens v. Horner, 611 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1992). No cause of action existed
against police officer by an individual injured by another driver eluding police. Dickens, 611
A.2d at 695. The negligence claim was premised on the decision to engage in a high speed
chase. Id. The court found that the failure of the chased individual to stop, and their colli-
sion with the individual, caused the individual's injuries. Id. The court concluded:
We cannot impose liability for the crimes of Horner on the Township or Officer Bush
... because the legislative scheme of immunity consistently excludes all criminal acts
from liability, including the acts of one such as Horner, who chooses to defy a lawful
order to stop his car and commits a series of crimes which terminate in inflicting
serious injuries to an innocent bystander like [Dickens].
Id. at 695.
Accord Dennis v. City of Philadelphia, 620 A.2d 625 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993); Tobay v.
Crossland, 620 A.2d 636 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993); White v. Moto Laverda (S.R.L.), 620 A.2d
52 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993); Conroy v. City of Philadelphia, 620 A.2d 51 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1993); Burnett v. City of Philadelphia, 620 A.2d 50 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
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requirement that the vehicle operation be an act controlled by the
commonwealth party and existing as the focus of the claim. Thus,
a claim for injuries sustained while stepping off a bus, 9' or for in-
juries from being accosted "9" or struck while on public transporta-
tion,293 do not set forth colorable claims. The focus of such actions
is not on the commonwealth party's activities but rather on the
actions of the individual claimant or third parties. In contrast, a
claim for injuries associated with the operation or movement of the
vehicle, whether actual operation, 94 or operation of an attach-
ment29 5 does focus on the commonwealth party's activities and
does set forth an appropriate claim. Only when the above parame-
ters are satisfied will a colorable action exist.
B. Waiver Addressing Claims for Medical Professional Liability
1. General Provisions
The Sovereign Immunity Act contains an exception to the gen-
eral grant of immunity for acts of health care employees of com-
monwealth agency medical facilities or institutions.2 96 A claim
under this exception must allege negligence for the actions or
omissions of the commonwealth health care employee.9
The term "health care employee" was analyzed by the common-
291. Love, 543 A.2d 531.
292. Hussey, 588 A.2d 110.
293. Hall, 596 A.2d 1153.
294. Love, 543 A.2d at 533 (stating that "to operate something means to actually put
it in motion. Merely preparing to operate the vehicle, or acts taken at the cessation of oper-
ating a vehicle are not the same as actually operating that vehicle." Id.)
295. Sonnenberg, 586 A.2d at 1028. But see Speece v. Borough of North Braddock,
604 A.2d 760 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (vehicle liability exception to immunity (in this case,
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542(b)(1) (1990)) does not include injuries sustained by an individual
at a fire scene who was injured by a fire hose that burst from its coupling on the fire truck.
The operation of the vehicle as a water pump, an activity taken at the cessation of the
vehicle operation, falls outside the narrow confines of this immunity waiver.)
296. Section 8522(b)(2) waives immunity for the following: "(2)Medical-Professional
Liability.-Acts of health care employees of Commonwealth agency medical facilities or in-
stitutions or by a Commonwealth party who is a doctor, dentist, nurse or related health care
personnel." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(2) (1990).
297. Id. The Tort Claims Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8541-8564 (1990) contains no
immunity waiver for acts of health care employees. Consequently, no cause of action exists
for medical malpractice suits against local government agencies. City of Philadelphia v.
Brown, 618 A.2d 1236 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992); City of Philadelphia v. Glim, 613 A.2d 613
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992); Weissman v. City of Philadelphia, 513 A.2d 571 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1986); Matteo v. City of Philadelphia, 512 A.2d 796 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986), appeal denied,
524 A.2d 496 (Pa. 1987); Henagan v. Katz, 509 A.2d 1387 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
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wealth court in Freedman v. Allentown.2"8 The undisputed facts in
Freedman indicated that plaintiff's decedent was arrested for vio-
lating Pennsylvania prescription drug laws.29 9 Decedent was ques-
tioned and subsequently placed in an isolated cell in the city jail.3 00
When checked less than one hour later, it was found that decedent
had committed suicide by hanging himself in the cell.301
A wrongful death and survival complaint was filed against the
City of Allentown; its police department personnel; the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, Board of Probation and Parole; and the
decedent's parole officer.302 The complaint alleged that the parole
officer was a "related health care personnel" who had knowledge of
the decedent's mental disorders and suicidal tendencies but failed
to communicate this knowledge to the Allentown police
department. 303
The parole officer, along with the Board of Probation and Pa-
role, filed a motion for summary judgment claiming sovereign and
official immunity.304 The trial court granted the motion and plain-
tiff appealed, contending, among other things, that the parole of-
ficer was a related health care person.30 5 According to the plaintiff,
the parole officer's job description indicated that he rendered "the
type of psychological care that classifie[d] [him] as [a] health care
personnel related to doctors, dentists or nurses."308
The commonwealth court disagreed, stating that the relevant
section30 7 specified that the term "health care personnel" included
doctors, dentists, and nurses, all of which "must receive degrees
298. Freedman v. City of Allentown, 562 A.2d 1012 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), overruled
in part on other grounds by Frankle v. Miklich, 618 A.2d 1145 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).





304. Freedman, 562 A.2d at 1013. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2310 (Supp. 1992).
305. Freedman, 562 A.2d at 1013-14. Plaintiff also claimed the parole officer's "failure
to notify the Allentown police of the decedent's mental instability was willful misconduct
subjecting him to liability." Id. at 1014.
306. Id. The job description for a parole officer stated, in relevant part:
An employe[e] in this class is responsible for counseling and advising clients on pro-
bation and parole to foster personal, social and economic adjustment in the commu-
nity. Work involves providing counseling and supervision to persons on probation and
parole, developing treatment plans for clients, completing pre-sentence investigation
reports, investigation of pre-parole plans, Pardon Board investigations, classification
summaries and other special investigations.
Id.
307. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(2) (1990). See note 296.
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and be licensed by the Commonwealth to practice in their respec-
tive fields." 30 8 The court noted that in order to be a parole officer
"no specialized training and certification in counseling is
required."'3 0 9
The court also adopted the principle set forth in Steinberg v.
Department of Public Welfare,310 which analyzed whether a youth
development center was a medical facility employing workers as
health care personnel, subject to suit under the medical profes-
sional liability exception. In that case, the commonwealth court
concluded that such facilities do not fall within the classification of
a medical facility for purposes of the Sovereign Immunity Act and
the employees did not qualify as health care personnel, despite the
fact that employees provided counseling and other psychological
services for the student-inmates of the institution.311 The Freed-
man court reiterated its obligation to narrowly interpret the excep-
tions to sovereign immunity312 and stated that it could not "draw
the broad conclusion that all professionals, from doctors to clergy,
who provide counseling to clientele are 'related health care person-
nel' as contemplated by [the Sovereign Immunity Act]." 313
Where a portion of a commonwealth agency facility is dedicated
to providing medical care, the health care administrator for the fa-
cility will be classified as a health care provider under the Sover-
eign Immunity Act. In Wareham v. Jeffes,31" an action was
brought against the chief health care administrator for a prison in-
firmary, alleging that the infirmary failed to provide the inmate
with adequate medical or therapeutic treatment.31 5 The common-
wealth court distinguished its holding in Steinberg,316 noting that
while the function of a prison is similar to that of a youth deten-
•tion center, the function of a prison infirmary is to provide medi-
cal care to the inmates, and that function is separate from the
function of the prison as a whole. The court supported its holding
with the chief health care administrator's testimony, which indi-
cated that the function of the administrator encompassed provid-
308. Freedman, 562 A.2d at 1014.
309. Id.
310. 405 A.2d 1135 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979).
311. Steinberg, 405 A.2d at 1136-37.
312. Freedman, 562 A.2d at 1014 (citing Moore v. Department of Justice, 538 A.2d 111
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988)).
313. Freedman, 562 A.2d at 1014.
314. 564 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
315. Wareham, 564 A.2d at 1317, n. 4.
316. Id. at 1319. See note 311 and accompanying text.
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ing health care services to inmates pursuant to a physician's or-
ders. " ' This, according to the court, fell within the definition set
forth for "health care providers" found in the Sovereign Immunity
Act.
318
An analysis of the above case law shows the courts' strict con-
struction approach to the definition of health care provider. In or-
der for an employee to be classified as a health care provider, the
employee must engage in some activity focused primarily upon
health care. In addition, the health care provided must have as its
source licensed, professionally trained employees who direct the
medical activities. The routine activities of certain employees, in-
cluding the activities of counselors and parole officers will not sat-
isfy the definition, and therefore, will not be subject to liability
under the medical exception waiver. The term "health care em-
ployee" has been applied only to those individuals who have re-
ceived substantial formal education in health care or provide con-
tinuous health care as a primary function of their employment
responsibility.
When determining whether activities fall within this exception
to the immunity waiver, the court's analysis may focus on the dis-
tinct, separate activities of a portion of the facility. The fact that
the general function of a facility is not health care will not necessa-
rily bar a claim under this section if a portion of the facility does
provide such care. The court focuses attention on the care given
and whether such care is the type generally provided by a health
care facility.
It is clear that the General Assembly intended to waive immu-
nity for claims of medical malpractice made against commonwealth
health care employees at commonwealth health care facilities. The
General Assembly also specifically waived immunity for claims
against a commonwealth doctor, dentist, nurse or related health
care personnel.319 The courts have interpreted this to include pri-
marily those educated in a medical discipline who are licensed by
the Commonwealth. Additionally, employees whose primary focus
is on providing health care may constitute "related health care
personnel." Courts will review the particular fact patterns
presented, focussing on the activities of the employee in question
to determine whether the employee falls within the "related health
317. Wareham, 564 A.2d at 1319.
318. Id. at 1323-24.




2. Mental Health Care Liability
In Goryeb v. Commonwealth,2 ° the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was faced with the issue of whether a commonwealth health
care professional who participated in a decision to examine, treat
or discharge a patient could be held liable to third parties under
the provisions of the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA). 21
An action was brought against the commonwealth agency and hos-
pital officials alleging negligence and/or misconduct in discharging
a patient who subsequently shot himself and three other people.
The facts indicated that Jeffrey Geiger was brought to Clarks
Summit State Hospital by Sergeant Zuba of the Edwardsville Bor-
ough Police Department. Upon arrival, Zuba completed an invol-
untary emergency examination and treatment application pursuant
to the MHPA.322 In accordance with the MHPA procedure for in-
voluntary admissions, Zuba indicated on the application that Gei-
ger posed a clear and present danger to himself and others, and
was severely mentally disabled. s According to Zuba, Geiger had
been carrying a hunting knife and was threatening to use it on
himself if he did not receive immediate help. Geiger also related to
Zuba that he had held a loaded .357 magnum to his head while
contemplating suicide. Geiger stated he was distraught over the
termination of his relationship with his girlfriend of five years.324
An hour after his arrival at the hospital, Geiger was examined by
a hospital physician who diagnosed him as severely mentally dis-
abled and in need of treatment. In light of the diagnosis, Geiger
met the criteria for an involuntary emergency admission.3 25 As an
involuntary admittee, Geiger was required to be discharged within
120 hours of admission unless he either consented to voluntary
treatment or the hospital obtained a court certification extending
320. 575 A.2d 545 (Pa. 1990).
321. Act of July 9, 1976, 1976 Pa.. Laws 817, as amended PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50,
§§ 7101-7116 (Supp. 1993).
322. Goryeb, 575 A.2d at 546.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7301(a) (Supp. 1993) provides:
A person is severely mentally disabled when, as a result of mental illness, his capacity
to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and so-
cial relations or to care for his own personal needs is so lessened that he poses a clear
and present danger of harm to others or to himself.
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involuntary emergency treatment. 26 A preliminary requirement for
obtaining such a certification is that the hospital explain why an
extended emergency treatment is believed to be necessary.32 7
Geiger was discharged on NOvember 26, 1984, within the 120
hour period. On December 5, 1984, Geiger entered the premises
occupied by his former girlfriend, Marie Collins, her current boy-
friend, and another individual, Greg Goryeb. Geiger shot all three
residents of the household, killing Goryeb and wounding Collins
and her boyfriend. Geiger then turned the gun on himself, commit-
ting suicide. 28
An action was brought against the hospital and the hospital phy-
sician alleging gross negligence and willful misconduct in discharg-
ing Geiger. The claim alleged that the hospital and doctor knew or
should have known that Geiger continued to present a danger to
himself and to others, particularly his former girlfriend and those
associated with her. The trial court denied defendants' motion for
summary judgment, which was based on the defense of sovereign
immunity.32 9 The commonwealth court, after permitting an inter-
locutory appeal,330 granted summary judgment in favor of the com-
monwealth entities based on sovereign immunity.331
The supreme court reversed, holding that when a commonwealth
party participates in a decision to examine, treat or discharge a
patient, it can be held liable to third parties under the provisions
of the MHPA where the commonwealth party's treatment decision
constitutes willful misconduct or gross negligence. 2  The court an-
alyzed both the medical-professional liability waiver to sovereign
326. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7302(d), 7303 (Supp. 1993).
327. Section 7303(d) states, in pertinent part:
Contents of Certification.-A certification for extended involuntary treatment shall
be made in writing upon a form adopted by the department and shall include:
(1) findings by the judge or mental health review officer as to the reasons that the
extended involuntary emergency treatment is necessary;
(2) a description of the treatment to be provided together with an explanation of the
adequacy and appropriateness of such treatment, based upon the information re-
ceived at the hearing. ...
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7303(d) (Supp. 1993).
328. Goryeb, 575 A.2d at 546-47.
329. Matter of Goryeb, 557 A.2d 822, 824 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
330. Matter of Goryeb, 557 A.2d 822.
331. Matter of Goryeb, 557 A.2d at 824. The commonwealth court held that the su-
preme court decision in Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 523 A.2d 1118 (Pa. 1987), was
controlling and that the criminal acts of a discharged mental patient did not constitute acts
of the Commonwealth or its employees for which immunity was waived under the medical-
professional exception. Matter of Goryeb, 557 A.2d at 824.
332. Goryeb, 575 A.2d at 548-49.
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immunity under the Sovereign Immunity Act and the MHPA sec-
tion dealing with immunity from civil and criminal liability.33 8 Ac-
cording to the MHPA, mental health care personnel are immune
from civil and criminal liability "[iun the absence of willful miscon-
duct or gross negligence . . . -"', The court determined that since
the provisions of the two acts related to the same class of persons,
they must be read in pari materia.33 5 According to the Statutory
Construction Act of 1972,386 statutes in pari materia should, if
possible be construed together as one statute.3 7 Reading the rele-
vant medical exception to the Sovereign Immunity Act in conjunc-
tion with the relevant immunity section of the MHPA led the su-
preme court to rule that "a [c]ommonwealth party participating in
a decision to examine, treat or discharge a mentally ill patient
within the purview of the MHPA who commits willful misconduct
or gross negligence can be liable for such decision. ' ' as
Interestingly, the court concluded that reading the two statutes
in pari materia limited the applicability of the sovereign immunity
waiver. In practicality, however, the analysis expands the potential
liability. Under the supreme court analysis, claims may be asserted
based upon gross negligence and willful misconduct, areas tradi-
tionally outside the "scope of employment" arena. Since a com-
monwealth party is defined as including an employee of a common-
wealth agency "but only with respect to an act within the scope of
his office or employment",339 permitting claims based on gross neg-
ligence or willful misconduct allows claims against governmental
agencies in areas heretofore closed to such claims.
The case of Sherk v. County of Dauphin40 provided the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court with an opportunity to further define the
parameters of this exception as related to treatment of mental
health patients. The complaint filed in the action s4' indicated that
333. Id.
334. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7114(a) (Supp. 1993).
335. Goryeb, 575 A.2d at 548.
336. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1501-1991 (1975 & Supp. 1992).
337. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1932 (1975).
338. Goryeb, 575 A.2d at 548-49.
339. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8501 (1990). In addition, the Task Force specifically re-
jected waiving claims for intentional torts when drafting the Sovereign Immunity Act. See
JOINT REPORT, cited at note 145, at 15.
340. 614 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1992).
341. In Sherk, the court was reviewing the grant of preliminary objections in the na-
ture of a demurrer, requiring the court to accept as true all material facts set forth in the
complaint as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, in order to determine
whether on the facts averred the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible. Sherk,
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Sherk, a township police officer, was dispatched to investigate a
report of a suspicious person with a gun.""2 Officer Sherk did en-
counter and arrest Jordan, who had a history of mental illness and
had been released from the Harrisburg State Hospital approxi-
mately six weeks prior.348 While attempting to control Jordan, a
scuffle broke out, and Jordan acquired possession of Sherk's
weapon. Jordan fired a shot at Sherk, wounding Sherk in the leg.
34'
Jordan then fled the scene and shortly thereafter committed sui-
cide with Sherk's weapon.
3, 5
The issue as defined by the court was whether "allegations of
reckless, wanton and negligent conduct on the part of Harrisburg
State Hospital ... in the care and release of a psychiatric patient
(Jordan) [constituted] a substantial and foreseeable factor in
bringing about the harm to Sherk .... -846 As in Goryeb, the court
looked to the language of the MHPA, particularly section 114 ,
7
which discusses the potential liability for treatment decisions. Ex-
panding on the term "decision" and referring to section 114 of the
MHPA, the court opined: "[tihus, a Commonwealth party who
commits willful misconduct or gross negligence in participating in
a decision to examine, treat or discharge a patient pursuant to the
Mental Health Procedures Act shall be 'liable for such decision or
for any of its consequences.' "s8 According to the court, the term
"any of its consequences":
clearly indicates a recognition that discharging a mentally disabled patient,
especially one who has been classified as a clear and present danger to him-
self and/or others constitutes a potential serious danger, not only to himself
but to others. [citation omitted]. In the present case, an alleged conse-
quence of the reckless, wanton and negligent release of the patient Jordan
was the injuries and damages suffered by Officer Sherk.34
The reasoning adopted in Sherk potentially exposes a common-
wealth party to strict liability for treatment decisions when such
decisions are determined to be either grossly negligent or an act of
willful misconduct. Additionally, while the court claimed that the
614 A.2d at 227.
342. Sherk,'614 A.2d at 227.
343. Id. Jordan was a patient at the Hospital from October 12, 1985 until May 3, 1986.
Id. The encounter occurred on June 14, 1986. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Sherk, 614 A.2d at 231.
347. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7114 (Supp. 1993).




waiver attaches to the doctor's decision to release the patient, the
liability attaches for the acts of the patient, who was clearly not a
commonwealth party as the term is defined both generally at sec-
tion 850150 or specifically at section 8522(b)(2). 51 Thus, while
claiming to construe the medical professional liability immunity
waiver "in conjunction with and as limited by the provisions of
[s]ection 114 of the Mental Health Procedures Act, 35 1 the court's
reasoning expanded the commonwealth party's potential exposure
to include acts of third parties (generally outside the scope of lia-
bility) based upon theories not specifically waived (gross negligence
and willful misconduct). A more reasoned approach to analyzing
the duty owed by a psychologist to third parties was set forth by
the Pennsylvania Superior Court, as discussed below.
Dunkle v. Food Service East, Inc.3 5 presented the superior
court with the issue of whether a psychologist or other health care
professional owed a duty to third persons to protect the third per-
son from a patient's hostility. In Dunkle, a patient named Tindal
had been receiving psychiatric care and was diagnosed as suffering
from a schizophreniform disorder. " He was treated with the drug
Navane and at some later point was instructed by his psychiatrist
to discontinue regular use of the drug. When Tindal discontinued
the use, he became "nasty" and "violent". Consequently, the psy-
chiatrist re-prescribed the drug.
3 55
In December, the psychiatrist discharged Tindal under the care
of a counselor, discontinued his medication, and instructed him to
take Navane on an "as needed" basis.351 In March 1985, Tindal
told police that he had been stealing. His counselor was contacted
that day but neither confirmed nor denied any association with
Tindal. The following day, Tindal strangled his girlfriend in the
men's room of a store, believing her to be a Russian agent.3 57
In its analysis of the case, the superior court undertook an ex-
tensive review of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Califor-
nia s5 and concluded that a psychologist may have a duty to pro-
350. See note 87 and accompanying text.
351. See note 296 and accompanying text.
352. Sherk, 614 A.2d at 232-233 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
353. 582 A.2d 1342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).




358. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). In Tarasoff, the plaintiffs alleged that the patient had
confided to his psychologist his intent to commit violent acts against a specific target. Id. at
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tect an identifiable, foreseeable victim from a patient's threat to
violence. " This would include those individuals against whom the
patient had threatened to inflict harm.3 60
The superior court specifically limited a physician's duty to third
parties, concluding that any such duty was limited to those who
are identifiable or foreseeable. What constitutes an "identifiable or
foreseeable" victim from a patient's violent threats will signifi-
cantly affect the exposure mental health care providers face when
treating patients. The superior court limited such protection to in-
dividuals against whom the patient has made a particular threat.
However, the court did not define the parameters to which this will
be applied.
Whether the mental health care provider owes a duty only to
those individuals specifically named is unclear. The superior court
chose not to address this, stating instead that the decision required
a balancing of the health care provider's duty to the patient
against the duty to advise a third party of a perceived risk. The
court carved out two potential exceptions to the general rule that a
person owes no duty to control the conduct of another or to warn
those endangered by such conduct: (1) where the patient has mani-
fested a specific intent to commit violent acts against a specific,
identified target; and (2) where the physician stands in some "spe-
cial relationship" to either the person whose conduct needs to be
controlled or in a relationship to the foreseeable victim of that
conduct.36'1
339-40. The victim was not advised of this fact and subsequently was killed by the patient.
Id. In Tarasoff, the California Supreme Court concluded that in certain, very limited cir-
cumstances, the public's interest in safety must take precedence over the patient's interest
in confidentiality. Id. at 347. The reasoning in Tarasoff was adopted by the Pennsylvania
Superior Court in Coath v. Jones, 419 A.2d 1249 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
359. Id. Dunkle, 582 A.2d at 1345 (citing Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 346).
360. Id. However, the court found no duty in this case because Tindal had not
threatened to harm his girlfriend.
361. Dunkle, 582 A.2d at 1345 (quoting Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343). In Leonard v. La-
trobe Area Hosp., 625 A.2d 1228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), the Pennsylvania Superior Court
further discussed the reasoning in Dunkle. Leonard addresses specifically the extent of a
psychiatrist's responsibility to warn a third person of the violent propensities of a patient,
who is under the psychiatrist's care, when the patient does not specifically identify the vic-
tim whom the patient later harms. Leonard, 625 A.2d at 1229. James Gault was admitted to
Latrobe Hospital's psychiatric unit for eight days following an overdose of aspirin. Two
months after his release, Mr. Gault shot and killed his wife. The treating physician signed
an affidavit stating that the patient had not threatened to inflict harm on any particular
individual. However, the psychiatrist was aware of prior incidences where Mr. Gault had
abused his wife, and the defendants were aware that on discharge there were signs of a
"hostile dependent relationship" between Mr. Gault and his wife. Also, on discharge Mr.
1993
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In applying the "special relationship" test, the court placed great
emphasis on the relationship of the physician to the foreseeable
victim. Indeed, in Dunkle the superior court concluded "that a
psychologist (or psychiatrist) owes no duty to warn or otherwise
protect a non-patient where the patient has not threatened to in-
flict harm on a particular individual.
' 6 2
As stated by the superior court, no cause of action will exist in
Pennsylvania against mental health care providers for injuries
caused to third parties unless the patient, prior to committing the
tort, had threatened to inflict some harm on the particular individ-
ual. The court concluded that to hold otherwise would make
mental health care providers strictly liable "for the wrongful acts
of their patients where there is any reason to believe that a third
party might be endangered by the patient's possible misconduct
and the medical professional fails to inform the third party of
same." 63 Thus, despite the superior court's stated recognition of
liability where a "special relationship" exists, the reasoning of the
court indicates that the only "special relationship" permitting a
claim would be when the patient had specifically identified a par-
ticular third- party as subject to the patient's violent propensities.
However, in light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's analysis in
Sherk64 and its apparent adoption of an "inverse analogy" ration-
ale, it is unclear whether the superior court's analysis in Dunkle
will be adopted in such actions brought against a commonwealth
party.
Gault was diagnosed as having an organic brain syndrome with depression. Id.
The court in Leonard affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the defendants. Id. at 1232. In so doing, the court followed the reasoning in Dunkle, 582
A.2d at 1345, and Leedy v. Hartnett, 510 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 686
(3d Cir. 1982). According to the superior court, Dunkle and Leedy held that an action may
not be maintained against a mental health care provider for injuries caused by a patient to a
non-patient unless such injury is both foreseeable and the specific identity of the intended
victim has been brought to the attention of the provider. Leonard, 625 A.2d at 1232. As the
court stated "[nlot only foreseeability of a general danger, but the specific identity of an
intended victim, must be brought to the attention of the physician before it can be held that
a physician has a duty to warn the intended victim." Id. Such a holding also addressed the
superior court's concerns to prevent strict liability from being " 'imposed upon treating phy-
sicians for the wrongful acts of their patients where there is any reason to believe that a
third party might be endangered by the patient's possible misconduct and the medical pro-
fessional fails to inform the third party of same.'" Id. (quoting Dunkle, 582 A.2d at 1346-
47). The court concluded that "[s]uch a rule would be unworkable and illogical." Id.
362. Dunkle, 582 A.2d at 1347.
363. Id. (footnote omitted).
364. Sherk v. County of Dauphin, 614 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1992); see notes 340-352 and ac-
companying text.
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C. Waiver Addressing the Care, Custody or Control of Personal
Property
Immunity has been waived for negligent acts involving the care,
custody or control of personal property in the possession or control
of a commonwealth party.36 5 The personalty involved may be
owned by a commonwealth party or may be the property of others,
provided the Commonwealth has control over the personalty. 866
Note, however, that the provision specifically excludes actions aris-
ing out of commonwealth agency activities involving the use of nu-
clear and other radioactive equipment, devices and materials.
67
The initial inquiry for this section is to determine whether the
property in question is real or personal. Generally, chattels placed
upon real property may be classified in one of three categories: (1)
those that are manifestly furniture, (2) those that are so annexed
to the realty as to be difficult or impossible to remove without ma-
terial injury to the realty, and (3) those that are affixed to the re-
alty and cannot be removed without destroying or substantially
harming the personalty or the realty.66 Chattels falling within the
first category remain personalty, while those in the second category
become realty. 69 As to the third, "these become part of the realty
or remain personalty, depending upon the intention of the parties
at the time of annexation . "... ,,370 When determining intent, "'it is
not so much what a party intended his legal rights to be, as it is
what intended use of the property was manifested by the conduct
of the party.' "3171
Temporary structures upon land may be deemed part of the re-
365. Section 8522(b)(3) of the Act provides:
(3)Care, custody or control of personal property.-The care, custody or control of
personal property in the possession or control of Commonwealth parties, including
Commonwealth-owned personal property and property of persons held by a Com-
monwealth agency, except that the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth is re-
tained as a bar to actions on claims- arising out of Commonwealth agency activities
involving the use of nuclear and other radioactive equipment, devices and materials.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(3) (1990).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Clayton v. Lienhard, 167 A. 321, 322 (Pa. 1933).
369. Clayton, 167 A. at 322.
370. Id. See also Maloney v. City of Philadelphia, 535 A.2d 209 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1987), appeal denied, 548 A.2d 258 (Pa. 1988).
371. Canon-McMillan Sch. Dist. v. Bioni, 561 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989)
(quoting McCloskey v. Abington Sch. Dist., 515 A.2d 642, 644 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986), quot-




alty or remain personalty, 3 7  even when temporarily affixed, de-
pending upon whether removal would substantially harm the re-
alty.M For example, a trash dumpster may be considered
personalty or realty, depending upon the length of time it remains
in a specific area and the function it serves.174 As a general rule,
when making a determination between realty and personalty, 
3 7
courts look to a number of factors, including the nature and use to
which the personalty is put, the manner in which the personalty is
annexed to the realty, and the relationship of the possessor of the
personalty to the realty.
3 76
Once a determination on whether the property is real or personal
has been made, the analysis shifts to whether the property is in the
"possession or control" of the commonwealth party. 77 As used in
this statute, possession or control does not include the mere right
to inspect property or regulate its use.378 Courts look for more tan-
gible evidence of possession or control over property, 379 and require
a showing that the commonwealth agency maintained physical pos-
session or actual control of the property. The ability to regulate
use of property is insufficient without actual possession or control
of the property in question.3 0
372. See, e.g., Maloney, 535 A.2d at 209 (scaffolding remains personalty and is not an
improvement to land).
373. Deritis v. City of Philadelphia, 582 A.2d 738, 741 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (tempo-
rary bleachers remain personalty "[e]ven if further evidence could indicate that the bleacher
falls within the third category of chattels, [because] the temporary nature of its placement
upon the land makes it clear that the City did not intend the bleacher to become part of the
realty." Id.)
374. See Stahl v. Cocalico Sch. Dist., 534 A.2d 1141 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
375. Interestingly, the supreme court has concluded that the determination whether
personalty affixed to realty under the third category of personalty remains personal prop-
erty or becomes realty is a legal determination for the courts to make. Bioni v. Canon-
McMillan Sch. Dist., 555 A.2d 901 (Pa. 1989). Generally, questions of intent, which by their
nature require an analysis of the facts of the case, are left to the fact-finder. Bioni, 555 A.2d
at 901.
376. Canon-McMillian Sch. Dist. v. Bioni, 533 A.2d 179, 184 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
377. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(3) (1990). See note 365.
378. Donaldson v. Department of Transp., 596 A.2d 269, 280 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991)
(PaDOT's right to inspect scaffolding and work place does not place scaffolding in the de-
partment's care, custody and control for purposes of 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8522(b)(3) (1990));
See also Kline v. Pennsylvania Mines Corp., 547 A.2d 1276 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (the
right to inspect a mine does not create an exception to sovereign immunity where the de-
fendant failed to inspect and take the necessary steps to insure the safety of the mine).
379. Buffalini v. Shrader, 535 A.2d 684, 688 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (possession or
control does not include control exercised by a municipality through zoning ordinances).
380. See, e.g., Walters v. Department of Transp., 474 A.2d 66, 67 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1984) (Plaintiffs attempted to bring suit for injuries based on the Department of Transpor-
tation's alleged failure to obtain physical custody of an individual's suspended driver's li-
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When the above two requirements are satisfied, the focus shifts
to the fundamental element of a claim brought under this immu-
nity exception; whether the personal property in the possession or
control of the commonwealth party is "in some manner responsible
for the injury" claimed.381 If there is no direct link between the
personal property itself and the injury sustained, then no claim
may be maintained under this immunity provision.18s Thus, the
commonwealth agency was immune from liability when a bank se-
curity guard injured a bank employee while committing a robbery,
even though the agency incorrectly reported that the guard had no
criminal record, when a diligent search of the records would have
shown otherwise. 88 In such a case, the injury itself was not caused
by the failure to properly search records. Rather, the robbery was
the cause of the injury.3 84 In short, the records themselves were not
involved in the chain of causation and thus did not cause any in-
jury to the plaintiff. The only involvement of the records was the
negligent search of the same.
Likewise, where an individual is detained for a significant period
of time awaiting lab results on a test of suspected drug material
found on his person, no cause of action will lie when the delayed
cense. The court concluded that the action did not fall within the immunity exception, stat-
ing "[PaDOT] was not .. . in physical possession or actual control of any of those items,
having only the option to negate their effectiveness by withdrawal; .... " Id.); Susko v.
Pennsylvania State Police, 572 A.2d 831 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (judgment on the pleadings
affirmed where the plaintiff failed to allege that the Pennsylvania State Police or their agent
removed a wrecked vehicle, thereby creating a statutory duty on the part of the State Police
to remove transmission fluid left on the road because of the accident, which fluid the plain-
tiff allegedly struck and which allegedly caused plaintiff to lose control of his vehicle. Plain-
tiff claimed the personal property exception applied since the Pennsylvania State Police
troopers were at the scene and had control thereof. Id. at 837. The commonwealth court
disagreed, noting that "[wihile it is true that actual title to property is not required in order
for the section 8522(b)(3) exception to apply .... [plaintiffs] have failed to plead that the
PA. State Police had even arguable control of the wrecked vehicle and resulting fluids." Id.)
381. Nicholson v. M & S Detective Agency, 503 A.2d 1106, 1108 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1986) (irrespective of any duty the state police may have to search their records in order to
prevent known criminals from being employed as private security guards, an action for dam-
ages cannot be maintained because it did not fall within "the care, custody or control" ex-
ception to sovereign immunity.); see also, Giovannitti v. Department of Transp., 537 A.2d
966, 968 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (claim that PaDOT failed to revoke an operator's license
after being advised by a physician of the operator's condition did not fall within any excep-
tion to immunity. The duty to recall a license pursuant to 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §1519(c)
(1993) "does not involve physical possession or actual control sufficient to bring the license
within the ambit of 42 Pa. C. S. [sic] §8522(b)(3)."), appeal denied, 548 A.2d 258 (Pa. 1988)
382. Nicholson, 503 A.2d at 1108.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 1106.
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test indicates the material is aspirin, not heroin. 8 5 The failure to
quickly analyze the substance does not fall within the ambit of the
exception, because the property itself did not cause the injury.3 8
Conversely, a cause of action may exist for injuries sustained by an
individual struck by an allegedly defective baseball bat while play-
ing in a baseball game operated by the Pennsylvania Department
of Public Welfare. 887 The bat, which was in the possession or con-
trol of the commonwealth agency, was within the direct chain of
events that caused the injury claimed. 88
The decisions in this area make it clear that the courts focus on
whether the property itself was integrally responsible for the injury
claimed. The fact that the property was peripherally related to the
incident will be insufficient to permit an action under this
exception.
In Department of Environmental Resources v. Myers, "9 a claim
was brought against the Department of Environmental Resources
("DER") seeking compensation to recover for personal injury and
property damage sustained when a helicopter collided with power
lines while the helicopter pilot was spraying forest areas to control
a gypsy moth population.9 0 Prior to the spraying operation, DER
had posted the boundaries for the spray area with balloons and
had provided the pilot with a map indicating the location of the
power lines.391 The pilot was also given a radio to permit contact
with DER personnel on the ground. 92 Testimony at trial indicated
that DER policy was to highlight on the map the existence of
hazards. 398 The map given to the pilot was not highlighted, though
it did designate the power lines with a dotted line.3 94 Testimony at
trial also indicated that boundary balloons were to be tethered far
enough from power lines to prevent entanglement,8 95 and that the
pilot should have been advised of any hazards in the area prior to
any operation. 96
385. Serrano v. Pennsylvania State Police, 568 A.2d 1006 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
386. Serrano, 568 A.2d at 1009.-
387. Vaughn v. Department of Public Welfare, 405 A.2d 1119 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979).
388. Vaughn, 405 A.2d at 1120.
389. 581 A.2d 696 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
390. Myers, 581 A.2d at 697.
391. Id.
.392. Id.
393. Id. at 699 (citing trial notes, pp. 82-83).
394. Myers, 581 A.2d at 699.
395. Id. at 699 (citing trial notes, p. 89). At trial there was no evidence presented that
the balloons tangled with the wires or helicopter. Id. at 699 n.3.
396. Myers, 581 A.2d at 699 (citing trial notes, pp. 86-87).
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The claim was based on the waiver of immunity for the care,
custody and control of personal property.3 97 The jury found in
favor of the plaintiffs and the defendant appealed, arguing that the
claim did not fall within the personal property exception because
the personal property in question (the map, balloons and radio)
did not cause the accident. 98 In short, the defendant argued that
the plaintiffs' claims of negligence concerning the lack of highlights
on the map, improper placement of the balloons, and failure to use
the radio to warn of the power lines, did not give rise to a viable
cause of action under the immunity exception. 99 The defendant
alleged that the proximate cause of the accident was the plaintiff
hitting the power lines; the map, balloons and radio only had pe-
ripheral involvement. °0
The commonwealth court agreed with the defendant and re-
versed the trial court order denying judgment n.o.v. in favor of
DER.'01 With respect to the map, the court noted that it did show
the location of the power lines, even if the lines were not high-
lighted. 02 As to the balloons, the court concluded that they func-
tioned in their capacity as indicia of the spray operation bounda-
ries and that the radio (or lack of its use in warning of the hazard)
"[was] of no moment since Myers was or should have been aware
of the power lines on the map.' 0
3
Courts take a narrow approach in determining whether the per-
sonal property itself was the cause of the injury. The analysis fo-
cuses on a causal connection review of whether the property was
involved with the injury. The fact that the commonwealth party
could have done more with respect to the personal property, such
as reviewing records or obtaining licenses, is not sufficient. For ex-
ample, in Myers, a viable action may have existed had the balloons
become entangled with the helicopter blades, since there would
then be a direct link between the personal property and the dam-
age claimed.40 Absent such a direct link, however, a cause of ac-
397. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(3) (1990). The property claimed to have caused the
accident was the map, balloons and radio. Myers, 581 A.2d at 699.
398. Myers, 581 A.2d at 698-99.
399. Id. at 698.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 700.
402. Id.
403. Myers, 581 A.2d at 700.
404. Id. at 699. Interestingly, the commonwealth court hinted at this in its opinion. Id.
at 699 n.3.
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tion under this section will not exist.40 5 Claims advanced without
providing a direct link between the property and injuries claimed
fall outside this exception.
D. Waiver Addressing a Dangerous Condition of Real Estate
1. General Provisions
Section 8522(b)(4) of the Act waives immunity for claims involv-
ing dangerous conditions of commonwealth real estate, highways
and sidewalks.0 6 The statutory language provides a broad defini-
tion of commonwealth real estate.0" However, it does not include
dangerous conditions created by natural elements; these situations
are addressed in a separate waiver provision.0 8
Generally, the fact finder determines whether a condition is
"dangerous. 409 In Snyder v. Harmon,41 ° the court stated, however,
that the "duty of care a [c]ommonwealth agency owes to those us-
ing its real estate, is such as to require that the condition of the
property is safe for the activities for which it is regularly used, in-
tended to be used or reasonably foreseen to be used." 11
The action in Snyder was brought for injuries stemming from an
incident involving motorists stopped on the berm of the road, who
fell over an embankment and into a strip mine. 412 The accident
405. Sugalski v. Commonwealth, 569 A.2d 1017, 1018 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (citing
DeVeaux v. Palmer, 558 A.2d 166 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989)); Nicholson, 503 A.2d 1106.
406. Section 8522(b)(4) provides:
(B) ACTS WHICH MAY IMPOSE LIABILITY.-The following acts by a Commonwealth party
may result in the imposition of liability on the Commonwealth and the defense of
Sovereign Immunity shall not be raised to claims for damages caused by:
(4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and sidewalks-A dangerous condition of
Commonwealth agency real estate and sidewalks, including Commonwealth-owned
real property, leaseholds in the possession of a Commonwealth agency and Common-
wealth-owned real property leased by a Commonwealth agency to private persons,
and highways under the jurisdiction of a Commonwealth agency, except conditions
described in paragraph (5).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(4) (1990).
407. Id.
408. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(5) (1990); see note 569.
409. See Bendas v. Township of White Deer, 611 A.2d 1184 (Pa. 1992); Drew v. Laber,
383 A.2d 941 (Pa. 1978). Additionally, the initial determination of what duty, if any, a de-
fendant owes to potential plaintiffs is a question of law and the responsibility of the court.
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, §37 at 236 (5th ed.
1984).
410. 562 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1989) ("Snyder II").
411. Snyder I, 562 A.2d at 312.
412. Id. at 308.
Sovereign Immunity In Pennsylvania
occurred at about 2:30 a.m., after the plaintiffs departed from the
Sky View Lounge located in Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania."" The
group drove out of the parking lot and proceeded onto Legislative
Route ("L.R.") 33060."1' As a result of a request of one of the pas-
sengers ("Johnson"), the driver stopped the car on the berm, di-
rectly adjacent to a strip mine.
41 5
The strip mine was active at the time of the accident and the
owners had previously sought and obtained a variance from DER
permitting mining within one hundred feet of the roadway. 41 The
variance required the mine owners to erect an earthen embank-
ment on the high wall of the mine, intended to prevent vehicles
from leaving the roadway and dropping the eighty-foot distance
into the mine pit.417 When constructed, the dirt, rock and shale
embankment was approximately six to seven feet wide and seven
feet high."18 Mining operations over the years had resulted in the
embankment being moved closer to the roadway;" 9 however, the
exact distance of the embankment from the right-of-way was a dis-
puted matter. 20
After stopping, Johnson exited the car.' 21 Within moments, a
second vehicle drove past the stopped vehicle, pulled onto the
berm in front of it, and began reversing at a high rate of speed
toward it.422 Johnson scrambled up the embankment to avoid be-




416. See § 4.2(c) of the Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.4(b)(c) (1966 & Supp. 1993). In Snyder I, the Department of Environ-
mental Resources was also named as a defendant. Snyder II, 562 A.2d at 309. The claims
against the Department of Environmental Resources were similar to those against the De-
partment of Transportation but included a claim that the Department of Environmental
Resources failed to inspect or supervise the mine and enforce the laws applicable to mining.
Id. The Department of Environmental Resources was granted summary judgment based in
part on the fact that since the Department of Environmental Resources did not own, pos-
sess or lease the property in which the mine was located, the authority to inspect the mining
operation would not support a claim against the Department of Environmental Resources
since such a claim did not fall within any exception to sovereign immunity. Id.
417. Snyder II, 562 A.2d at 308.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 308-09.
420. Id. at 310 n. 2. The embankment in the area where Johnson fell was located ap-
proximately seven feet outside the road's right-of-way. Id. at 309. The embankment in the
area where the women fell was approximately twelve feet outside the right-of-way. Id.
421. Id. at 309.




The second vehicle then passed around the stopped vehicle.424
At this time, Snyder, Fleming and Van Horn, ("women") passen-
gers in the stopped vehicle, alighted from it onto the shoulder of
the road.428 The second vehicle was then driven forward, toward
both the stopped vehicle and the three women.'12  The three
women scrambled up the embankment and also fell into the
427mine. Van Horn was killed, while Snyder and Fleming received
serious injuries. 8
Suit was brought against PaDOT alleging negligence for failure
to warn the public of the existence of the pit, by neither lighting
the shoulder of the road nor by erecting barriers or guardrails
along the right-of-way adjacent to the mine.429 A claim was also
made against PaDOT for permitting mining activities so close to
the road.43 °
PaDOT denied the allegations, raised sovereign immunity as a
defense, and moved for summary judgment.43 1 PaDOT contended
it was without liability because the accident and injuries occurred
off of its right-of-way.43 2 According to PaDOT, the cause of action
was barred because the commonwealth realty contained no danger-
ous condition. 33 The trial court granted summary judgment, con-
cluding that the dangerous condition complained of was located
where the individuals fell.43 Since this area was beyond the right-
of-way, the real estate exception to sovereign immunity was
inapplicable.3 5
The commonwealth court reversed, 86 finding that the complaint
contained sufficient facts to indicate that a dangerous condition
may have existed.437 According to the court, although the immedi-










432. Snyder 11, 562 A.2d at 309.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 309-10.
436. See Snyder v. Harmon, 519 A.2d 528 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) ("Snyder I").
437. Snyder 11, 562 A.2d at 310.
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admittedly off of the right-of-way, the lack of a guardrail on the
right-of-way was another alleged dangerous condition, which may
also have been a cause of the injury.""8 Consequently, the court
concluded there were sufficient facts pled against PaDOT to pre-
clude the entry of summary judgment.
49
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the
trial court order granting summary judgment.44 0 Initially, the su-
preme court examined the language of section 8522(b)(4), noting
the requirement to strictly construe the language of the excep-
tion.44 1 The court focused on the initial language providing for an
exception to immunity when there exists "'[a] dangerous condition
of Commonwealth agency real estate .... , ",442 The supreme court
concluded that the unambiguous language required the dangerous
condition to "derive, originate from or have as its source the Com-
monwealth realty."
44 3
The court then reviewed the real property exception of the Tort
438. Snyder I, 519 A.2d at 531.
439. Id. ("With respect to [PaDOT], however, we hold that Appellants have pled facts
sufficient to show that a dangerous condition may have existed, so as to fall within the terms
of Section 8522(b)(4)." Id.)
440. Snyder 11, 562 A.2d at 313.
441. Id. at 311 (citing Love v. City of Philadelphia, 543 A.2d 531 (Pa. 1988)); See also
Mascaro v. Youth Study Ctr., 523 A.2d 1118 (Pa. 1987); Davidow v. Anderson, 476 A.2d 998
(Pa. .Commw. Ct. 1984).
442. Snyder II, 562 A.2d at 311 (citing. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(4)).
443. Id. at 311. The court noted "[tihe critical word in the statutory language is the
word 'of'. The meaning ascribed to this preposition is '(2) used to indicate derivation, origin
or source.' See THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE Copyright 1966
by Random House, Inc." Id. at 311 n.5. See also Fitchett v. S.E. Pennsylvania Transp.
Auth., 619 A.2d 805, 807 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (grease and debris which had accumulated
on the concourse "cannot be said to be a defect of the land itself" [emphasis added]); First
Nat'l Bank v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., 609 A.2d 911, 914 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992)
(vehicle parked on the roadway is not affixed to the roadway, it is a condition on the road-
way; thus the required standards of the real estate exception are not met [emphasis added]),
appeal denied, 614 A.2d 1144 (Pa. 1992); Ambacher v. Penrose, 499 A.2d 716, 717 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1985) (commonwealth court affirmed trial court's holding that wire fence laying
.on sidewalk was a dangerous or defective condition on the sidewalk rather than of the side-
walk [emphasis added]). But cf. Shubert v. S.E. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 625 A.2d 102,
104 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (summary judgment inappropriate in an action alleging injuries
resulting from a fall allegedly caused by an oily substance placed or left "upon" a platform
by SEPTA because factual issue remained as to whether the substance was affixed to the
platform so as to become a condition of the platform.) and Giosa v. School Dist. of Philadel-
phia, 562 A.2d 411, 414 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (summary judgment inappropriate for action
alleging injuries as a result of a fall on an accumulation of snow and ice on a sidewalk. A
question of fact remained as to whether the snow and ice were so affixed to the sidewalk as
to become a dangerous condition of, rather than on, the sidewalk.), appeal denied, School
Dist. of Philadelphia v. Giosa, 578 A.2d 416 (Pa. 1990).
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Claims Act"" (applicable to local government agencies) and the ac-
companying case law, for guidance in interpreting the real estate
exception to sovereign immunity.4 4 5 The court stated that, for the
Tort Claims Act's real property exception to apply, there is a re-
quirement of finding negligence which made the property itself un-
safe for activities for which the property is used.""6 As the supreme
court explained, "use" included not only regular activities, but also
those activities for which the property is "intended to be used or
reasonably foreseen to be used." 47 Additionally, following an anal-
ysis of prior cases dealing with similar subject matter, the court
concluded that "[t]he focus of the negligent act involving a danger-
ous condition of government owned real estate becomes the actual
defect(s) of the real estate itself."""8 The court went on to state
that the artificial condition or defect of the land itself must cause
the injury and not merely facilitate an injury which was caused by
the acts of others. 9 Such third party acts are outside the scope of
liability for governmental entities. 50
In light of the above, the court viewed the General Assembly's
initial focus to be directed solely to whether the injury occurred on
Commonwealth-owned or leased real estate.451 The liability
claimed in Snyder was predicated on alleged knowledge of a dan-
gerous condition existing on land next to, rather than on, common-
wealth property.452 Such a condition was held not to fall within
any exception to sovereign immunity.' " The court also dismissed
444. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542(b)(3) (1990).
445. Snyder II, 562 A.2d at 312. The court stated that it was instructive to review 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(4) in light of 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542(b)(3) and its accompany-
ing case law. Id. The court further noted that the Tort Claims Act exceptions to the rule of
governmental immunity are narrowly interpreted, given the express legislative intent to in-
sulate political subdivisions from tort liability. Id. at 312 (citing Mascaro v. Youth Study
Ctr., 523 A.2d 1118 (Pa. 1987)).
446. Snyder II, 562 A.2d at 312 (citing Vince v. Ringgold School Dist., 499 A.2d 1148
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985)).
447. Snyder II, 562 A.2d at 312 (citing Cestari v. School Dist. of Cheltenham Town-
ship, 520 A.2d 110 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987), alloc. denied, 535 A.2d 84 (Pa. 1987)).
448. Snyder II, 562 A.2d at 312 (citing Gratkie v. Air Wisconsin, Inc., 528 A.2d 1032
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987), aboc. denied, 541 A.2d 1139 (Pa. 1988).
449. Snyder II, 562 A.2d at 312.
450. Id. at 312 (citing Mascaro v. Youth Study Ctr., 523 A.2d 1118 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1987)).
451. Snyder II, 562 A.2d at 311.
452. Id. at 312.
453. Id. at 312. As the court stated:
[L]iability is not predicated on a defective condition on Commonwealth land, but
rather the knowledge of an inherently dangerous condition contiguous with the Com-
monwealth property which the Commonwealth knows or should reasonably know and
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the claim that an absence of lighting on the commonwealth prop-
erty created a deceptive appearance which resulted in a dangerous
condition. 54 The court concluded that under the real estate excep-
tion to sovereign immunity there must be a negligent act making
the real property itself unsafe for activities for which it is used,
intended to be used or reasonably foreseen to be used.5
All claims against a commonwealth party alleging negligence
based on the real estate exception to sovereign immunity must
state a cause of action related directly to the condition of the prop-
erty.4 58 The focus of any negligent act concerning real estate be-
comes the actual defect of the real estate itself.457 Therefore,
claims must specifically allege a defect or artificial condition in the
real estate, for if they do not, the plaintiffs risk that the claims will
be summarily dismissed for failure to state a claim. 5 s Claims for
takes no action to prevent any harm from occurring. While this theory appears at-
tractive, it is not supported by any exception to our immunity statute.
Id.
454. Id. at 313 (finding such an "appearance of the shoulder of the road cannot be said
to be either an artificial condition or a defect of the land itself." Id.) See also Slonecker v.
Martin, 604 A.2d 751 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (no duty to install lighting or illuminate
highways).
455. Snyder 11, 562 A.2d at 312.
456. Benson v. City of Philadelphia, 606 A.2d 550, 552 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992), appeal
denied, 615 A.2d 1313 (Pa. 1992) (citing Houston v. Central Bucks School Auth., 546 A.2d
1286 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), appeal denied, 562 A.2d 322 (Pa. 1989). See also cases cited at
note 443.
457. Mascaro v. Youth Study Ctr., 523 A.2d 1118 (Pa. 1987); see also Snyder v. Har-
mon, 562 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1989). The claim must also set forth the breach of a duty; claims
related solely to the failure to perform a discretionary act do not set forth a valid negligence
cause of action. For example, in Bendas v. Township of White Deer, 611 A.2d 1184 (Pa.
1992), a claim was brought based, in part, on PaDOT's failure to place appropriate traffic
control signs on the highway, as authorized by 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6122 and 6124 (1992).
Plaintiffs claimed that the aforementioned provisions implicitly created an affirmative duty
on PaDOT to exercise its authority under certain circumstances. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court disagreed, concluding that "the clear language of these sections [75 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§6122 and 6124] is discretionary, and no duty can be derived from the statute."
Bendas, 611 A.2d at 1185-86 n.2. In general, the supreme court noted that PaDOT had a
duty to maintain a reasonably safe road, which may include appropriate signing. This, how-
ever, would be a factual question left to the jury. Id. See also Slonecker v. Martin, 604 A.2d
751 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (townships have no common law or statutory duty to erect traf-
fic control devices); Majestic v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., 601 A.2d 386 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991) (discretionary authority to erect traffic control devices does not confer
mandatory duty).
458. See, e.g., Farber v. Pennsbury Sch. Dist., 571 A.2d 546 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990)
(school district was immune and could not be held liable for injuries suffered by a student
injured in a race where the negligence allegations failed to set forth any defect or artificial
condition of the land); King v. City of Philadelphia, 527 A.2d 1102 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987),
appeal denied, 563 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1989) (city immune from liability for injuries suffered by a
prison inmate who fell while handcuffed to a crutch and who was being escorted to the city
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negligent supervision of the property,8 9 or for acts of third parties
on the property460 do not fall within the real estate exception.
Criminal acts of third parties are also excluded, 61 even where the
defect of the real estate may have facilitated the injury, because
the focus of the negligent act is on the criminal act, not the defect
in the real estate.462
The Snyder decision followed the analysis first adopted by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Mascaro v. Youth Study
Center.6 In Mascaro, a detainee in the city detention center for
juvenile criminal offenders escaped.' 6 ' The escape was allegedly
due, in part, to negligently maintained real estate. 63 Once free, the
detainee and an accomplice broke into plaintiff's home, tied up the
mother, father and son and beat and raped the daughter. 66 A
claim was brought against the city and center under the real prop-
erty exception applicable to local agencies.'67 The suit claimed that
the negligent maintenance of the property facilitated the de-
tainee's escape and led to the injuries suffered by the Mascaro
family.4
68
The court began its analysis by setting forth the preconditions
for maintaining an action against the city. 60 First, the plaintiffs
jail, where plaintiff alleged a failure to maintain the real property in a manner to permit his
safe transport but failed to allege that any real property defect caused his injury).
459. See, e.g., Houston v. Central Bucks Sch. Auth., 546 A.2d 1286 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1988), appeal denied, 562 A.2d 322 (Pa. 1989) (claims of negligent supervision of child in-
jured when he fell leaving school building with school employee did not fall within
exception).
460. See, e.g., Douglas v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 578 A.2d 1011, 1013 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990) (claim against the Authority for injuries of a pedestrian struck by a large
ham bone which fell from property owned by Authority did not fall within the real estate
exception since "the ham bone was set in motion by someone and thus action by a third
party was the proximate cause of... [the] injury."); Wellons v. S.E. Pennsylvania Transp.
Auth., 596 A.2d 1169 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 600 A.2d 1260 (Pa. 1991)
(claim for injuries to plaintiff who slipped on a bag on steps of train platform did not fall
within real estate exception because person who dropped the bag on the platform, rather
than any real estate defect, caused the injuries).
461. See, e.g., Johnson v. S.E. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 532 A.2d 409 (Pa. 1987)
(immunity not waived for claims of injuries resulting from criminal assault on a subway
concourse); Moore v. Department of Justice, 538 A.2d 111 (Pa. 1988).
462. Mascaro v. Youth Study Ctr., 523 A.2d 1118 (Pa. 1987).
463. Mascara, 523 A.2d at 1118.
464. Id. at 1119.
465. Id. The claim against the city was based upon the center's alleged failure to prop-
erly secure the doors and windows of the facility, thus permitting escape. Id. at 1121.
466. Id. at 1119.
467. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542(b)(3) (1990).
468. Mascara, 523 A.2d at 1122.
469. Id. at 1121.
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had to "demonstrate that at common law or by statute one not
having an immunity defense available could be held liable for the
same harm alleged . . . .,," Second, the injury must have been
caused by the negligent acts of the agency or an employee "acting
within the scope of his office or duties, excluding acts of crimes,
fraud, malice or willful misconduct. ' ' 7 1 And third, the claim must
fall, under an exception to the general grant of immunity.
47 2
As to the first prong, the court engaged in a detailed history of
the duty applicable in the case, noting the general requirement
that a property owner not engage in activity which will unreasona-
bly increase the risk to another.473 Past decisions also have defined
a common law duty for a custodian of personal property "to keep
that personalty out of the reach of individuals who would misuse it
and harm others with it.' 7' 4 The court determined that the plain-
tiffs had satisfied this inquiry by asserting that the defendants
failed to maintain their property, allowing the detainee to es-
cape.7 The second prong was satisfied by the plaintiffs' allega-
tions that "the City and Center failed to secure the locks, door and
windows of the Center so as to prevent [the detainee's] escape.'
'47 6
However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that
plaintiffs failed to satisfy the third prong of the test.477 The court
noted that the exception to the general rule of immunity "must be
narrowly interpreted given the expressed legislative intent to insu-
late political subdivisions from tort liability.' ' 47 8 This exception re-
fers to "[aicts of the local agency or its employees which make the
property unsafe for the activities for which it is regularly used, for
which it is intended to be used, or for which it may reasonably be
foreseen to be used ... It does not apply to the acts of other
individuals, which "are specifically excluded in the general immu-
nity section .. .and are nowhere discussed in the eight excep-
470. Id.
471. Id. at 1123.
472. Id.
473. Mascaro, 523 A.2d at 1122 (quoting Ford v. Jeffries, 379 A.2d 111, 115 (Pa.
1977)).
474. Id. (citing Kuhns v. Brugger, 135 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1957) and Anderson v. Bushong
Pontiac Co., 171 A.2d 771 (Pa. 1961)).
475. Mascaro, 523 A.2d at 1122.
476. Id. at 1123.
477. Id. at 1124.
478. Id. at 1123 (citing Casey v. Geiger, 499 A.2d 606 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)); Vann v.
Board of Educ. of the Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 464 A.2d 684 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
479. Mascaro, 523 A.2d at 1124.
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tions.' '4s0 Consequently, harm caused by others "may not be im-
puted to the local agency or its employees. "4
8
1
The court recognized that this standard was different from the
duties and liabilities of a private landowner, who could be held lia-
ble for foreseeable criminal conduct of others. s2 The court con-
cluded that the General Assembly, in its general scheme of immu-
nity, had precluded the imposition of liability on itself or local
agencies for the acts of third parties. ss Since the General Assem-
bly had specifically precluded liability for criminal acts, actual
fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct by agencies or their em-
ployees, it logically followed that the agencies would be shielded
from such liability on the part of third parties. 84
The Mascaro court also rejected the available "superseding
cause" analysis.485 Instead, it focused on whether the government
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id. (citing Ford, 379 A.2d 111). In Ford, a landlord permitted his structure to
become in such a state of disrepair as to attract vermin and dogs, and failed to take steps to
secure his property against entry by other persons. Ford, 379 A.2d at 113. Two fires broke
out in the house, with the second one spreading to the neighboring structure, nearly de-
stroying it. Id. at 113. The landlord was held liable for the damage to the neighbor because,
according to the court, "a -property owner can reasonably be expected to know that the
visible conditions of vacant property in a state of disrepair may attract, for various pur-
poses, children or adults, who, having entered the property, might act, either negligently or
intentionally, in a manner that would cause a fire." Id. at 113.
Section 448 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS states:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding
cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct
created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third person to commit such
a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or
should have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created, and that a
third person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.
Mascaro, 523 A.2d at 1124 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965)).
The court in Mascaro also examined section 8542(a)(2) of the Tort Claims Act, which states:
(a)Liability imposed.-A local agency shall be liable for damages on account of an
injury to a person or property within the limits set forth in this subchapter if both of
the following conditions are satisfied and the injury occurs as a result of one of the
acts set forth in subsection (b):
(2)The injury was caused by the negligent acts of the local agency or. an em-
ployee thereof acting within the scope of his office or duties with respect to one
of the following categories listed in subsection (b). As used in this paragraph,
'negligent acts' shall not include acts or conduct which constitute a crime, ac-
tual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.
Mascaro, 523 A.2d at 1124 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542(a)(2) (1990)).
483. Mascaro, 523 A.2d at 1124.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 1125 (Hutchinson, J., concurring).
Sovereign Immunity In Pennsylvania
party's own negligence was a primary (though not necessarily ex-
clusive) cause of the plaintiffs injuries."" Only in such a case
would the court find a waiver of immunity.
487
In Crowell v. City of Philadelphia,88 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court revisited' the area of "superseding cause" analysis. The
Crowell case arose from an automobile accident involving the
plaintiffs, who were travelling west on University Avenue in Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania.48 9  At the same time, another driver
("Lewis"), was proceeding east on University Avenue.' 9 0 The east
and west lanes were separated by a low concrete medial strip.
49 1
From opposite directions, the two vehicles approached a curve in
the road.93 For eastbound traffic this curve was to the right.'
However, at some time prior to the accident, a traffic directional
sign had been installed indicating the road curved to the left.'9
Lewis apparently followed the arrow,9 5 crossed the median and
collided with the plaintiffs' vehicle, causing injuries which eventu-
ally resulted in the death of the plaintiffs' son.9 6
An action was brought against Lewis and the City of Philadel-
phia ("city").' 7 The claims against the city focused on the applica-
ble exception to governmental immunity addressing trees, traffic
controls and street lighting.49 A jury returned a verdict against the
defendants in the aggregate amount of $1,650,000, apportioning
eighty percent of the liability against Mr. Lewis and twenty per-
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. 613 A.2d 1178 (Pa. 1992) ("Crowell II').









498. Id. Section 8542(b)(4) may impose liability on a local government agency as
follows:
Trees, traffic controls and street lighting.-A dangerous condition of trees, traffic
signs, lights or other traffic controls, street lights or street lighting systems under the
care, custody or control of the local agency, except that the claimant to recover must
establish that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the
kind of injury which was incurred and that the local agency had actual notice or
could reasonably be charged with notice under the circumstances of the dangerous
condition at a sufficient time prior to the event to have taken measures to protect
against the dangerous condition.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542(b)(4) (1990).
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cent against the city.49
On appeal to the commonwealth court, the judgment against the
city was reversed and judgment n.o.v. was entered in favor of the
city, and against the plaintiffs.50 0 The judgment was based on the
commonwealth court's analysis and interpretation of the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court decision in Mascaro v. Youth Study
Center.50 1 According to the commonwealth court, the Mascaro
decision
require[d] the Crowells to prove that the dangerous condition of the traffic
directional sign itself caused the Crowells' injuries and not merely that the
dangerous condition of the traffic directional sign facilitated the injury by
the acts of Lewis, whose acts are outside the scope of liability contained in
§8542(b)(4).60
Accordingly, the commonwealth court felt "compelled to conclude
that the city was entitled to . . . immunity"503 because
[t]he dangerous condition of the traffic directional sign, standing alone, did
not cause harm to the Crowells. No harm was caused to the Crowells until
the erroneous traffic directional sign was acted upon by Lewis. Because the
City caused no harm to the Crowells absent the conduct of Lewis, the City
merely facilitated the Crowells' injuries by the acts of Lewis. " I
The commonwealth court was aware that the jury in Crowell found
the city twenty percent negligent, but did not conclude that this
justified a finding that the city also caused the injury.50 5 Instead,
the court concluded that the city's past attempts to have the issue
resolved on pre-trial motion were improperly denied.506 Thus, the
court opined that "it [was] illogical to permit recovery in this case
solely on the basis that the trial court failed to dismiss the
Crowells' complaint prior to the case going to the jury."
50 1
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court viewed the issue differently. It
noted that the jury determined that the city's activity was in fact a
499. Crowell H, 613 A.2d at 1180. The trial court molded the verdict to reflect the
limitation of liability statutory damage cap under the Governmental Immunity Act, and
added delay damages, entering judgment for plaintiffs in the amount of $202,594.50 against
the city and in favor of the plaintiffs and for $311,655.50 against the city and in favor of the
estate of the plaintiffs' son. Id.
500. Crowell v. City of Philadelphia, 570 A.2d 626, 627 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990)
("Crowell I").
501. 523 A.2d 1118 (Pa. 1987). See notes 463-487 and accompanying text.




506. Id. at 631.
507. Crowell I, 570 A.2d at 630.
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substantial cause of the injuries sustained and did not merely facil-
itate the injuries.20 Consequently, "the liability of the City here
was found to be joint as opposed to merely vicarious."509 This, ac-
cording to the supreme court, was the fundamental distinction be-
tween the issue presented in Crowell and the issue reviewed in
Mascaro 1 ° Since the General Assembly precluded imposition of
liability based on "acts of others," 1 the supreme court concluded
that such language prevented a finding of vicarious liability against
a governmental agency.512 The court also explained that the deci-
sion in Mascaro "was grounded in statutory interpretation, and
was intended to be applied to like situated cases."51'
Turning then to address "the theoretical framework from which
to analyze those situations which fall within the exceptions and
those which will not,"5" " the supreme court adopted the analysis
set forth in Builder's Supply v. McCabe.51 5 Builder's Supply cited
numerous situations in which a right of indemnification would ac-
crue and concluded that such a determination rested on the differ-
ence between primary versus secondary liability.51 As noted in
Builder's Supply, the difference in liability:
is not based on a difference in degrees of negligence or on any doctrine of
comparative negligence, . . . [i]t depends on a difference in the character
or kind of the wrongs which cause the injury and in the nature of the legal
obligation owed by each of the wrongdoers to the injured person.
5 1 7
Thus, "the governmental unit can be subjected to liability de-
spite the presence of an additional tortfeasor if the governmental
unit's actions would be sufficient to preclude it from obtaining in-
508. Crowell H, 613 A.2d at 1181.
509. Id. The supreme court, in a footnote, found it "unfortunate" that the common-
wealth court "did not draw a distinction between the type of analysis applicable to a vicari-
ous liability situation, wherein the political subdivision because of its position is claimed to
be negligent, as opposed to joint liability, wherein acts of the political subdivision which fall
within the Act's exception are the basis of the liability claim." Id. at 1181 n.4.
510. Id. at 1182.
511. Section 8541 provides "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local
agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property
caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person." 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 8541 (1990).
512. Crowell II, 613 A.2d at 1183.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. 77 A.2d 368 (Pa. 1951).
516. Builder's Supply, 77 A.2d at 370-71.
517. Id. at 370.
1993
Duquesne Law Review
demnity from another for injuries rendered to a third person."518
This, of course, assumes "the specific facts fall squarely within one
of the exceptions. s5 1  If an action is brought against a governmen-
tal unit and the action depends upon the unit's status, as opposed
to the action falling within one of the exceptions, then the court
said that no liability attaches, based on the language of section
8541.520
In Mascaro, the court viewed the claim as one brought against
the center based upon its status as a correctional housing facil-
ity.521 That is, the claim in Mascaro was based on the notion that a
correctional housing facility owed a duty to the general population
to maintain its real estate in a manner to prevent those placed in
the facility from escaping and harming others. Under the analysis
adopted by the commonwealth court, this responsibility translated
into a specific duty to an individual harmed by an individual who
escaped because of a condition of the facility's real estate. It was
this argument that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected, find-
ing that the narrow construction mandated for exceptions to im-
munity did not permit such a broad interpretation. 2
Conversely, in Crowell the court viewed the claim as one brought
by individuals injured as a result of action directly related to the
real estate itself; namely, the negligence of the city employee who
incorrectly placed the traffic directional sign.52 3 The individual's
injury was directly related to the city's negligence, which fell
518. Crowell 11, 613 A.2d at 1184 (citation omitted).
519. Id.
520. Id. (footnote omitted.)
521. Mascaro, 523 A.2d. at 1123. In Mascaro, the court was persuaded by prior deci-
sions focusing not on negligently maintained real estate, but instead on the unavailability of
an action under the real estate exception for claims consisting "of a failure to supervise the
conduct of students or persons adequately." Id. at 1124 (citing Davies v. Barnes, 503 A.2d
93 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986); Messina v. Blairsville-Saltsburg Sch. Dist., 503 A.2d 89 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1986); Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 500 A.2d 520 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985);
Acker v. Spangler, 500 A.2d 206 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985); Usher v. Upper St. Clair Sch. Dist.,
487 A.2d 1022 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985); Robson v. Penn Hills Sch. Dist., 437 A.2d 1273 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1981); Wimbish v. School Dist. of Penn Hills, 430 A.2d 710 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1981)).
522. Mascaro, 523 A.2d at 1123.
523. Crowell II, 613 A.2d at 1184. The court, in a footnote, discussed the employer/
employee relationship of a governmental unit with its employees noting that the "govern-
mental unit can only act through its employees", and further noting that the General As-
sembly has defined employees to be within the scope of the exceptions when acting within
the scope of their employment, indicating this "is not a classic common law master/servant
relationship and there need not be an imputation of negligence for liability to be imposed."
Id. at 1184 n.11.
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within the immunity exception. A reasonably prudent person could
have followed the sign's direction and collided with the Crowell ve-
hicle; the same cannot be said under the Mascaro fact pattern.
Another important step in reconciling the Mascaro and Crowell
decisions is to look to the issues as presented and defined by the
court. In Mascaro, the issue was "whether the real estate exception
to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act exposes the City and
Center to liability coextensive with the liability imposed on private
landowners."52 ' It was to this specific issue that the supreme court
responded in the negative, concluding "that any harm that others
cause may not be imputed to the local agency or its employees. "5
25
This is different from the duties and liabilities of a private land-
owner, who may be held accountable for the foreseeable criminal
conduct of others.5 26 The decision in Mascaro was based on the
defined issue and rested upon the defendant's status as a govern-
mental unit, coupled with the fact that the applicable immunity
act precluded a cause of action under the theory advanced.
In Crowell, the issue presented to the court focused on whether a
governmental unit could be subjected to liability despite the pres-
ence of an additional defendant, where the specific facts fell within
an exception to sovereign immunity. 27 To this the court answered
in the affirmative, concluding that the immunity bar's preclusion
of a cause of action for "acts of others "528 was inapplicable to the
action at hand. In other words, the court found the governmental
agency's liability in Crowell to be primary, and concluded, albeit
ex post facto, that the liability in Mascaro was secondary.
2. Liability Premised Upon A Failure to Update
A commonwealth party, in some cases, may be held liable for
failing to update a highway. This is so even when the highway was
originally built to conform to then-existing standards. In Wyke v.
Ward,529 the commonwealth court held that a governmental agency
could not plead its discretion as an absolute defense against liabil-
ity where there was a change in circumstances and "the govern-
mental entity fail[ed] to make necessary improvements to protect
524. Mascaro, 523 A.2d at 1123.
525. Id. at 1124.
526. Id. (citing Ford, 379 A.2d 111 (Pa. 1977)).
527. Crowell H, 613 A.2d at 1184.
528. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8541 (1990).
529. 474 A.2d 375 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
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the innocent wayfarer from foreseeable harm."530 Wyke addressed
this issue in the context of a situation involving numerous actions
arising out of a multi-vehicle accident at a highway intersection.
In Wyke, trial testimony indicated the accident occurred at a
"T" intersection of a four-lane road (Route 60) and a two-lane
road (Cliff Mine Road) outside of Pittsburgh, Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania.531 Route 60 provided main access from Pittsburgh to
the Pittsburgh International Airport.53 Northbound Route 60 traf-
fic was permitted to make a left turn across the southbound lanes
of Route 60 to travel west on Cliff Mine Road.538 A party defend-
ant had stopped to make a left-hand turn and, as he waited, a ve-
hicle approached from behind, swerved across the southbound
lanes, and collided with approaching southbound vehicles. 3"
Shortly thereafter, a tractor-trailer traveling southbound collided
with the entangled vehicles.
535
As a result of the accident, multiple lawsuits were filed and all
actions were consolidated for trial.536 PaDOT was named as a de-
fendant in the suits.5 3 7 During the course of the trial, PaDOT ob-
jected to the plaintiffs' evidence and the objections were sustained
by the trial court.3 PaDOT requested and received directed ver-
530. Wyke, 474 A.2d at 381. See also Bendas v. Township of White Deer, 611 A.2d
1184, 1185-86 n.2 (Pa. 1992) (a claim based solely upon a discretionary duty, the placement
of traffic control signs on or along a state highway, was not valid because "the clear language
of these sections is discretionary, and no duty can be derived from the statute.")





536. Wyke, 474 A.2d at 377.
537. Id. at 378.
538. Id. At the time of trial, plaintiff attempted to offer the following:
(1) evidence compiled by [Pa]DOT of 177 accidents at this intersection between 1960
and 1980; (2) letters from various individuals to [Pa]DOT complaining about the fre-
quency of accidents at the intersection and asking that [Pa]DOT take some steps to
correct the problem (either close the crossover, install a traffic signal or build a sepa-
rate left-hand turn lane); (3) a reply to one of these letters from the Secretary of
Transportation acknowledging that the intersection was unsafe and describing plans
to build a separate left-turn lane; (4) a survey of accidents compiled by the com-
mander of a nearby Air National Guard Base which showed that seven accidents had
occurred between 1957-77 under circumstances similar to this accident, (5) evidence
that this intersection was the only left turn area on Route 60, as two nearby left turn
medial areas had recently been closed; (6) evidence that [Pa]DOT planned to build a
separate lane for left turns in 1977 but had not done so; (7) testimony of a [Pa]DOT
employee which identified the intersection as a hazardous road location because of its
traffic pattern; and, (8) evidence that the State Police officers who investigated this
-accident filed a highway hazard report with [Pa]DOT.
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dicts in all suits in which it was a defendant.5 3 9
The claims against PaDOT were premised upon the alleged
"dangerous condition" of the intersection.4 0 The trial court con-
cluded that no liability could be established against PaDOT be-
cause the plaintiffs failed to offer any proof that the roadway de-
sign, as originally adopted and constructed, was negligent. With no
proof that the design and construction were negligent, the jury
would not be permitted to consider changes in the highway that
the plaintiff advanced because "[it is not the function of the judi-
cial branch of government to supplant its wisdom for that of the
governmental entities whose job it is to determine, fund and super-
vise road construction and improvements.' 541 In short, the trial
court reasoned that if the original design was proper at its time
and the construction was in conformance with the original design,
PaDOT could not be found negligent simply for failing to deter-
mine the need for changes in the road resulting from either in-
creased use or other changed conditions.
5 4
1
The commonwealth court disagreed with the trial court's reason-
ing.54 3 The commonwealth court looked to the fact that the duty
owed by PaDOT to users of the roads is "to provide reasonably
safe highways. ' " The trial court's reasoning was based on two su-
preme court decisions adopting the negligence principle that one
engaged in a trade or industry should be held to no higher stan-
dard of conduct than called for in the practices and customs of
that trade or industry. "5 The commonwealth court noted that the
Id.
539. Id. at 378.
540. Id. at 378-79.
541. Wyke, 474 A.2d at 380.
542. Id. at 381.
543. Id.
544. Id.
545. Id. See McIntyre v. City of Pittsburgh, 86 A. 300 (Pa. 1913); Canavan v. Oil City,
38 A. 1096 (Pa. 1898). In McIntyre, the plaintiff was injured when she fell walking down
some steps in one of the City of Pittsburgh's hilly districts. The plaintiff testified the steps
were too steep and the treads were too narrow. Following a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the
trial court granted the motion of the city for judgment n.o.v., and the supreme court af-
firmed stating:
It was not contended. . . that the steps were out of order in any way. Criticism was
directed entirely against the manner in which [the steps] were constructed. It was
claimed that they were too steep and that the treads were not wide enough. It was
not shown that the method of construction was unusual, or that it differed from the
ordinary plan found in such localities.
McIntyre, 86 A. at 300.
In Canavan, in response to a claim by the plaintiff that the defendant City was negligent in
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supreme court had held that the "custom and usage analysis [did]
not furnish the test which is controlling on the question of negli-
gence. '5 8 Consequently, the court concluded that there was no
need to show a defect in the original design of the highway. In-
stead, the court adopted the following test: "Even if adoption of an
original design plan of the highway was not negligent, a change in
circumstances can support a finding of negligence when the gov-
ernmental entity fails to make necessary improvements to protect
the innocent wayfarer from foreseeable harm. '54 7 Therefore, if it is
alleged that a dangerous condition has developed and individuals
are injured as a result of the changed conditions, the common-
wealth agency may be held liable. The Commonwealth may not
plead its discretion to make changes as an absolute defense.
The court did not indicate what type of notice was required to
show a change in circumstances. Any claim of a changed condition
would likely require notice of some type, since the commonwealth
court looked to the notice in distinguishing the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's past decisions in this area.54 8 Prior accidents which
are sufficiently similar in type and circumstance should provide the
proper notice. 5 9 Additionally, admissions by the commonwealth
agency officers, including correspondence acknowledging the un-
safe condition of the roadway, provide the proper notice. 50
There also must be a causal connection between the alleged dan-
gerous condition and the resulting injury.5 1 In order to be com-
pensable, the claim must flow from the alleged dangerous condi-
tion. Merely alleging a changed condition without showing how it
permitting an open gutter to exist in the area of an intersection, the court stated "[ilt is
possible the open gutter is not the very best design; but there is no duty on the city to adopt
the very best. .... There was no dispute as to the fact that the open gutter was a common
approved method of construction of crossings; .... " Canavan, 38 A. at 1098. In light of the
above, the Canavan court concluded that there could be no negligence found against the
defendant- City since the City had followed the standard of conduct then called for in the
practices and customs in existence at the time. Canavan, 38 A. at 1098. See Lehigh Coal Co.
v. Hayes, 18 A. 387 (Pa. 1889) (one engaged in a trade or industry will be held to a standard
of conduct called for in the practices and customs of that trade or industry).
546. Wyke, 474 A.2d at 381 (citing MacDougall v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.,
166 A. 589 (Pa. 1933)).
547. Wyke, 474 A.2d at 381.
548. See McIntyre v. City of Pittsburgh, 86 A. 300 (Pa. 1913).
549. See Ringelheim v. Fidelity Trust Co., 198 A. 628 (Pa. 1938).
550. See, e.g., Whitman v. Riddell, 471 A.2d 521 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
551. Wyke, 474 A.2d at 381. As the court noted, "[w]here, however, it is alleged that a
dangerous condition has developed and individuals are injured as a result thereof,
[Pa]DOT may not plead its discretion as an absolute defense against liability." Id. (empha-
sis added).
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is causally connected to the injury does not satisfy the negligence
test adopted by the courts. 52
It would appear from the holding in Wyke v. Ward that the dis-
cretionary defense, generally available to a commonwealth
agency, 553 is unavailable to PaDOT in cases where plaintiffs claim
that a change in the conditions, usages, volumes or manner of
travel, known to PaDOT, caused or contributed to the accident.5 54
Instead, where a dangerous condition develops and its existence is
apparent from a review of either substantially similar accidents,
admissions by PaDOT officials, or some other evidence, and
PaDOT fails to make the necessary improvements, PaDOT can be
held liable for the change in conditions if the condition is causally
connected to the injury.
555
3. The Responsibility of the Public Using A Public Road
In Merritt v. City of Chester,550 the Superior Court of Pennsyl-
vania was asked to reverse a trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment based upon the lack of any duty on the part of the defendant
to construct or maintain a fence sufficient to withstand the impact
of a motor vehicle. 557 The facts indicated that a car operated by
552. See, e.g., Fennell v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 603 A.2d 1064, 1066-67 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992) (citations omitted). See also notes 262, 534.
553. See JoINT REPORT, cited at note 145, at 18:
[a]n exercise of discretion by a proper official should not result in liability of the
individual or the Commonwealth as respondeat superior. To permit this result would
transfer legislative (or quasi-judicial) authority to courts and juries and render each
exercise of official authority subject to subsequent evaluation by a fact finder. [Em-
phasis original].
Id.
See also 42 PA. CON. STAT. § 8524, which retains and makes available to the commonwealth
party certain common law defenses, including, in particular, the following:
An employee of a Commonwealth agency, or a member of the General Assembly or of
the judiciary may assert on his own behalf, or the Commonwealth may assert on his
behalf, the defense that the act was within the discretion granted to the employee by
statute or statutorily authorized discretion.
42 PA. CON. STAT. § 8524(3) (1990).
554. Wyke, 474 A.2d at 381.
555. Id. at 375. The court noted that the commonwealth agency would not be relieved
from liability simply because another party may be considered negligent, stating that a
party "'may be required to foresee the actions of third persons even where they are negli-
gent . . . if a reasonable man would do so under the circumstances.'" Id. at 382 (citing
Fleming James,Jr., Accident Liability: Some Wartime Developments, 55 YALE L.J. 365, 381
(1946)(footnote omitted). Cf. Mascaro, 523 A.2d 1118; see notes 463-487 and accompanying
text.
556. 496 A.2d 1220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
557. Merritt, 496 A.2d at 1221.
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Roscoe Merritt ("Merritt") left a parking lot on Seventh Street in
the City of Chester with two passengers.55 Merritt failed to turn
right or left at Seventh Street and instead continued across the
road, where the car mounted a two to four inch curb, crossed the
sidewalk, mounted a six to eight inch high retaining wall, knocked
down a cyclone fence and landed in a creek. 59 Merritt and one of
the passengers died in the accident and the other passenger alleg-
edly suffered various neurological injuries.5 60
The survivor sued the City of Chester, alleging negligence for
failure to install and maintain a fence of sufficient strength to
withstand the impact of a vehicle moving directly at it at a rate of
speed in excess of 25 m.p.h.561 The trial court ordered summary
judgment based on the determination that, as a matter of law, the
City of Chester had no such duty.
5 62
In affirming the trial court, the superior court reviewed the duty
of the city in light of the responsibility of drivers, concluding that
the city "was obligated merely to maintain its streets so that they
were reasonably safe for normal use. 5 63 The court concluded that
ordinary, normal use was foreseeable and extraordinary activities
are "outside the scope of the duty owed . ,,56" If the use is such
that it would be considered normal or ordinary, then such use is
foreseeable. However, if the use is extraordinary, then it would not
be foreseeable. Applying the "foreseeability of use" test to the use
of the real estate remains a preliminary step in determining
whether the commonwealth agency breached a duty owed. 65
In summary, the duty of the Commonwealth, with respect to
roadways in its possession or control, can be separated into three
categories: (1) a duty to design new roads in a reasonably safe
558. Id. at 1220-21.
559. Id. at 1221.
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Merritt, 496 A.2d at 1221.
563. Id. at 1222.
564. Id.
565. See Merritt, 496 A.2d at 1221-22:
Public roads are intended for ordinary travel; if they meet the requirements which
their ordinary uses demand, the authorities in charge of them have performed their
duty under the law and cannot be made answerable in damages for extraordinary
accidents occurring on them. This is a rule of foreseeability; it is applicable to deter-
mine the scope of the legal duty owed by a defendant, in this case a municipality.
The validity of the rule has not been impaired by the more recent enactment of the
Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Law.
Id. (citations omitted).
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manner; (2) a duty to update design in certain circumstances; and
(3) a duty to maintain the highways. With respect to a duty to
design, the commonwealth agency must initially provide that the
highway be designed in a prudent manner. In certain circum-
stances, even where the adoption of the original design plan was
not negligent, a change in circumstances can support a finding of
negligence if the governmental agency failed to make necessary im-
provements to protect a user of the road from foreseeable harm.56 6
Additionally, the roads must be maintained in a manner consistent
with the due care that a prudent person would exercise under the
circumstances in light of the regular, intended and foreseeable use
of the property."
s 7
Thus, with respect to initial design of a road, the focus is not
only upon the conformity to usual or customary methods, but also
upon the location of the road, the type and volume of traffic ex-
pected or anticipated, the road's design speed, and the expected
traffic volume increases on the road over time. This is in addition
to other engineering judgments and concerns which must be ad-
dressed with respect to placement of the road."18 In reviewing what
activities are necessary with respect to a road, the commonwealth
agency has a general duty to consider the normal and ordinary use
of the road (which is foreseeable), and what might occur when such
activity, though negligent, is not reckless (which is also
foreseeable).
E. Waiver Addressing Claims for Potholes and Other Dangerous
Conditions Created by Natural Elements
1. General Provisions
The General Assembly created a distinct exception to sovereign
immunity for claims based upon dangerous conditions resulting
from potholes, sinkholes or other similar conditions created by nat-
566. Wyke, 474 A.2d at 381.
567. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Borough of Rochester, 150 A.2d 338, 340 (Pa. 1959) "A mu-
nicipality is required to construct and maintain its highways in such a manner as to protect
travelers from dangers which, by the exercise of normal foresight, careful construction, and
reasonable inspection, can be anticipated and avoided." Id. (quoting Drew v. Laber, 383
A.2d 941, 943 (Pa. 1978)).
568. See, e.g., BUREAU Op DESIGN, PENNSYLVANIA DEPT OF TRANSP. DESIGN MANUAL
PART 2 HIGHWAY DESIGN, Publication 13 (January 1990); AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF STATE
HIGHWAY AND TRANSPORTATION OFFICIALS, A POLICY ON GEOMETRIC DESIGN OF HIGHWAYS AND
STREETS (1990); 67 PA. CODE § 201 (1977, as amended 1982).
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ural elements." 9 To recover under this section, the claimant must
be able to establish both that a reasonably foreseeable risk of in-
jury is created by the dangerous condition and that the common-
wealth agency has timely written notice of that dangerous condi-
tion.570 Thus, PaDOT may be liable for a dangerous condition
created by potholes or other conditions created by natural ele-
ments if the agency had actual written notice of the dangerous
condition.5 11
Written notice is not required for a pothole that exists because
of construction to a roadway, for such a claim is based on the con-
struction activities rather than a natural condition.572 If the hole is
caused by a combination of traffic and natural elements, written
notice is mandatory.57 3 Further, the commonwealth court has con-
cluded that the term "potholes and sinkholes" encompasses any
such holes in the roadway caused by deterioration resulting from a
combination of water, freezing and thawing and traffic.7 4
The fundamental decision as to whether an action falls within
the parameters of sections 8522(b)(4) or (b)(5) is a legal one for the
court to make.57 5 In general, section 8522(b)(4) is applicable to sit-
uations in which the agency, through an affirmative act or failure
to act, creates an artificial condition. s  Section 8522(b)(5) applies
569. Section 8522(b)(5) provides:
Potholes and other dangerous conditions.-A dangerous condition of highways under
the jurisdiction of a Commonwealth agency created by potholes or sinkholes or other
similar conditions created by natural elements, except that the claimant to recover
must establish that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of
the. kind of injury which was incurred and that the Commonwealth agency had actual
written notice of the dangerous condition of the highway a sufficient time prior to the
event to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. Property
damages shall not be recoverable under this paragraph.
42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 8522(b)(5) (1990).
570. Id.; see also Stevens v. Department of Transp., 492 A.2d 490 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1985).
571. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(5) (1990). See Cressman v. Department of Transp.,
538 A.2d 992 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988). However, the commonwealth court found that the
pothole exception was meant to encompass holes on highways caused by deterioration re-
sulting from a combination of water, freezing, thawing and traffic. Cressman, 538 A.2d at
994. See also Lehnig v. Felton, 419 A.2d 1330 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980), wherein the court re-
jected a claim that an accident qualified under the potholes and dangerous conditions ex-
ception because appellees had a "duty to warn" of the pothole.
572. Cressman, 538 A.2d at 994.
573. Id.
574. Id.
575. See Hall v. Acme Markets, Inc., 532 A.2d 894, 895 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) ("[tlhe
determination of whether a suit is barred by official or sovereign immunity is solely a matter
of law." Id.)
576. See, e.g., Snyder v. Harmon, 562 A.2d 307, 312 (Pa. 1989) ("sovereign immunity
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to situations wherein the agency has failed to correct a condition
which naturally arises.57 The General Assembly made clear its de-
sire to limit its exposure in such situations, where risk manage-
ment is uncertain. 78 What the General Assembly found to be most
important was a need to limit liability caused by natural condi-
tions on commonwealth realty which were unknown to the com-
monwealth agency and beyond the agency's control.
57 9
In cases brought under section 8522(b)(5), the courts uphold the
written notice requirement quite stringently, requiring written no-
tice to the responsible agency. 580 Thus, the fact that a pothole is
located close to a PaDOT office will not impute knowledge of the
pothole to PaDOT.5 1s This was the situation in Stevens v. Depart-
ment of Transportation,582 where evidence existed identifying a
pothole located in a roadway situated within one and one-half
miles of PaDOT's local maintenance shed.58 The claims against
PaDOT arose out of a vehicle accident on U.S. Route 22 in West-
moreland County.5 8 4 Stevens was operating a vehicle owned by the
Benedictine Sisters and lost control of the vehicle, colliding with
another vehicle in the oncoming lane of traffic. 585 Stevens allegedly
lost control of her vehicle after striking a pothole and brought an
action against PaDOT for the injuries sustained. 8 e
On appeal, the sole issue before the commonwealth court was
is waived ... where it is alleged that the artificial condition or defect of the land itself
causes an injury to occur." Id.); Wyke v. Ward, 474 A.2d 375 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984) (liabil-
ity premised on the defective design of the highway).
577. Cressman, 538 A.2d at 994 (42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(5) includes claims for
holes in the highway caused by deterioration resulting from a combination of traffic and
natural elements); Merling v. Department of Transp., 468 A.2d 894 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983)
(42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(5) applicable for defects alleged consisting of a pothole, an
unstable berm and guardrails needing repair).
578. See JOINT REPORT, cited at note 145, at 10, 13-14.
579. Id. at 13-14, stating:
[tihe task force was cognizant of the potential liability exposure arising out of the
difficulty of maintaining the 45,000 miles of designated Commonwealth highways,
particularly in light of weather conditions usually existing in the Commonwealth dur-
ing winter and early spring. At the present time, pothole patching can be accom-
plished only during favorable weather conditions, even if the dangerous condition is
known.
Id.
580. See Stevens v. Department of Transp., 492 A.2d 490, 493 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
581. Stevens, 492 A.2d at 493.
582. 492 A.2d 490 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
583. Stevens, 492 A.2d at 493.
584. Id. at 491-92.
585. Id.
586. Id. at 492.
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whether notice to PaDOT of the allegedly dangerous condition was
sufficient to meet the requirements of section 8522(b)(5).5 "  The
evidence indicated that PaDOT was unaware of the pothole in
question prior to the date of the accident and that PaDOT re-
paired the pothole four or five days following the accident in ques-
tion.58 8 Despite alleged constructive notice,58 9 the court held that
the burden remained with the claimant to prove that actual writ-
ten notice of a pothole was given to PaDOT.59 0 As a rule, the plain-
tiff must prove actual written notice; PaDOT is not required to
show a lack of such notice.5 " 1 The court concluded that the lan-
guage of the exception was clear in requiring the claimant to es-
tablish actual written notice of the condition within a sufficient pe-
riod of time to effectuate repair.5 92 The court went on to note that
in light of the clear language it was "not empowered to alter the
clear wording of the statute under the pretext of searching out
some unexpressed legislative intent."
5 93
.The statutory requirement that PaDOT receive actual written
notice of a pothole defect prior to an accident caused by potholes
is not a violation of a person's constitutional rights guaranteed
under Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.594 The
courts have concluded that there is a legitimate basis for the notice
requirement under section 8522(b)(5) of the statute. 95
The courts have also strictly interpreted the "dangerous condi-
tion" provision of section 8522(b)(5). 5" For example, in Walters v.
587. Stevens, 492 A.2d at 492.
588. Id. at 493.
589. Id. at 492.
590. Id. at 493.
591. Id.
592. Stevens, 492 A.2d at 493.
593. Id. at 493-94 (citing section 1921(b) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1
PA. CONS. STAT. §1921(b) (1975); Shestack v. General Braddock Sch. Dist., 437 A.2d 1059
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981)).
594. See Ketterer v. Department of Transp., 574 A.2d 735 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
Article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
Inherent Rights of Mankind
Section 1. All Men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent
and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pur-
suing their own happiness.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
595. Ketterer, 574 A.2d at 737.
596. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(5) (1990) waives immunity for "potholes and other
dangerous conditions."
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Department of Transportaion,91 the commonwealth court con-
cluded that PaDOT did not create a dangerous condition by failing
to obtain the driver's license, license plate and registration of a
driver whose operating privileges had been suspended following his
conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol, when that
driver was subsequently involved in a traffic accident.51 An action
brought by the woman injured in the accident with the driver
whose privileges had been suspended did not fall within the statu-
tory exception to sovereign immunity for creation of a dangerous
highway condition.5 " The failure to obtain the documents did not
cause the injury; the negligent operation of the vehicle did.00
2. Claims Addressing Accumulations of Snow or Ice
One final area worth noting is the analysis concerning whether a
natural accumulation of snow or ice on a roadway constitutes a
"dangerous condition" created by natural elements within the con-
text of the waiver set forth at section 8522(b)(5). In Huber v. De-
partment of Transportation,60 1 the commonwealth court held that
PaDOT did not owe a specific duty to individual motorists to clear
highways of natural accumulations of snow and ice. 2
. The facts of Huber are not complex. Huber was involved in a
multi-car collision.603 At the time of the accident, the roadway was
covered with a layer of snow and ice due to a snow storm which
had begun approximately eight and one-quarter hours prior to the
accident. 04 Initially, Huber's vehicle was struck from behind by a
car and when Huber got out to inspect the damage, he was injured
when a third vehicle struck the second vehicle, which in turn
struck Huber. 6
As a result of the above, Huber and his wife brought an action
against PaDOT, alleging that PaDOT was aware of the icy condi-
tions seven hours before the accident and failed to remove or treat
the ice and snow condition.606 This failure to treat the ice and snow
597. 474 A.2d 66 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
598. Walters, 474 A.2d at 68.
599. Id.
600. Id. at 67.
601. 551 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988); alloc. denied, 578 A.2d 931 (Pa. 1989).
602. Huber, 551 A.2d at 1134.






condition, the plaintiffs contended, was negligent.0 7 PaDOT ar-
gued that it had no duty to remove ice and snow which naturally
accumulated from a winter storm.60 8
The trial court granted PaDOT's motion for summary judg-
ment.60 9 A request for reconsideration was granted and a subse-
quent motion to open the summary judgment was denied. 610 In an-
alyzing the claim, the trial court noted that PaDOT is statutorily
charged with the exclusive responsibility for repairing and main-
taining the roads. " ' The court further noted that the Administra-
tive Code of 1929612 grants PaDOT exclusive authority and juris-
diction over all state highways.613  Additionally, PaDOT is
empowered to repair and maintain the state highway system.614
Based on the above, the trial court concluded that PaDOT had a
duty to remove snow and the failure to do so would permit a cause
of action against PaDOT.613 However, the plaintiff's claim was de-
nied after the court concluded that although a colorable claim
against PaDOT had been stated, PaDOT was immune because
there had been no actual written notice of the road conditions pro-
vided to PaDOT. 16
Although it affirmed the decision, the commonwealth court dis-
agreed with some of the trial court's rationale,6 17 concluding that
no duty existed with respect to an individual plaintiff to treat nat-
ural accumulations of ice and snow resulting from a snow storm.618
The commonwealth court determined that although PaDOT is
statutorily charged with exclusive responsibility for repairing and
maintaining the highways,6 19 the inquiry with respect to a tort
607. Huber, 551 A.2d at 1134.
608. Id. at 1131.
609. Id.
610. Id. at 1131.
611. Id. at 1132-33.
612. The Administrative Code of 1929, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 512(a)(10) (1990) ("the Administrative Code"); The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
noted that initially it is a question of law for the court to determine whether a duty exists
between one party as to another. See Mindala v. American Motors Corp., 543 A.2d 520 (Pa.
1988).
613. Huber, 551 A.2d at 1133 (citing Haas v. Department of Transp., 479 A.2d 100
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984)).
614. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1-2203 (1990).
615. Huber, 551 A.2d at 1133.
616. Id. at 1131.
617. Id. at 1134.
618. Id.
619. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit 71, § 512(a)(10) (1990).
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claim is more refined.620 The court adopted the "duty" test from
Mindala v. American Motors Corporation,621 which stated:
[I]n reviewing whether a duty exists, the court must determine the relation-
ship between the parties and balance the various competing interests and
costs involved in providing the requested protection. This requires a deter-
mination of the probability of harm in conjunction with the inconvenience
of acting to prevent that harm."'
In applying the above test, the court refused to interpret
PaDOT's general duty of snow removal "to include a specific duty
to protect Appellants from the harm suffered in this case."' In
short, the statutory provisions impose a duty on PaDOT with re-
spect to the general public. The failure to remove naturally ac-
cumulating snow and ice, however, does not result in a cause of
action with respect to an individual. According to the court, if such
a cause of action did exist, any individual involved in an accident
where ice and snow was a factor could claim a cause of action
against PaDOT. 624 In applying the test garnered from Mindala,62 5
the court concluded that the public interests to be protected were
outweighed by the costs involved in providing the protection
sought. Consequently, no cause of action existed against PaDOT
based upon failure to remove or treat natural accumulations of ice
and snow.
In analyzing this type of action, the court focuses significant at-
tention on whether the accumulation is natural or artificial. 6 ' Ad-
ditionally, the fact that PaDOT is aware of the snowy or icy condi-
tion and begins to remove the snow or ice does not result in a duty
to immediately remove it from all areas.62 7 "[Pa]DOT does not as-
sume the duty to clear a highway on behalf of specific motorists
because its vehicles have begun to remove ice and snow somewhere
else on the highway." 6 8 Finally, a natural condition includes ruts
620. See Huber, 551 A.2d at 1133; see also note 622 and accompanying text.
621. 543 A.2d 520 (Pa. 1988).
622. Huber, 551 A.2d at 1133 (quoting Mindala v. American Motors Corp., 543 A.2d at
524).
623. Huber, 551 A.2d at 1134 (emphasis added).
624. Id. at 1133.
625. See Mindala, 543 A.2d at 524; see also note 622 and accompanying text.
626. Bowles v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 581 A.2d 700 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1990) (morning frost on a platform of a mass transit station is a natural occurrence, and
not a defect permitting a cause of action).
627. Hunt v. Department of Transp., 587 A.2d 37 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991), alloc. de-
nied, 598 A.2d 286 (Pa. 1991).
628. Hunt, 587 A.2d at 40.
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and ridges in the snow caused by vehicles travelling through the
snow, even if the snow had been shovelled into the street.
2 9
Generally, an improper plowing procedure by PaDOT will not
result in a cause of action.630 However, where PaDOT plows the
snow in such a way as to create an artificial accumulation, such as
a ramp, liability may be incurred.631 In Commonwealth v. Wel-
ler,632 the court was faced with a situation where PaDOT piled
snow in a manner which created an artificial accumulation in the
form of a ramp over the berm and guardrail. An action was
brought against PaDOT on behalf of a decedent who lost control of
his vehicle on a bridge on the interstate and vaulted over the
bridge railing.633 At trial, the plaintiff contended that the snow and
ice had been piled in such a fashion as to form a "ramp" over the
berm and guardrail."" The vehicle ascended the ramp before clear-
ing the guardrail and falling to the ground.6 35 Evidence further in-
dicated that a total of four and one-half inches of snow had fallen
in the two day period prior to the accident.636 In concluding that a
cause of action existed, the court focused on the artificially created
ramp, which could have been created only through the effort of
PaDOT:
Because the natural accumulation of snow which fell, combined with the
effects of passing traffic, would not be sufficient to allow a vehicle to vault
the guardrail without striking it, the trial court did not err in accepting the
jury's finding that [PaDOT's] plowing created an artificial accumulation of
snow and ice, which rendered the guardrail ineffective and caused the dece-
dent's fatal accident. Therefore, although [PaDOT] has no common law
duty to remove natural accumulations of ice and snow from a public road,
Weller had a cause of action against [PaDOT] based on [PaDOT's] negli-
gent conduct in creating an artificial accumulation.63 7
629. See Vitelli v. City of Chester, 545 A.2d 1011, 1012-13 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988)
("[s]hovelled snow is a natural incident of the snowfall which cannot be separated from the
snowfall itself. The fact that snow has been shovelled into the street does not change its
character from 'natural' to 'artificial.'" Id.).
630. Miller v. Kistler, 582 A.2d 416 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990), alloc. denied, 593 A.2d
427 (Pa. 1991).
631. Commonwealth v. Weller, 574 A.2d 728 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
632. Weller, 574 A.2d 728.
633. Id. at 729.
634. Id.
635. Id.
636. Id. The testimony revealed "that three and one-half inches of snow had accumu-
lated on the ground between 7:00 a.m. on January 26 and 7:00 a.m. on January 27. An
additional one inch fell by 7:00 a.m. on January 28, the morning of the accident." Id. The
accident occurred at approximately 5:30 a.m. on January 28. Id.
637. Weller, 574 A.2d at 730. Weller was distinguishable from Vitelli in that in Weller
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The analysis appropriate here is to determine whether the act of
plowing actively creates a dangerous condition. In general, the sim-
ple act of plowing will not create an artificial accumulation of snow
and ice. However, where the act of plowing does create a danger-
ous, artificial condition, PaDOT may be held accountable. 38
F. Waiver Addressing Claims for the Care, Custody or Control of
Animals
An exception to sovereign immunity exists with respect to inju-
ries resulting from certain animals within the care, custody or con-
trol of a commonwealth party. The exception does not extend to
injuries caused by wild animals, except as otherwise provided by
statute.3 9 Injuries caused by wild animals are covered by the
Pennsylvania Game Law, 40 which requires the purchase of bear
and deer-proof fences and authorizes payment for damages caused
by bears. 4 1 Obviously, the General Assembly did not intend to
usurp the function of the Pennsylvania Game Law with the adop-
tion of section 8522(b)(6).6 '2
Injury must be caused by the animal, not to the animal,64 3 and
the animal must be under the control of the commonwealth party
the plowing created a ramp which resulted in the guardrail being ineffective. Id.
638. Weller, 574 A.2d at 729.
639. Section 8522(b)(6) provides:
Care, custody or control of animals.-The care, custody or control of animals in the
possession or control of a Commonwealth party, including but not limited to police
dogs and horses and animals incarcerated in Commonwealth agency laboratories.
Damages shall not be recoverable under this paragraph on account of. any injury
caused by wild animals, including but not limited to bears and deer, except as other-
wise provided by statute.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(6) (1990).
640. 34 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 101, 546, 551-556 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (original version at
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 1311.101 (1985).
641. 34 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 546, 555 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
642. See JOINT REPORT, cited at note 145, at 14.
643. For example, in Mayo v. Lichtenwalner, 557 A.2d 798 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989),
plaintiffs' dogs were killed by the dog law enforcement officer of Lehigh County. Plaintiff
sought damages for emotional distress and mental anguish, loss of society and companion-
ship and economic loss associated with the value of the dogs. Mayo, 557 A.2d at 799. The
commonwealth court held that the exception to sovereign immunity for damages caused by
the care, custody or control of animals in the possession or control of a commonwealth party
does not apply to a claim for damages caused to animals. Id. The commonwealth court
noted the complaint addressed damages "caused to the animals, not by the animals." Id.
The court then concluded "that the exception to sovereign immunity set forth in
§ 8522(b)(6) is not applicable in a case where, as here, damages are sought for damages
caused to, not by, animals." Id. Since the claim was not for injury by the animal in the
control of the Commonwealth party, the claim fell outside the exception. Id.
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or local agency.64" In Herman v. Green County Fair Board,4 5 the
court discussed whether horses at a county-sponsored horse-pull-
ing contest were in the control of the county for purposes of sec-
tion 8542(b)(8). This provision, similar to section 8522(b)(6), ad-
dresses the liability waiver of local governmental agencies for the
care, custody or control of animals. 46 The horses in question broke
away from their owner during the contest and ran into a.crowd of
spectators. 47 The plaintiff argued that the county's control of the
contest was sufficient to bring the action within the exception to
immunity addressing control of animals.6 4  The court did not
agree, finding the record clear that care of the horses at the show
was the responsibility of the owners,4 9 further noting that the hor-
ses were in the control of the owner at the time they broke free.650
While the county did have control of the decision to permit the
horses to participate in the contest, this control was not sufficient
to permit a finding of negligence against the county for the injuries
"caused when the horses escaped from the control of third
parties." '51
The threshold inquiry under this provision is whether the animal
in question was in the possession or control of the commonwealth
party. Absent such a finding, this section will not apply. Conse-
quently, there is also no waiver for injuries caused by stray ani-
mals, as those animals are not within the possession or control of
the governmental party.6 52 Finally, where the animal is in posses-
644. Herman v. Greene County Fair Bd., 535 A.2d 1251 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).
645. Herman, 535 A. 2d 1251.
646. Section 8542(b)(8) provides an exception to immunity for local government agen-
cies for acts involving:
Care, custody or control of animals.-
The care, custody or control of animals in the possession or control of a local agency,
including but not limited to police dogs and horses. Damages shall not be recoverable
under this paragraph on account of any injury caused by wild animals, including but
not limited to bears and deer, except as otherwise provided by statute.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542(b)(8) (1990). Compare note 639.
647. Herman, 535 A.2d at 1252.
648. Id. at 1253.
649. Id. at 1254.
650. Id.
651. Id. at 1255.
652. See Jenkins v. McDonald, 498 A.2d 487 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (a city is immune
to suit for damages for injuries sustained for an attack by a stray dog, since a stray dog is
not in the possession or control of the city); see also Potts v. Davis, 610 A.2d 74 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990) afl'd, 610 A.2d 42 (Pa. 1992) (state not liable for damage by deer to
plants on private property); DeLuca v. White Marsh Township, 526 A.2d 456 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1987) (injuries caused by a wolf do not fall within the immunity exception because a
wolf is a wild animal and injuries caused by wild animals are specifically excluded from the
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sion or control of the commonwealth agency, the damages must be
for acts by the animal, rather than injuries caused to the animal in
question.65 The limitations provided in the waiver itself make
clear this provision is directed to a narrow set of cases, and is not
to be construed as permitting actions involving the wildlife inhab-
iting commonwealth property.
G. Waiver Addressing Claims for Liquor Store Sales
The waiver for the sale of liquor found at section 8522(b)(7)
reads as follows:
LIQUOR STORE SALEs-The sale of liquor at Pennsylvania liquor stores by
employees of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board created by and oper-
ating under the Act of April 12, 1951 (P.L. 90, No. 21), known as the "Li-
quor Code" [footnote omitted], if such sale is made to any minor or to any
person visibly intoxicated, or to any insane person, or to any person known
as a habitual drunkard, or of known intemperate habit.6'
The intent of the above waiver was to hold liquor store employees
to the same standard as private licensees in instances of wrongful
sale of alcoholic beverages.155 As with a private licensee"'6 or a so-
cial host,6 57 a liquor store employee may be found negligent if the
employee sells liquor to members of any of those groups included
in the statute.5 s
In Barrie v. Liquor Control Board,19 the commonwealth court
addressed a case brought under the liquor store liability excep-
tion e60 to sovereign immunity. The administratrix of the estate of
Barrie appealed the trial court order denying a motion for post-
trial relief. 61 Barrie and Krisovenski, both sixteen at the time, re-
care, custody or control of animals exception to immunity); Bradley v. Pennsylvania Turn-
pike Comm'n, 550 A.2d 261 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), appeal denied, 588 A.2d 511 (Pa. 1990)
(holding Commonwealth agencies specifically exempt from claims arising from injuries
caused by wild animals).
653. Mayo v. Lichtenwalner, 557 A. 2d 798 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989). See note 643.
654. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(7) (1990).
655. JoINT REPORT, cited at note 145, at 14.
656. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493(1) (1969 & Supp. 1993); see also Reber v.
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 516 A.2d 440 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986), appeal granted,
527 A.2d 548 (Pa. 1987) (holding that the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board was not a
private licensee).
657. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 306 (1983 & Supp. 1993). See also Congini v. Porter-
sville Valve Co., 470 A.2d 515, 517-18 (Pa. 1983).
658. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(7) (1990).
659. 586 A.2d 1017 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 593 A.2d 423 (Pa. 1991).
660. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(7) (1990).
661. Barrie, 586 A.2d at 1018.
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quested that Green, age twenty, purchase a half-gallon of vodka
and one-fifth gallon of gin for them.662 Green agreed, obtaining the
money from both Barrie and Krisovenski and subsequently
purchasing the liquor from a state liquor store.63 At the time of
the sale, Green was not asked to produce any identification to ver-
ify his age.66' That night Barrie and Krisovenski, along with a
third individual, drank the half-gallon of vodka.665
Krisovenski testified at trial that he passed out, awakened
around 2:30 a.m. and made his way home.666 Barrie did not return
home that evening and his body was found three weeks later in a
creek, some distance from the site where he and the two others had
consumed the vodka.67 The cause of death was listed by the coro-
ner as accidental drowning with acute alcohol intoxication as a
contributing factor.6 '
The action was brought against the Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board ("PLCB") and a PLCB employee for negligence in selling
alcohol to a minor.6 9 The jury found the commonwealth parties
ten percent negligent, Green twenty percent causally negligent and
Barrie seventy percent negligent in causing his own death. 670 Based
upon the above findings, the court entered a verdict in favor of all
defendants.671 On appeal, the commonwealth court addressed three
issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in allowing the defense of
contributory negligence; (2) whether the court erred in allowing
testimony that a minor who purchased alcohol looked to be in his
mid-twenties; and (3) whether evidence of a minor's prior alcohol
consumption should be admitted.
With respect to contributory negligence, the court determined





666. Barrie, 586 A.2d at 1018.
667. Id.
668. Id. at 1018-19.
669. Id. at 1019. There was also an action brought against Green for supplying the
liquor to Barrie. Subsequently, Krisovenski and the third individual, Mary Beth Dawson,
were joined as additional defendants for participating in the party. The administratrix and
her ex-husband, Richard Barrie, were also joined as additional defendants on a theory of
negligent parental supervision. Id.
670. Id.
671. Id.
672. Barrie, 586 A.2d at 1019.
673. Id. at 1020.
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reviewed the history of such cases, and concluded that failure to
permit the court or jury to consider the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff would place strict liability upon the liquor store for a
sale to a minor.67 4 The court concluded that under the Compara-
tive Negligence Act,675 the fact finder was to resolve whether the
defendant's negligence would not preclude recovery and the court
should not dismiss outright such negligence claims.676
As to the introduction of testimony concerning the age of Green,
the court concluded that the narrow construction provided to im-
munity exceptions warranted admission of evidence as to the age
of Green, despite the fact it came only from his appearance. 7 This
evidence was admissible even though the commonwealth employee
had violated section 493(1) 1 Qf the Liquor Code and failed to
comply with section 495.679 Together, these provisions set forth the
acceptable forms .of identification and the requirement of a state-
ment from any individual whose age is in question. Compliance
with the sections will shield the licensee or employee of the liquor
store from liability.680 The plaintiff attempted to argue that, by im-
plication, the failure to comply would expose the employee to lia-
bility.M The court disagreed, finding that the failure to abide by
the guidelines set forth in section 495 of the Liquor Code to be
relevant only in an action for violation of section 493(1) of the Li-
quor Code. 82 According to the commonwealth court, failure to
abide by the section 495 guidelines "should not be applied in a
negligence action." 83
The court did not address whether compliance with section 495
guidelines would shield the liquor store from liability in a civil ac-
tion. Instead, it refused to permit introduction of the violation,
674. Id. at 1019.
675. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7102 (1990).
676. Barrie, 586 A.2d at 1020; see also Congini, 470 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1983).
677. Barrie, 586 A.2d at 1021.
678. Section 4-493(1) prohibits the sale of liquor "to any person visibly intoxicated, or
to any insane person, or to any minor, or to habitual drunkards, or persons of known intem-
perate habits." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493(1) (1969 & Supp. 1993).
679. Section 4-495 sets forth the acceptable forms of identification to be furnished
prior to the sale of alcohol to any individual whose age is in question. Additionally, this
section provides the appropriate language for a statement to be signed by the individual
whose age is in question in order for the licensee or employee of the liquor store to be
protected from liability in civil and criminal prosecutions for serving a minor. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 47, § 4-495 (1969 & Supp. 1993).
680. Barrie, 586 A.2d at 1020 n.3.
681. Id. at 1019.




based on relevance objections.184 However, it appears that compli-
ance would be relevant and would act as a bar to an action. Ac-
cording to this section, obtaining an appropriately signed state-
ment from an individual "may be offered as evidence in all civil
and criminal . . . prosecutions for serving a minor ... "I"
The Barrie decision simultaneously limited available actions
against the PLCB, while expanding the defenses available in such
actions. Most importantly, the court permitted evidence of the
purchaser's appearance to show that it was reasonable to believe
the purchaser to be over the age of 21.8s In addition, the court
precluded as evidence the fact that the liquor store clerk failed to
obtain the appropriate identification card from the purchaser.8
The court viewed these as related issues, noting that the former
went to the question of whether there was any limitation on the
PLCB's use of the contributory negligence defense. 8 Finding no
limitation within the narrow confines of the immunity waiver, the
court permitted introduction of evidence related to the purchaser's
appearance. 9
With regard to the lack of a signed statement, the court found
no relevance to the proposed introduction of a failure to abide by
section 495.690 Such a failure was not relevant to issues involved in
a negligence action, being limited only "to the imposition of fines
and other penalties under the Liquor Code. . ,,"91 Introduction
of a violation of the Liquor Code, which has as its focus fines and
penalties, was found to be inappropriate in a civil case. 92
The Court's analysis in this case and its focus on the interplay of
sections 493(1) and 495 of the Liquor Code, ignores the language of
the waiver provision itself. This section waives immunity whenever
684. Id.
685. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-495(e) (1969 & Supp. 1993).
686. Barrie, 586 A.2d at 1020. The court viewed the introduction of testimony con-
cerning the purchaser's age, as determined by his appearance, to be part of the defense of
contributory negligence. Id.
687. Id. at 1020.
688. Id. at 1021. In concluding there was no limitation on the contributory negligence
defense, the court noted the exceptions to sovereign immunity were to be construed strictly
and that any legislative intent to limit such a defense could have been written into the Act.
Without such language, the court concluded it "should not read such a limitation into the
statute." Id *
689. Id.
690. Id. at 1020.
691. Barrie, 586 A.2d at 1020.
692. Id.
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a "sale is made to any minor . ",693 It would appear from this
express language, then, that the physical appearance of the pur-
chaser is irrelevant to the issue. At a minimum, the type of identi-
fication found acceptable under the Liquor Code, 9' which should
be read in pari materia to this waiver provision,"9" would be rele-
vant to the claims directed to the sale to a minor. Indeed, the Gen-
eral Assembly's reference to an adoption of verbiage similar to that
of the Liquor Code696 reinforces this point.
H. Waiver Addressing Claims for Acts of Pennsylvania Military
Forces
Section 8522(b)(8) waives immunity for acts of Pennsylvania
military forces. 9 7 According to the General Assembly, this waiver
reconciles the provisions of the Sovereign Immunity Act with the
provisions of the Pennsylvania Military Code. 98 The Pennsylvania
Military Code holds the Commonwealth liable for payment of all
judgments and costs against a member of the Pennsylvania mili-
tary forces699 who was on state duty and who was either acting pur-
suant to orders or who relied on an order which a reasonable per-
son would consider to be lawful under the circumstances. 00 The
General Assembly stated that section 8522(b)(8) should be read in
pari materia with section 4108 of the Pennsylvania Military
Code. o1
In Knauer v. Salter, °7 2 an action was brought by a member of
the Pennsylvania National Guard who allegedly was injured while
on active training duty.703 According to the complaint, Knauer was
assisting Salter, a major in the Pennsylvania National Guard, in
693. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(7) (1990).
694. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-495 (1969 & Supp. 1993).
695. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1932 (1975).
696. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493(1) (1969 & Supp. 1993).
697. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(8) (1990).
698. See JOINT REPORT, cited at note 145, at 15.
699. Section 4108 provides:
Liability of Commonwealth for judgments against personnel on State duty.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania shall be responsible for the payment of all judg-
ments and costs secured against a member of the Pennsylvania Military Forces on
state duty who was acting under lawful orders or who in good faith relied on an order
which a reasonable person would consider to be lawful under the circumstances.
51 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4108 (1990).
700. Id.
701. JoINT REPORT, cited at note 145, at 15; see also 1 PA. CONS. STAT. §1932 (1975).
702. 459 A.2d 1233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983), aff'd, per curiam, 482 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1984).
703. Knauer, 459 A.2d at 1234.
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unloading a truck when Knauer sustained injuries to his knee.70
The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of the defend-
ant, ruling that state compensation benefits as provided in the
Pennsylvania Military Code70 5 and as supplemented by federal
compensation708 established the exclusive remedy for the injury. 7
Because the state benefits are determined by the Pennsylvania
Worker's Compensation Act, the court concluded that the Pennsyl-
vania Worker's Compensation Act restrictions, including the fact
that such compensation is the sole and exclusive remedy against
the employer°70 8 barred the suit.
7 09
The superior court, on appeal, affirmed the trial court finding. 10
The court cited the rationale of the United States Supreme Court
when confronted with a similar issue. 1' In the federal action, a ser-
viceman was injured while on active duty and sought recovery
through the Federal Tort Claims Procedure Act.712 The Supreme
Court denied relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act, construing
that Act to fit within the "entire statutory system of remedies
against the government to make a workable, consistent and equita-
ble whole. '71 3 In Knauer, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
adopted the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court, con-
cluding that the purpose of the military activity waiver to sover-
eign immunity was to provide a remedy to those who had been
without a remedy, rather than to extend additional protection to
those who already enjoyed coverage.
7 14
The reasoning in Knauer makes clear that the provisions of sec-
tion 8522(b)(8) are applicable for claims related to injuries to third
parties occasioned by acts of the Pennsylvania military forces. In-
juries incurred by members of the Pennsylvania National Guard
while on duty do not fall within this exception and instead are pro-
vided for under the provisions of the Workman's Compensation
Act. Therefore, National Guard members injured while on duty
704. Id.
705. 51 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 101, 3501-02 (1990).
706. 32 U.S.C.A. § 318 (1959, repealed 1986).
707. Knauer, 459 A.2d at 1234.
708. Id., see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481(a) (1992).
709. Knauer, 459 A.2d at 1234.
710. Id. at 1237.
711. Id. at 1236 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)).
712. Knauer, 459 A.2d at 1236 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1980) and citing Feres,
340 U.S. at 135).
713. Knauer, 459 A.2d at 1236 (citing Feres, 340 U.S. at 135).
714. Knauer, 459 A.2d at 1237.
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may not seek relief under this immunity provision for such
injuries.
I. Waiver Addressing Claims for Toxoids and Vaccines
An exception focusing on toxoids and vaccines, and covering
very limited circumstances, was added to the Sovereign Immunity
Act in 1986.715 It waives immunity if the Commonwealth provides
a vaccine to a private party from a source which will not supply
the vaccine to a private party directly.716 Under the language of the
Act, if a qualified private party purchases a vaccine from the Com-
monwealth, it must agree to indemnify the state from damages. 717
This exception was added by an amendment to enable the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania, through waiver of its immunity, to
purchase from the State of Michigan drugs and serums to be used
in the Commonwealth .7 1  The State of Michigan required indemni-
715. Section 8522(b)(9) waives immunity for negligent acts concerning toxoids and
vaccines as follows:
(9)Toxoids and vaccines.-The administration, manufacture and use of a toxoid or
vaccine not manufactured in this Commonwealth under the following conditions:
(i)The toxoid or vaccine is manufactured in, and available only from, an agency of
another state.
(ii)The agency of the other state will not make the toxoid or vaccine available to
private persons or corporations, but will only permit its sale to another state or state
agency.
(iii)The agency of the other state will make the toxoid or vaccine available to the
Commonwealth only if the Commonwealth agrees to indemnify, defend and save
harmless that agency from any and all claims and losses which may arise against it
from the administration, manufacture or use of the toxoid or vaccine.
(iv)A determination has been made by the appropriate Commonwealth agency, ap-
proved by the Governor and published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin that the toxoid
or vaccine is necessary to safeguard and protect the health of the citizens or animals
of this Commonwealth.
(v)The toxoid or vaccine is distributed by a Commonwealth agency to qualified
persons for ultimate use.
The Commonwealth shall make the toxoid or vaccine available to a qualified person
only if the person agrees to indemnify, defend and save harmless the Commonwealth
from any and all claims and losses which may arise against the Commonwealth from
the manufacture, distribution, administration or use of the toxoid or vaccine.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(9) (1990).
716. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(9)(ii) (1990).
717. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(b)(9) (1990).
718. Pa. Leg. J. H.R., 1097-98, June 3, 1986. Although the exception is drafted broadly
to apply to the purchase of toxoids or vaccines from another state, the provision was drafted
as a result of a law passed by the Michigan Legislature prohibiting Michigan laboratories
from selling any of their products to any individuals or any states unless the states agree to
hold Michigan harmless and indemnify Michigan against any claims brought about by rea-
son of the production, manufacture and subsequent use of the vaccines and serums pro-
duced, manufactured and sold by Michigan. The State of Michigan was sensitized to this
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fication from purchasers for claims brought about by reason of the
production, manufacture, and subsequent use of the vaccines and
serums.719 Without the indemnification, the Michigan laboratories
producing the products could not sell the products to other states
or end-users."'
The exception was drafted to provide access to necessary drugs
and provide a safeguard in requiring indemnification from any
seller for claims related to the manufacture, distribution, adminis-




Section 852821 limits the amount and type of damages recover-
able against a commonwealth agency for a negligent act or omis-
sion. 22 The constitutionality of section 8528 was challenged in
issue as a result of a lawsuit brought against the State of Michigan concerning a vaccine
developed by the State. At the time of the amendment, the State of Michigan manufactured
and produced certain vaccines, serums and toxins to be used to vaccinate humans and ani-
mals to prevent exposure of humans and livestock to certain forms of anthrax and equine
botulism. The purpose of the amendment was to permit the Commonwealth to buy the
drugs and serum from the State of Michigan and in turn sell the drugs to a veterinarian or
group of veterinarians or a doctor who would indemnify the Commonwealth. Ultimately, the
necessary drugs and serums would make their way to the humans and livestock where they
were needed. Id.
719. Pa. Leg. J. H.R., 1097, June 3, 1986.
720. Id.
721. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8528 (1990).
722. Id. Section 8528 provides as follows:
§8528. Limitations on Damages
(a)General rule.-Actions for which damages are limited by reference to this sub-
chapter shall be limited as set forth in this section.
(b)Amount recoverable.-Damages arising from the same cause of action or transac-
tion or occurrence or series of causes of action or transactions or occurrences shall not
exceed $250,000 in favor of any plaintiff or $1,000,000 in the aggregate.
(c)Types of damages recoverable.-Damages shall be recoverable only for:
(1) Past and future loss of earnings and earning capacity.
(2) Pain and suffering.
(3) Medical and dental expenses including the reasonable value of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental services, prosthetic devices and necessary ambulance,
hospital, professional nursing, and physical therapy expenses accrued and anticipated
in the diagnosis, care and recovery of the claimant.
(4) Loss of consortium.
(5) Property losses, except that property losses shall not be recoverable in claims
brought pursuant to section 8522(b)(5) (relating to potholes and other dangerous
conditions).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. §8528 (1990).
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Lyles v. City of Philadelphia,2 ' which involved a plaintiff who had
suffered permanent quadriplegic injuries in an automobile acci-
dent.724 The plaintiff subsequently brought an action against
PaDOT alleging negligent highway design.7 25 After a jury trial, a
verdict was rendered in favor of Lyles, awarding $750,000 in dam-
ages. 2 PaDOT filed a motion to mold this award to the statutory
maximum limitation applicable.727 The trial court granted this
motion.726
Lyles appealed the court's order to mold the verdict, challenging
the constitutionality of the damages provision contained within the
Sovereign Immunity Act.7 2' The commonwealth court upheld the
limitation, finding the state constitution provision prohibiting leg-
islative limitations on recoveries for injuries resulting in death or
for injuries to person or property730 inapplicable to suits against
the Commonwealth.3 1
The appellant also challenged the statutory damage limitations
by claiming a violation of the state and federal provisions relating
to equal protection.732 The court determined that the rational rela-
In addition, section 8526 authorizes the Commonwealth to assert a counterclaim against the
plaintiff. This section states:
COUNTERCLAIM BY THE COMMONWEALTH.
In any action initiated under this subchapter, the Commonwealth may set forth
any cause of action or set-off which it has against the plaintiff. A counterclaim need
not diminish or defeat the relief demanded by the plaintiff. It may demand relief
exceeding in amount or different in kind from that demanded by the plaintiff.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8526 (1990).
An analysis of this section was undertaken by the commonwealth court in Hill v. Port Au-
thority Transit System of Allegheny County, 585 A.2d 1129, 1133 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
723. 490 A.2d 936 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985), aff'd, Lyles v. Department of Transp., 516
A.2d 701 (Pa. 1986). See also Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 516 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1986), appeal
dismissed, 479 U.S. 1074 (1987) (holding that the limitations on recovery contained in
§ 8553 of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, Act of October 5, 1980, 1980 Pa. Laws
693, No. 142 at 221(1), as amended, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §8553 (limiting the recovery of dam-
ages against political subdivisions of the Commonwealth to $500,000 in the aggregate for
tort claims arising from the same transaction) to be constitutionally permissible).
724. Lyles, 490 A.2d at 938.
725. Id. at 936-37.
726. Id. at 938-39.
727. Id. at 939.
728. Id.
729. Lyles, 490 A.2d at 939.
730. PA. CONST. art. III, § 18; see note 738.
731. Lyles, 490 A.2d at 940. The commonwealth court analyzed article III, section 18
"through the eyes and minds of the constitutional delegates" before holding that the provi-
sion "does not apply to suits against the Commonwealth". Id.
732. The plaintiff challenged the limitation based upon a violation of article III, sec-
tion 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as well as a violation of the federal Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Lyles, 490 A.2d at 940 n.8.
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tionship test provided the proper analysis,733 and concluded that
the law would survive the constitutional challenge unless the legis-
lative classifications were patently arbitrary and lacked any ra-
tional relationship to a legitimate government interest.734 Thus, be-
cause the limitation on damages was not unconstitutional, the
court upheld the verdict granting the Commonwealth's motion to
mold the verdict to the $250,000 damage limitation imposed by
Act 152. In upholding the damage limitation the court stated:
Act 152's limit on the Commonwealth's damage payments rationally relates
to the legitimate government interest in preserving sufficient funds for es-
sential public services without imposing an undue burden upon taxpayers.
As we noted in an earlier decision upholding another provision of Act 152
against an Equal Protection Clause challenge:
A balance must be struck between unlimited potential liability and the need
for fiscal security. Full monetary responsibility for the tortious conduct of
[the Commonwealth's] agencies and employees involves the risk of an intol-.
erable tax burden .... The legislature legitimately may take steps to pre-
serve sufficient public funds to guarantee that the government will be able
to continue to provide those services which it believes benefit the
citizenry.7s
6
733. The three tests or levels of scrutiny were analyzed by the commonwealth court as
follows:
The highest level, known as strict scrutiny, applies to legislative classifications in-
fringing upon fundamental rights, such as free speech, and to those which are inher-
ently suspect because they inordinately burden a group of citizens traditionally vic-
timized by discrimination, for instance racial minorities. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Slater, 75 Pa. Commw. Ct. 310, 462 A.2d
870 (1983). Under this scrutiny, a classification will not pass constitutional muster
unless it is necessary to advance a compelling state interest. Benner v. Oswald, 592
F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832, 100 S.Ct. 62, 62 L.Ed. 2d 41
(1979). The next level, termed middle-level or intermediate scrutiny, applies to classi-
fications affecting less fundamental rights, such as commercial speech, and to classifi-
cations which are not quite so suspect, such as gender. Long v. 130 Market Street
Gift & Novelty of Johnstown, 294 Pa. Super Ct. 383, 440 A.2d 517 (1982). When this
test applies, a classification must serve an important government interest and be sub-
stantially related to the achievement of that interest. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97
S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed. 2d 397 (1976). The third level, employing the least scrutiny, is the
rational relationship test. It applies to all other legislative classifications, for example
those implicating economic rights. This minimal scrutiny upholds classifications un-
less they are patently arbitrary and lack any rational relationship to a legitimate gov-
ernment interest. Robson v. Penn Hills School District, 63 Pa. Commw. Ct. 250, 437
A.2d 1273 (1981).
Lyles, 490 A.2d at 940-41.
734. Lyles, 490 A.2d at 942.
735. Id. This damage limitation was also upheld in Murdoch v. Commonwealth, 531
A.2d 1164 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
736. Lyles, 490 A.2d at 941 (quoting Picariello v. Commonwealth, 421 A.2d 477, 480
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980)).
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When it initially drafted the Sovereign Immunity Act, the Gen-
eral Assembly considered constitutional language otherwise
prohibiting a limitation on recovery.3 7 In recommending the limit,
the Joint State Government Commission on Sovereign Immunity
discussed the provision contained in article III, section 18 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution,"8 precluding the General Assembly
from limiting "the amounts to be recovered for injuries resulting in
death . . . .,7 After careful consideration, the commission con-
cluded that this provision must be read in pari materia with the
general prohibition of suit against the Commonwealth, 740 and that
the General Assembly has specific constitutional authority to waive
this prohibition. 741 In light of this language, the commission fur-
ther concluded that the General Assembly was permitted to affix
limitations where it waived immunity in general.74 1
In setting forth the parameters under which the waivers to sov-
ereign immunity are to be read, the Sovereign Immunity Act spe-
cifically confines the exceptions "within the limits set forth in
[slection 8528 (relating to limitations on damages). ' '7 3 Generally,
section 8528 limits both the amount recoverable7 44 and the type of
damages recoverable..45
In Huda v. Kirk,4 6 the commonwealth court addressed the issue
of whether wrongful death damages were recoverable against a
commonwealth agency under the limitations set forth in section
8528(c). 47 In a panel decision,74 8 the court answered in the nega-
737. See JOINT REPORT, cited at note 145, at 19-20.
738. Article III, section 18 provides in relevant part:
The General Assembly may enact laws requiring the payment by employers, or em-
ployers and employees jointly, of reasonable [workmen's compensation benefits];...
but in no other casbs shall the General Assembly limit the amount to be recovered for
injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons or property ..
PA. CONST. art. III, §18.
This provision has been found to be. inapplicable to suits against the Commonwealth. Lyles,
490 A.2d at 940.
739. PA. CONST. art. III, § 18.
740. JOINT ?REPORT, cited at note 145, at 19-20; see also 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1932(a)
(1984) (statutes or parts of statutes are read in pari materia when they relate to the same
persons or things or to the same class of persons or things); 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1932(b)
(1984) (statutes in pari materia shall be construed together, if possible, as one statute.)
741. JOINT REPORT, cited at note 145, at 19-20, see also PA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
742. JOINT REPORT, cited at note 145, at 19.
743. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522(a) (1990).
744. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8528(b) (1990).
745. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8528(c) (1990).
746. 551 A.2d 637 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) ("Huda II").
747. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8528(c) (1990).
748. Huda v. Kirk, 536 A.2d 513 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988)("Huda r').
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tive.749 After granting reargument, the court en banc concluded
that a limited action for wrongful death can be maintained against
the Commonwealth. 5 °
The facts of the Huda case indicate that Huda was killed and
her two children were injured in an automobile accident. 751 The
plaintiffs attributed some fault to a sight distance deficiency and
alleged that PaDOT was aware of the problem in the area and
failed to correct it. Count I of the complaint, captioned "Wrongful
Death" stated:
34. By reason of the death of the decedent, the said beneficiaries have suf-
fered pecuniary losses, loss of value of the services of the decedent, and loss
of comfort and society of the decedent. Moreover, they have incurred other




PaDOT filed preliminary objections to this complaint, maintain-
ing that as a matter of law wrongful death damages were not recov-
erable against PaDOT.753 Initially, the commonwealth court agreed
with PaDOT's argument, finding that damages for wrongful death
were not recoverable against PaDOT because such damages were
not enumerated in section 8528(c). 4 Upon reconsideration, how-
ever, the commonwealth court en banc concluded that this view "is
not in keeping with the legislative intent as evidenced by
§8528(c) ,
On reconsideration, the commonwealth court focused initially
upon the consortium claim756 and noted that the plaintiffs had
brought both a wrongful death claim and a survival claim.757 These
two claims, according to the court, allowed for two separate recov-
eries: recovery under a wrongful death claim for the losses sus-
tained by individuals as a result of a decedent's death,758 and re-
covery under the survival action for the damages the decedent
749. Huda I, 536 A.2d at 514. The panel determined the lower court was correct when
it concluded " 'that Section 8528(c) clearly is limited in scope to the type of damages prop-
erly recoverable in a survival action, not a wrongful death action.' " Id.
750. Huda H, 551 A.2d at 639.
751. Huda I, 536 A.2d at 513.
752. Id.
753. Id. at 513-14.
754. Id. at 514.
755. Huda H, 551 A.2d at 638.
756. Id.
757. Id.
758. Id. at 638.
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could have recovered had he or she survived. 7"9 The court reviewed
the claims made by plaintiffs in light of the limitations contained
in section 8528(c) and determined that the claims for lost earnings
and pain and suffering were recoverable under the survival action,
while the consortium claim and medical expenses were recoverable
under the wrongful death action.7 16  Because these damages were
recoverable pursuant to the Sovereign Immunity Act and also fell
within the definitions of a survival and wrongful death action, the
court concluded that a limited wrongful death action was
available.76'
In Tulewicz v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Au-
thority,62 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that for ac-
tions brought seeking wrongful death and survival damages, "sepa-
rate damage caps should apply to each cause of action. '763 The
court looked to the beneficiaries of each cause of action, noting
that a wrongful death action compensates the decedent's family
members for their loss, while a survival action compensates for the
monetary losses of the decedent.76 Finally, the court found com-
pelling the fact that although the two actions must be consolidated
for trial (if independently commenced), 765 "a jury must bring in a
separate verdict for each cause of action,"' 66 with damages from
the two being cumulative, not alternative. 7
Significantly, the court's analysis focuses on the "claims" being
brought, rather than the fact that the claims are brought by one
plaintiff. The General Assembly specifically restricted the amount
recoverable under the sovereign immunity exception76 8 by limiting
759. Id.; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8301 (1990).
760. Huda H, 551 A.2d at 639. The court disallowed recovery for funeral expenses,
holding that such expenses were not included in section 8528(c). Id.
761. Huda H, 551 A.2d at 638.
762. 606 A.2d 427 (Pa. 1992).
763. Tulewicz, 606 A.2d at 431.
764. Id.
765. See PA. R. Civ. P. 213(e).
766. Tulewicz, 606 A.2d at 431 (citing Feldman, Pennsylvania Trial Guide, Section
33.6.)
767. Tulewicz, 606 A.2d at 431 (citing Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 26 A.2d 659 (Pa. 1942)).
768. The General Assembly, when drafting the Sovereign Immunity Act and in partic-
ular the limitation on damage provision, specifically considered the Pennsylvania constitu-
tional provision in section 18, article III, prohibiting the General Assembly from limiting the
amount recoverable for injuries resulting in death or for injuries to persons or property. As
to this prohibition, the General Assembly stated:
After careful consideration of the various public policies involved, it was concluded
that the foregoing provision must be read in the light of the "constitutional" prohibi-
tion of suits against the Commonwealth. Therefore, the [General Assembly], under its
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the amount recoverable "in favor of any plaintiff."' 9 The court's
focus, then, should have been on this clear limitation. Instead, the
court disregarded the unambiguous language of the statute "under
the pretext of pursuing its spirit. '770 The court ignored the stat-
ute's language making clear that the General Assembly did not
separate the damage limitation by reference to counts or causes of
action, instead opting for limitations to be based upon the claims
per plaintiff.
77 1
B. Claims for Loss of Consortium
In Kowal v. Commonwealth,72 the commonwealth court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the claim for loss of consortium is
separate and distinct from the claims of the injured spouse, or in-
stead whether such a claim merges with the injured spouse's per-
sonal injury claim. 77 S Here, the court looked to the language of the
Sovereign Immunity Act limiting recoveries against the Common-
wealth to $250,000 for any plaintiff.77 4 The court then noted that
the damages recoverable against the commonwealth agency in-
cluded loss of earnings, pain and suffering, medical expenses and
loss of consortium. 7 ' Notwithstanding the derivative nature of the
consortium claim, the court concluded this did not "alter the unin-
jured spouse's status as a plaintiff in her own right since her dam-
ages, although derivative, are personal to her. 7 7'  Therefore, it
specific constitutional authority to waive the prohibition 'in such manner, in such
courts and in such cases,' may affix any limitations it chooses to its waiver.
JOINT REPORT, cited at note 145, at 19.
The General Assembly also looked to the public policy considerations and practical ramifi-
cations on recovery in any lawsuit against an individual or corporation, noting:
Recovery in most instances is effectively limited by the insurance coverage of the
defendant; where the ultimate recovery exceeds insurance coverage, a further practi-
cal limitation exists to the extent of any defendant's resources. In the case of a sover-
eign with public taxing powers, the absence of a statutory limitation on recovery
would make the liability exposure in each individual case theoretically unlimited.
Id. at 20. The court rejected the argument that a court can employ its power of remittur in
cases where excessive verdicts are reached, concluding "the effect of relying upon judicial
oversight would be to transfer the exclusive authority over the public purse from the Legis-
lature to the judiciary." Id.
769. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8528(b) (1990) (emphasis added).
770. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(b) (1975).
771. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8528(a) (1990).
772. 515 A.2d 116 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986); appeal denied, 524 A.2d 496 (Pa. 1987).
773. Kowal, 515 A.2d at 118.
774. Id.
775. Id.
776. Id. at 119.
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would appear that a claim for loss of consortium is to be viewed as
separate and distinct, permitting the spouse (as a plaintiff) to re-
cover against a commonwealth agency as a separate plaintiff, with
a separate statutory cap for the consortium claim.777 Finally, courts
do not recognize a loss of consortium claim by a child for a parent,
or a parent for a child. 8
C. Delay Damages
In Woods v. Commonwealth, 9 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that damages for delay as permitted by rule 238 of the Penn-
sylvania Rules of Civil Procedure are awardable against a common-
wealth party based upon the jury verdict as rendered, rather than
on the verdict as molded pursuant to the damage limitations pro-
vided in the Act.780 Woods involved claims against PaDOT brought
by a motorcycle operator who was injured after his motorcycle
failed to negotiate a turn and struck a utility pole.781 Woods al-
leged that the accident and injuries were the result of a defectively
designed roadway. 782 A settlement offer by PaDOT of $65,000 was
rejected by the plaintiff and at trial the jury returned a verdict of
1.5 million dollars, which was molded by the trial court to enforce
the Sovereign Immunity Act's $250,000 statutory cap.7es Woods
then filed post-trial motions seeking delay damages78 4 based upon
the jury verdict of 1.5 million dollars.785 The trial court denied the
motion and instead calculated damages based upon the $250,000
777.. However, a wrongful death claim for consortium is not separate. See Linebaugh
v. Lehr, 505 A.2d 303, 305 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) ("We hold, therefore, that a surviving
spouse cannot maintain a separate cause of action for loss of consortium resulting from the
death of a spouse but must instead recover damages for loss of the deceased spouse's society
in an action for wrongful death." Id.).
778. See Schroeder v. Ear, Nose & Throat Ass'n, 557 A.2d 21, 23 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
(refusing to recognize filial consortium and stated that such claims are limited to spouses).
See also Brower v. City of Philadelphia, 557 A.2d 48 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (under Penn-
sylvania law no cause of action exists for loss of consortium to a parent when the adult child
is the injured party); Sprague v. Kaplan, 572 A.2d 789 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (soon-to-be
husband's claim for loss of consortium based on fiance's injury rejected. Despite injury oc-
curring only hours before the wedding ceremony, absence of marriage at time of underlying
injury precludes action for loss of consortium).
779. 612 A.2d 970 (Pa. 1992).
780. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8528(b) (1990).
781. Woods, 612 A.2d at 970.
782. Id.
783. Id.
784. Id. See PA. R. CIv. P. 238.
785. Woods, 612 A.2d at 970.
1993
Duquesne Law Review
molded verdict. 786 The commonwealth court affirmed this ruling. 78 7
The supreme court reversed the commonwealth court, conclud-
ing that delay damages were to be calculated based upon the jury
verdict as rendered. In so holding, the supreme court focused its
analysis on the language and purpose of rule 238.789 The court ini-
tially noted that the rule's express language provides for delay
damages to be added to the "verdict of the jury, "790 rather than
the amount recoverable against a defendant. The supreme court
also considered the purpose of the rule, which was "to both com-
pensate the plaintiff for the delay in receiving his or her recovery
and to encourage settlements. ' 791 The court stated that accepting
the commonwealth party's position would frustrate the purpose of
the rule.792
The court's determination that rule 238(a)(1) clearly and unam-
biguously indicates that the delay damages are to be calculated
based upon the jury verdict is incorrect. Rather, this section
provides:
(a)(1) At the request of the plaintiff in a civil action seeking monetary relief
for bodily injury, death or property damage, damages for delay shall be
added to the amount of compensatory damages awarded against each de-
fendant or additional defendant found to be liable to the plaintiff in the
verdict of a jury, in the decision of the court in a nonjury trial or in the
award of arbitrators appointed under Section 7361 of the Judicial Code, 42
Pa. C. S. §7361, and shall become part of the verdict, decision or award. "'
Contrary to the analysis of the supreme court, the phrase "ver-
dict of a jury" does not relate to the calculation of delay damage,
but instead to the application of delay damages. In short, if a de-
fendant is "found to be liable to the plaintiff in the verdict of a
jury," delay damages apply. This does not require calculation to
be based on the verdict, especially since the rule states the dam-
ages are to "become part of the verdict, decision or award."794
The proper delay damage calculation should consider the inter-
786. Id. Damages for delay based upon the $250,000 molded verdict totalled
$103,731.15. The damages for delay based upon the jury verdict as rendered were calculated
to be $622,386.95. Id.
787. Id. at 970-71. The commonwealth court's affirmance was based upon its opinion
in Kowal.
788. Woods, 612 A.2d at 971.
789. Id. at 971-72.
790. Id. at 972.
791. Id.
792. Id.
793. PA. R. Civ. P. 238(a)(1) (emphasis added).
794. Id. (emphasis added).
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play of rule 238 with the provisions of the Sovereign Immunity
Act 79 and the constitutional provisions setting forth the General
Assembly's authority over suits against commonwealth parties.
7 96
The supreme court's rule making authority authorizes the court to
"prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and the con-
duct of all courts . . . ., ,7 provided that the rules "are consistent
with [the] Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify
the substantive rights of any litigant,....798
Furthermore, the court's holding in Woods fails to account for
the conflict between the specific constitutional basis for the adop-
tion of sovereign immunity and the general right of the supreme
court to prescribe court rules and regulations. Article I, section 11
of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides the basis for the Gen-
eral Assembly's adoption of sovereign immunity.7 99 The conflict be-
tween this specific constitutional provision and the general right of
the supreme court to prescribe rules and procedures applicable to
the conduct of the courts was addressed in the context of venue
regulations for sovereign immunity actions. There, the Joint State
Government Commission stated:
Again, these venue limitations, normally within the purview of the Supreme
Court's rule making powers under Article V, section 10(c), are specifically
authorized pursuant to Article I, section 11, insofar as it provides for legisla-
tive determination of the "manner" and "court" in which such suits are
brought. Accordingly, Article I, Section 11, constitutes a specific constitu-
tional exception to the general authority of Article V, section 10(c), vesting
in the Supreme Court the power to establish "general rules governing prac-
tice"; the latter power being specifically limited to the promulgation of such
rules as "are consistent with this Constitution. '"8 °0
It has long been recognized that where specific and general consti-
tutional provisions are in conflict, and the specific provision is
clearly applicable to a case, the specific provision will prevail. °
Therefore, the limitations set forth in article I, section 11 of the
795. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8521-8528 (1990 & Supp. 1992); 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2310
(Supp. 1992).
796. PA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
797. PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c).
798. Id.
799. Seel PA. CONS. STAT. § 2310 (Supp. 1992) (reaffirming sovereign immunity).
800. JOINT REPORT, cited at note 145, at 22-23.
801. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1933 (1975); see also Philadelphia County v. Commonwealth,
113 A. 661, 662 (Pa. 1921) ("It is well established that, where a conflict exists between a
specific constitutional provision, which is unquestionably applicable to a particular case, and
certain general provisions, which, were it not for such conflict, might apply, the specific
provision will prevail." Id.)
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Pennsylvania Constitution, including the damage limitations pre-
scribed by the General Assembly, 802 prevail. At most, then, "the
only reasonable course is to calculate delay damages under rule 238
on the award-the statutory maximum-of $250,000, rather than
the legally impermissible jury verdict of $1.5 million.
80 3
VII. CONCLUSION
Since its adoption in the Commonwealth, sovereign immunity
has followed a tortured historical path. The doctrine was originally
accepted as a carry-over from British law and in 1851 formally her-
alded as the law of the Commonwealth. In adopting this legal con-
cept, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court viewed the rule to be inher-
ent in the concept of a state body, requiring neither legislative nor
constitutional enactment. Notwithstanding this pronouncement,
the doctrine did evolve constitutional roots, finding a home in arti-
cle I, section 11. Despite the apparent constitutional foundation for
the doctrine, the courts did not regularly utilize this authority as a
basis for asserting immunity as a bar to claims against the state
until 1963.
. As the jurisprudential pendulum began to swing away from the
general concepts of immunity, sovereign immunity remained firmly
entrenched, presumably the result of the court-determined consti-
tutional foundation and the belief that immunity protected the
public coffers. Nevertheless, court decisions professed increasing
impatience with the legislature's failure to address the apparent
and obvious inequities of the sovereign's absolute immunity.
In 1978, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared the constitu-
tional foundation for sovereign immunity to be nonexistent, con-
cluding instead that the concept was founded upon common-law
principles wholly within the court's power to alter. Following the
court's abrogation of sovereign immunity, the legislature quickly
intervened with the statutory reaffirmation of sovereign immunity.
Also in 1978, the absolute immunity enjoyed by commonwealth
parties ended with the promulgation of the Sovereign Immunity
Act, now containing nine exceptions to immunity.
The legislative history of the Sovereign Immunity Act indicates
that the General Assembly's greatest concerns with the adoption of
the immunity waivers focused on economic, not legal, factors. Con-
sequently, the law was drafted with immunity being the rule, and
802. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8528 (1990).
803. Woods, 612 A.2d at 973 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
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the waivers being the exceptions. The legislature sought to strike a
balance to the immunity rule with the adoption of immunity waiv-
ers, intending to provide relief in certain enumerated situations
from the harsh rule of immunity, while continuing to maintain the
integrity of the state treasury.
The immunity waivers fall into two basic categories. Included in
the first category are the waivers for vehicle liability, personal
property, real estate, natural conditions and claims regarding ani-
mals in the custody of a commonwealth party. These waivers deal
with situations wherein the commonwealth activity generates sub-
stantial risk to the general public. Consequently, the courts should
focus on determining whether a claim in any of these areas has as
its basis a specific activity of the commonwealth party. For exam-
ple, under the vehicle liability exception, the focus is on the opera-
tion of the vehicle. Since the commonwealth party has no direct
control of how a person exits or enters a vehicle, no liability at-
taches for claims dealing with these activities. However, the com-
monwealth party does have direct control over the manner of vehi-
cle operation or, for that matter, the operation of the vehicle doors.
Because of this control, claims dealing with such activities fall
within the waiver.
In determining whether a cause of action falls within one of the
immunity waivers found in the first category, the court must focus
on whether there is a legal nexus between the injury and the com-
monwealth party activity. It is clear from the legislative history
and explanatory notes that the General Assembly, in promulgating
the "category one" waivers, was permitting actions to be brought
in situations where the commonwealth party or property was di-
rectly involved in the chain of causation leading to the accident.
Conversely, the General Assembly wanted to preserve immunity
for claims brought solely because of some indirect involvement of
the commonwealth party. This direct legal nexus between the in-
jury and the commonwealth party or personalty should be the fo-
cus of any court analysis in this area.
The second category of waivers includes the remaining excep-
tions. These waivers deal more directly with defined subjects such
as medical professional liability, liquor store sales, military activi-
ties and claims concerning toxoids and vaccines, and hold the com-
monwealth party engaged in such activity liable in a manner simi-
lar to other persons engaged in like activities. Therefore, the
second category of waivers is more corrective in nature, and the
analysis here is not as focused as that for the first category, but
1993
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more in line with the general body of law dealing with these
subjects.
The legislative reaffirmation of sovereign immunity and the
adoption of the Sovereign Immunity Act require courts to strictly
construe immunity waivers as the exceptions to the general rule.
This strict construction applies not only to the waivers set forth,
but also to other provisions of the Act, including the damage and
venue limitations listed. It is recognized that such a strict con-
struction will at times result in a lack of compensation for injuries
incurred as a result of tortious conduct. However, the adoption of
the immunity, by its very nature, creates this inequity. Because of
the General Assembly's 1978 reaffirmation of sovereign immunity,
the General Assembly now has the sole power to alter or amend
the Act. The role of the courts is limited to properly interpreting
the statute and the interpretation should be guided by the provi-
sions of the Statutory Construction Act.
